Ch 32 - The Russo-Japanese War

A Winter of Discontent

The final defeat of the Russian army at the Battle of Mukden marked the end of the land war in Manchuria.

Ten of the Russian generals and admirals responsible for the defense of Port Arthur were court-martialed following General Stoessel's surrender to the Japanese. A Russian government commission created to look into the reasons behind Port Arthur's capitulation found that,

... the surrender of Port Arthur could not be justified by the situation on the attacked fronts at that time, by the garrison not being large enough, by the health or morale of the troops, or by a shortage of ammunition and provisions. The conditions of the capitulation and its execution were very severe and insulted the honor of the army the dignity of Russia.

During the winter months of 1904-05, General Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, commander-in-chief of Russia's Manchurian Army, continued to strengthen his forces around Mukden (modern Shenyang) with large numbers of fresh reinforcements from Russia. He had little anticipation of any serious fighting after the onset of winter and believed that Port Arthur would likely hold out until the spring. By then, he expected to build his forces into three formidable armies with which he could resume the offensive. According to Lord Brooke, a Reuter's correspondent traveling with the Russian army, approximately 85,000 reservists had arrived by mid-December and more were arriving from European Russia in "an endless stream." It was estimated at the time that General Aleksei Kuropatkin's total troop strength had reached about 400,000 men, supported by nearly 2,000 artillery pieces.

The Russian and Japanese armies settled into "winter quarters" after the Battle of the Sha Ho River as frigid winter weather tightened its grip on the Manchurian plain. The opposing forces faced each other along a sixty to seventy mile front. They were so close in some locations that Russian troops could easily see the cigarette smoke from off-duty Japanese guards. The Russian lines stretched some 47 miles south of Mukden from the village of Hunhe in the southwest, around the north side of the Putilov and Novgorod hills on the Sha-ho River, and on toward Fushun in the east. Cavalry General Baron Aleksandr Vasilevich Kaulbars' 2nd Army anchored the right flank, General of Cavalry Baron A. A. Bilderling's 3rd Manchurian Army held the center and General Linievitch's 1st Manchurian Army held the left. General Kuropatkin held his reserve force in Mukden.

The Japanese Imperial Army established itself along the southern extent of the front over a distance of some 40 miles. Positioned from left to right were General Oku Yasukat's 2nd Army, Lieutenant General Nozu Michitsura's 4th Army, General Kuroki Tamemoto's 1st Army and General Kawamura Kageaki's 5th Army. The Japanese general reserve sat behind the center of the front line north of Liaoyang. Kuropatkin and his generals knew that General Nogi Maresuke's 3rd Army had been released from action at Port Arthur and was advancing from the upper Yalu through the mountains towards the Russian left rear. General Kawamura's 5th Army included a single division from the Port Arthur force and two reserve divisions. The 3rd Army, after arriving in theater, took up a position behind General Oku's 2nd Army.

Behind the front lines, the Russians linked their units together by telephone, telegraph and light rail. Their posture appeared to be more for defending Mukden than for launching a powerful counterattack against the Japanese. The Japanese did much the same, but with a difference. They built three equally strong lines of defense, each within easy reach of the front lines. Should the Russians breach the first line, they would encounter a second line just as strong as the first. The third line would present the same formidable obstacle.

Still holding to the belief that the Japanese were no match for Russian troops in a winter campaign, beginning in early January 1905, St. Petersburg urged General Kuropatkin to take the initiative against the Japanese and not to miss a single opportunity to earn a victory for Russia. Field Marshall Oyama Iwao and his field commanders thought that no major winter battles would be possible under such harsh winter conditions and assumed the Russians felt the same.

For his upcoming spring campaign, Kuropatkin had to find a vulnerable opening in the Japanese lines, which he believed existed in the area between the Hun and Liao Rivers southwest of Mukden along Field Marshal Oyama's left flank. In early January, he ordered a raid into the area which confirmed that Japanese defenses were light. Events beyond his control soon changed Kuropatkin's plans and timing. The surprising loss of Port Arthur forced Kuropatkin to consider attacking well before spring, since further delays would allow General Nogi's 3rd Army to reach the lines and reduce his numerical advantage.

