Ch 31 - Prelude to War

Caught in the Middle

In the wake of the Boxer Uprising in China, Russian and Japanese East Asian policy differences came into sharp conflict over the status of Manchuria and the future independence and neutrality of Korea.

By the turn of the century, both China and Korea had lost the ability to effectively direct their own fate. China survived not because of anything it did for itself, but because no single European Power dared to take the whole of it. As a result, because none of the Great Powers could agree on any principle of division that would be mutually satisfying, no one got anything. No one that is, except the Russians. While peace had been restored between China and the Allies, the nagging question of the Russian occupation of Manchuria still hung like an ominous cloud over East Asia, a question that had yet to be resolved.

Faced with economic and financial problems at home and a weak military presence in the Far East, Russian policy makers could not reach a consensus on a unified East Asian policy. On one side of the debate were men like Finance Minister Count Sergei Iul'evich Witte and his followers who wanted Russia to adopt a moderate, "peaceful" policy that would allow Russia to extend its economic hegemony over Korea and all of East Asia. The military insisted on taking and holding strategic bases in the region. Russia's provincial governors were contemptuous of the Japanese army and not in a conciliatory mood, a view shared by Tsar Nicholas II. Expansionists in St. Petersburg urged that Russia take advantage of the confusion caused by the Boxer Uprising in China to improve its position in both Manchuria and Korea.

Unlike the Russians, the Japanese held a clear vision for their East Asian policy, one based on the desire to ensure their political and economic hegemony over the Korean peninsula. As early as 1900, Japanese diplomats pursued this goal by trying to use the Boxer Uprising in China to Japan's advantage. They subtly let it be known among Western diplomats that they considered China's Boxers and Korea's so-called Righteous Armies to be groups cut from the same bolt of cloth and that Japanese military action would be required if it appeared that any such anti-foreigner movement took hold along the Korean-Manchurian border.

Emperor Kojong, who followed events in China during the Boxer Uprising, feared that a similar introduction of foreign troops on Korean soil would leave Korea in the same position as Qing China. To avoid this fate and to check further Japanese efforts to subjugate Korea, Kojong attempted to formulate a policy of Korean neutrality. The emperor's strategy was to induce the great powers to reach a balance of power regarding Korea, so that no one of them could attempt to swallow Korea entirely. He mistakenly believed however, that rivalries among the major players in the region would allow Korean independence, even though Korea's own defense capability could not guarantee it.

Russia's Foreign Ministry agreed that Korean neutrality would be a good way to keep the Japanese in check and ordered chargé d'affaires Aleksandr Pavlov to Seoul to start negotiations with the Korean government under the pretext that Russia would intervene to protect Korea's neutrality. Pavlov informed Emperor Kojong that if he should ever officially announce Korea's neutral status, he should ask for Russian support to get his position accepted by the rest of the international community. The Korean government delayed giving a response to Pavlov, due in part to Japan's negative attitude toward the idea of a neutral Korea.

At about the same time, Russia's Foreign Ministry instructed its minister to Japan, Aleksander Izvolskii, to begin talks with the Japanese government regarding the neutralization of Korea under Russian and Japanese guarantees according to each country's sphere of influence. Count Chinda Sutemi, Japan's Minister to St. Petersburg, bypassed Izvolskii and replied directly to the Russian government that so long as Russian troops remained in Manchuria, Japan would not even consider discussing the possibility of a neutral Korea. The Russians however, regarded Manchuria's status as an issue of concern only between St. Petersburg and the Chinese government. By effectively linking the Korean situation with Russia's presence in Manchuria, the Japanese hoped to unmask Russia's intentions. This linkage also made the Korean problem even more sensitive and its solution far more difficult to reach.

In 1900, Russia attempted to lease land in the Korean port of Masan west of Pusan, with the intent of constructing a naval base there. Although this attempt to establish a sea link between Port Arthur and Vladivostok was eventually frustrated by the British and Japanese, the boldness of the attempt generated a good deal of concern in Japan. The Russians already maintained a large military force in Manchuria and the Japanese believed that Russian control of Korea would give them far more freedom of action throughtout East Asia. Worse, a Russian-dominated Korea would pose a serious threat to Japan's security and seriously jeopardize its very independence.

In considering its options, the Japanese government decided that an attempt to expel Russia from Manchuria by force was a practical impossibility, since Japan's military was too small to challenge the Russians. Given Japan's deep hostility towards Russia, it's somewhat surprising that the government decided to resolve the difficult situation through a diplomatic treaty or agreement in which Japan would accept Russian seizure of Manchuria if Russia accepted Japanese control over Korea. Heated debates arose within the Japanese government, yet no conclusion was reached.

In late April 1900, Aleksandr Pavlov traveled to Tokyo to meet with Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi to discuss the situation in Korea. Ito sidestepped the issue of Korean neutrality by saying the Japanese government would prefer a new Russo-Japanese agreement that divided Korea into separate Russian and Japanese spheres of influence. The talks abruptly ended in June when Ito was replaced as Prime Minister by former War Minister Katsura Taro, who favored a more aggressive stance towards Korea.