In a number of senior staff meetings held in January, General Aleksei Kuropatkin spoke only of the grand strategy involved in defeating the Japanese, not the details. It became evident to a number of commanders, particularly Major General Mikhail Vasilevich Alekseev, Quartermaster-General of the 3rd Manchurian Army, that Russia's commander-in-chief was putting virtually all his faith in the sheer size of his army. Russia's Manchurian Army certainly outnumbered the Japanese, but it proved not to be the advantage General Kuropatkin expected.

The nearly year-long war caused serious repercussions in Russia, including rampant inflation and transportation problems. The Japanese victories at sea and in Manchuria totally discredited the corrupt and inefficient government in the eyes of the Russian people. As the war continued, the discontent only increased. In July 1904, shortly after the Russian defeat at the Battle of the Yalu River, revolutionary terrorists assassinated the unpopular Minister of the Interior, Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Pleve. The crushing defeat at Port Arthur pushed labor unrest near the breaking point.

On January 22, 1905, a Russian priest,one of the organizers of the pro-government trade unions, led a small group of workers to Tsar Nicholas II's Winter Palace to present a petition with 135,000 signatures demanding political and economic reforms. Also in the petition was the demand to immediately end the war with Japan. The workers were followed into the square in front of the palace by a generally peaceful, orderly crowd estimated at about 150,000 people carrying portraits of the Tsar and icons of the Russian Orthodox saints. The Russians still held to the belief they were the tsar's children and that he would surely grant their reforms to lessen the workers' discontent. The Winter Palace Guards suddenly opened fire on the crowd, killing hundreds and wounding hundreds more. The slaughter on "Bloody Sunday" did more than kill a few hundred people. It killed the Russian's age-old faith in the Tsar as the great guardian of his people.

The government in St. Petersburg became desperate. With the entire country about to erupt, they ceased urging Kuropatkin to act and deliberately ordered him to save the situation at home immediately, either with a dramatic victory or a desperate failure. Either way, do something. Kuropatkin ordered a push into the Japanese lines at the one vulnerable spot he knew about on Field Marshal Oyama's left flank.

The key to this sector was the small village of Sandepu, which sat on a broad, flat, snow-covered plain about 36 miles southwest of Mukden. Sandepu was just one of a number of small villages scattered about 2 miles apart amidst a collection of family farms. Each farmhouse was surrounded by high, 3-foot thick walls made from sun-dried bricks plastered with a mixture of dirt and chopped straw. The low, single-story houses and farm buildings also had thick walls made like the outer compound walls. Except for the villages, the surrounding terrain was very flat and wide open with a few low sandy hills.

On the night of January 23, the Russian 2nd Army, including the 8th and 10th Corps plus General Stackleberg's 1st Siberian Army Corps, concentrated about five miles behind the Russian front lines, some twenty-five miles southwest of Mukden. General Oskar Kazimirovich Grippenberg, the stubborn Swedish general who replaced General Kaulbars as commander of the Russian 2nd Army, understood that breaking the Japanese left flank where it jutted northward into the Russian front was the key to success. General Grippenberg moved his 2nd Army south across the frozen Hun River and on the morning of January 25 had his brigades positioned for an attack against a cluster of Japanese fortified positions. At daybreak, troops of General Stackleberg's 1st Siberian Army Corps found themselves within one mile of Japanese-held villages.

The snowstorm, which had begun on January 22, turned into a near blizzard. Between January 24 and January 28, frigid gale-force winds swept the Manchurian plain, driving temperatures to near zero. The sweeping Russian attack across fields of unmarked snow caught the Japanese forces "hibernating" in winter quarters by complete surprised. Their command chain lost coherence, and some forces fell into helpless chaos falling back to entrenched positions in the villages. The Russians, who held a roughly seven-to-four advantage in troop strength, made the most of their surprise attack and forcefully pushed the uncoordinated Japanese forces back through village after village. Russian spirits were high as they rolled up the Japanese left flank throughout the morning.

Flushed with success, the Russians rolled up the Japanese left flank, but soon found themselves caught in a semicircle of heavy and accurate artillery fire. The scattered Japanese troops broke into small groups of individual soldiers who struck back fiercely and instinctively against the enemies in front of them. For the first time, Russian field commanders realized they were advancing into the rear of the Japanese front defensive line. Unaware of the second line of defense, they had charged into a position between two parallel, heavily defended lines and, without accurate intelligence or maneuvering room, found themselves in a trap. After the Russians pushed to within striking distance of the walled villages of Sandepu and Hei-ku-tai, which anchored the Japanese left flank, General Oku's 2nd Army finally brought the Russian advance to a sudden halt.

Around noon on January 25, 3rd Army's chief of artillery began getting requests from the 10th Corps commander on the Russian right asking for artillery support. The requests were totally unexpected, since the 10th was scheduled to attack in unison with the 2nd Army, not on its own, and a lengthy and heavy artillery bombardment was to have preceded the assault. Kuropatkin seemed unperturbed at first and calmly replied that nothing was going to happen. He sent orders to General Grippenberg not to do anything other than attack the Sandepu area.

With the Russians pinned down, the Japanese hurriedly reinforced their left flank with reserves marched up from the Liaoyang area, who got into position by the morning of January 26. The longer the Russians held their fixed positions, the more time they gave Field Marshall Iwao to strengthen his position for a counterattack. Telegrams and telephone messages began to fly among the Russian commanders, even bypassing those directly in charge of the fighting. The lack of coordination and direct command from Kuropatkin revealed that he was not really the masterful military commander who "directs and controls" his army, but a man who did not understand that it was character, not sheer numbers, that led to victory on the battlefield.

Throughout the day on January 26, General Stackelberg's divisions fought not only the Japanese, but the bitterly cold arctic snowstorm that swept the plain. Due to poor intelligence, the Russians never realized that the Japanese had fortified Sandepu until they reached the village. General Grippenberg's 2nd Army suffered nearly 7,500 casualties trying to take it and the cost was rising by the hour. The Russian attack evolved slowly and was drawn out due to poor coordination backed with insufficient intelligence on the enemy's actual situation. This gave the Japanese time to wait for reinforcements and continue to fortify their positions.

On the night of January 27, General Grippenberg issued a categorical statement that Sandepu had been taken. Not exactly. The next morning, reports from a number of officers serving in supporting divisions started painting a different picture. The core of the village had been turned\ into an extremely strong, "sprawling fortress" which remained in Japanese control. Unless Sandepu could be captured, nothing at all would be achieved. The lack of skill, training and coordination among the Russian troops and commanders became a deadly handicap. Grippenberg was fighting a losing battle without support from either General Bilderling's 3rd Manchurian Army or Linievitch's 1st Manchurian Army.

Had the Russians mounted a full frontal assault all along the line, things may have turned out differently, but they did not. After a lengthy staff meeting on the night of January 29, General Aleksei Kuropatkin decided not to expend any further effort to take Sandepu. He called off the attack and ordered General Grippenberg to withdraw to positions held by his troops on January 24. The sudden order to stop attacking stunned the advancing Russian troops, whose morale was extremely high because they believed they were winning. They could not understand the reason for it. The explanation was the continued lack of persistence and resolve among Russian commanders. Grippenberg wanted to win and fought with a grim determination. Kuropatkin, who never used a single soldier from his "strategic reserve" in Mukden, did not want to lose. The two attitudes were incompatible.

At 9:00 a.m. on the morning of January 29, a mass of half-demented Japanese infantrymen climbed to the highest gable in Sandepu and planted the Japanese flag. Once the 2nd Manchurian Army began its withdrawal, Field Marshall Iwao sent 30,000 fresh reserves after them in hot pursuit, driving the defeated rabble back across the frozen Hun River.

The clash of opinions on how to conduct the war finally came to a head. As soon as the 2nd Army had retired across the Hun River, 67-year old General Grippenberg gave a major farewell speech to his troops, then went to Mukden, where he literally tossed his resignation in General Kuropatkin's face. He then submitted a lengthy telegram to Tsar Nicholas II and boarded a specially requisitioned train for St. Petersburg. A basic difference in outlooks, limited independence, a resistance to being patronized, and an unwillingness to become a plaything in someone else's hands compelled Grippenberg to send a telegram to the tsar asking to be relieved of command.