Russian Finance Minister Count Sergei Iul'evich Witte, who involved himself in nearly every aspect of Russian foreign affairs, devised and conducted Russia's Korean neutralization policy as a temporary tactic to keep Japan from "getting into Korea" while Russian troops were occupied defeating the Boxers in Manchuria. He believed the expense of maintaining its position in Korea would handicap Japan and make it more susceptible to Russian pressure. Once the Trans Siberian Railroad was completed, Russia could always take possession of Korea if need be. Witte's Korean policy was little more than a temporary accommodation with Japan that would give Russia time to prepare for a more permanent solution.

At this point, Korea had become little more than the playing field for an international sporting match. The Korean government could do nothing to free itself from becoming entangled in the intensifying Russo-Japanese rivalry, nor could it use either of them to ensure the country's continued independence. Emperor Kojong and his court labored under the misplaced expectations that the United States supported Korea's independence and neutrality and would use its "good offices" to mediate the growing dispute. The United States government however, had consistently maintained a non-committal stance with regards to Korea. Following the inauguration of President Theodore Roosevelt in January 1901, Washington began actively supporting Japanese diplomacy in Asia because it concluded that Japan was actually "playing America's game" in keeping the open door in Manchuria.

By the spring of 1901, the growing conflict and mutual distrust between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian and Korean questions began to raise fears of an impending war. Finance Minister Witte's primary concern remained to avoid a war with Japan. He felt the best way to solve the Manchurian problem was to renounce any political intentions in Manchuria and limit Russian interests there to the protecting the Chinese Eastern Railway as a private company. As for Korea, if the Japanese demanded the annexation of the peninsula, Witte believed the proper response would be to open the issue to international discussion rather than treat it as a cause for war.

In July, after the Foreign Ministry accepted Witte's ideas for a three-stage evacuation of Manchuria, with some reservations, Witte approached Japanese Minister Chinda Sutemi, unofficially, and suggested a conditional arrangement regarding the critical Korean issue. Witte told Chinda that Russia would agree to a neutral Korea and allow Japan the right to provide the Korean government with financial and administrative advisors. In exchange, Japan would officially recognize Russia's dominance in Manchuria. Chinda's main concern however, was Korea. The Japanese saw keeping Russia out of Korea as a matter of life and death and would not agree to any Russian proposal regarding Korea's status until Manchuria's future status was decisively settled.

The Japanese had their own designs on the Asian continent. They felt that if China was going to fall to a great power, it would be safer and far more desirable that it fall to Japan. Although militant and militaristic, Japan did not feel ready to oppose Russian expansion directly by force, nor strong enough to challenge all the Western powers. As an alternative, Japanese leaders sought to strike a bargain with one or more Western powers that would leave Japan free to face the others.

The Japanese government resolved to spare no expense to block Russian expansion, but the ruling group in Tokyo could not decide on the best way to do it. One group wanted to reach a settlement with Russia that sought to divide the spoils in Asia. Prime Minister Katsura Taro's war party however, urged the formation of an alliance with the British, whom they believed had similar interests in the region. In view of their past experiences, the Japanese were not at all sure that either aim could be achieved. Nevertheless, Prince Ito Hirobumi was ordered to St. Petersburg in November 1901, ostensibly to explore the potential for an agreement with Russia on creating a neutral Korea. Meanwhile, Ambassador Baron Hayashi Tadasu began sounding out the British government in London.

Ito Hirobumi found the Russians to be uncompromising and no amount of politeness could conceal the fact that the aims of a number of prominent Russians were incompatible with Japanese interests. Ito was fully prepared to concede Russia a free hand in Manchuria in exchange for the same freedom of action for Japan in Korea, but Russia wanted both Manchuria and Korea. The talks made little progress.

It soon became apparent that the two parties interpreted the Nishi-Rosen agreement differently. The Japanese government thought the agreement had placed Korea at its disposal. The Russians had no intention of leaving Korea completely to Japan. Prince Ito continued to negotiate the issue and reported back to Tokyo that a Russo-Japanese agreement was within the realm of possibility. The Japanese government meanwhile, accelerated the military buildup which began after the Triple Intervention in 1895. The Diet agreed to an ambitious plan to increase the size of the Imperial Army from seven divisions to thirteen. The buildup also called for 104 new ships, including four battleships and eleven armored cruisers, to be completed between 1896 and 1905.

After lengthy negotiations with Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamsdorff, Prince Ito Hirobumi submitted a draft agreement on November 30, 1901, that proposed a joint Russo-Japanese guarantee of Korean independence. Both countries would agree not to use the Korean peninsula for strategic purposes and would avoid constructing any military facilities along Korea's coast which could threaten free passage through the Korea Straits. In addition, Russia would recognize Japan's freedom to act on its political, commercial and industrial interests in Korea and its exclusive right to provide military assistance to suppress civil disturbances in Korea when necessary.