Ironically, the Battle of Sandepu was yet another Russian defeat caused by General Kuropatkin's lack of grit, but it was the hard-fighting Grippenberg who had to leave. If the Russian leaders, particularly Kuropatkin and his successor, had a firm resolve to execute the plan, the Russians could have smashed the Japanese. But they did not. Unlike Japanese leaders, their resolve was weak, and this weakness itself led the nation and its army to failure in the Russo-Japanese War. While it's true that failure would not lead to the collapse of Mother Russia, Russian leaders, for the most part, considered the war an "affair in the distant Far East." The Japanese however, saw the war as a matter of life or death for Japan. This fatal flaw in Russian leadership, as much as anything else, saved Japan, particularly the Japanese Imperial Army.

The close proximity of the Russian and Japanese troops to each other gave a distinct advantage to the side that struck first. Both sides were well-entrenched and backed with hundreds of artillery pieces. Field Marshall Oyama seized the advantage on the evening of February 22 by maneuvering the 5th Army into position to strike the Russian eastern flank. On the morning of February 23, under a heavy snowfall, General Kawamura pushed to within 1,000 yards of the Russian lines. The next day, he launched a strong assault against General Linievitch's 1st Manchurian Army between Mukden and Fushun and pushed the Russians back. Just four days into the fighting, on February 27, Field Marshall Iwao committed his armies to a major assault along a nearly 50 mile front. General Kuroki Tamemoto's 1st Army attacked just east of Mukden while General Nogi Maresuke's 3rd Army flanked the Russians on the west. The growing Japanese pressure drew a sizeable portion of the Russian army eastward to protect its left flank.

Added pressure from General Nozu Michitsura's 4th Army on the Russian right flank, forced both ends of the Russian defensive line to curve backwards in three days of bitter fighting. It soon became apparent to the Russians that the two Japanese flanking armies intended to encircle Mukden. The Russians began a general retreat in a series of hard-fought rearguard actions which soon deteriorated in a total collapse. As it turned out, the confusion was more rampant among the Russians. On March 10, 1905, after three weeks of bloody combat, Kuropatkin decided to withdraw to the north of Mukden. The retreating Russian 2nd and 3rd Manchuria Armys disintegrated as fighting units, but the Japanese failed to destroy them completely.

At the Battle of Mukden, the Russians fielded an army of some 330,000 men against a Japanese force of nearly 270,000 in the largest military engagement in any war of the nineteenth century, including the American Civil War. Neither General Aleksei Kuropatkin nor Field Marshal Iwao showed much confidence in managing such large forces. Reports from the battles at Port Arthur and Mukden clearly demonstrated the lethality of modern warfare and foreshadowed the combined effects of hand grenades, mortars, machine guns, and field artillery in World War I. In the two weeks of fighting, an estimated 53,000 Russian troops were either killed or wounded with another 40,000 taken prisoner. The Japanese lost an estimated 41,000 killed and wounded with about 34,000 taken prisoner.

The Japanese Imperial Army thoroughly spent its energy at the Battle of Mukden and the consensus opinion from the lowest to the highest ranks in the field and among the leadership in Tokyo was that there was little hope Japan could recover quickly from this state of exhaustion. The lack of combat-ready reserves, ammunition and supplies left the Japanese without the capacity to hit and sweep away the retreating Russians. Despite driving the Russians north and seizing the Manchurian capital city, they knew they could not continue the fight. They knew they were losing the chance of a lifetime, but could only watch as the helpless Russian units escaped to the north.

The abandonment of Mukden was seen as a major defeat not only in Russia, but around the world. General Kuropatkin failed to recover the strategic initiative and his failure to drive the Japanese back, combined with his heavy loses, further lowered Russian morale. The quarrelling, uncoordinated and, at times, incompetent leadership contributed greatly to the Russian failure. In the end however, it seems to have been an almost characteristic of Russia's senior officer corps that it could never quite discover a way to escape from the defensive attitude it developed almost of its own free will.

Without reinforcements and a major reorganization, it was now clear there could be no Russian victory in Manchuria. Worse, the revolutionary fervor building in Russia hampered any decisions on the issue. The government in St Petersburg could not or would not commit to seek peace so long as there was any hope the 2nd Far East Squadron from the Baltic could bring a much needed Russian victory.