Russia did not take Minister Chinda's earlier rejection of Russian proposals to mean a breakdown in negotiations. Finance Minister Sergei Witte, in reviewing the Russian counter-proposal, expressed his opinion that more emphasis should be placed on reaching a new agreement with Japan, stating that such an agreement would give Russia time to finish building the Manchurian Railway, carry out a massive migration to the Far East and complete a defensive build-up at Vladivostok and Port Arthur. He felt Russia risked being forced into a war with Japan if such an agreement could not be reached peacefully. In a letter to Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, Witte pointed out that the Russian people would not support a war with Japan over Korea, which would greatly increase international opposition to Russia's Far East policies.

In December 1901, while Russia and China debated the question of a military retreat from Manchuria, Sergei Witte met with Prince Ito to suggest more specific terms for Korean neutrality. Witte accepted the Japanese demands with respect to Korea, but would allow Japanese military assistance in Korea only after reaching a negotiated agreement with Russia. In return, Russia was to be left with a free hand in Manchuria and Japan had to recognize Russia's preponderant rights in all Chinese territory along Russia's border. On December 23, 1901, Prince Ito announced that he had reported to Tokyo that the Russian proposal was not worth negotiating and soon afterward left St. Petersburg for Berlin. It appears that Prince Ito had no interest in any Russian proposal regarding Korea or Manchuria. His mission was essentially a delaying tactic that allowed Prime Minister Katsura to gain more negotiating leverage with Great Britain.

Coincidental with the Japanese search for an ally against Russia, the British were also actively searching for allies. After three years of fruitless talks with the Germans, an earlier bid for a British-German-Japanese alliance to check the Russians fell apart when the Kaiser refused to challenge the Tsar over Manchuria. Complicating matters, the French strongly opposed the conclusion of any formal understanding between Russia and Germany. America's isolation policy ruled out any hope of a British-American-Japanese alliance.

The British realized they could no longer remain aloof and go it alone no matter what developed, but they remained uncertain about whom they would or should join. Harassed and threatened by Russia at points all across the Eurasian land mass and facing a high-spirited and demanding Germany, the British began to understand that isolation was no longer a workable alternative. Thinking mainly in global terms, they wished above all else to preclude any settlement between St Petersburg and Tokyo that might free Russia to advance in Asia or anywhere else in the world for that matter.

In contrast to Prince Ito's efforts in St Petersburg, Ambassador Hayashi's negotiations in London went smoothly. From the Japanese perspective, Hayashi found the British not only willing participants in negotiations, but quite hospitable to Japanese suggestions. The failure of renewed British overtures to Russia convinced Britain's Ambassador Lansdowne of the need for Japan's support. Great Britain soon found Japan to be an agreeable and potentially useful partner that could check Russian ambitions in Asia. The Japanese realized they could not have agreements with both nations and they were reluctant to alienate England. The British had not only abstained from interfering with their victory at Shimonoseki, but they had been the first Western Power to renounce extraterritoriality in Japan. In December 1901, Tokyo's Imperial Council concluded it was hopeless to strike a deal with Russia and decided that it was better to conclude an arrangement with the British.

On January 30, 1902, representatives from Great Britain and Japan signed the formal text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, an agreement that joined the two nations in an alliance that would last a minimum of five years. This was the first truly equal alliance between a Western nation and a non-Western nation. It was a unique and important document in terms of its effect on East Asia, particularly with respect to Korea. Both parties agreed to maintain an allegiance to the independence of China and Korea and support the precepts of the Open Door Policy in East Asia.

Specifically, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance acknowledged that Great Britain held special interests in China, while Japan held special commercial and industrial interests in Korea. From a British perspective, the alliance with Japan was not intended to help them gain the upper hand in Northeast Asia, rather it was hoped the Japanese would feel strong enough to challenge the Russians with forceful demands. Such an agreement would create a delicate power balance in the area that would keep Russia and Japan mired in such endless argument and conflict that neither would be in any position to challenge British interests elsewhere.

Though each side negotiated the alliance with different objectives, Japan appeared to gain more than England from the agreement. While it marked England's abandonment of isolation in East Asia, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance strikingly emphasized the status Japan had won for itself among the nations of the world. For the first time, a major Western Power had acknowledged Japan's position and special interests in Korea. To the Japanese, giving concessions to Great Britain regarding China really meant very little, since Great Britain already had numerous rivals in China that could hold it in check.

Compared to other bilateral assistance treaties, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unique in that it could not be invoked unless one of the signatories became involved in armed conflict with two or more foreign powers. The involvement of either party in a war with only one power would result in the neutrality of the other. In essence, the agreement virtually insured that the European powers would not again gang up on Japan. More important to Japan was the fact that should a war with Russia erupt, neither Germany nor France could intervene without bringing Great Britain into the fight on Japan's side. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance thus gave Japan the freedom to act in the region with far less anxiety. Though it was certainly not British Ambassador Lansdowne's intention, the alliance made war between Russia and Japan far more likely.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance created a sense of alarm in Emperor Kojong's mind. After a while, he complacently came to the conclusion that the alliance actually supported Korea's neutrality. The emperor's sense of reality puzzled even the Russian chargé d'affaires, Aleksandr Pavlov, who confided in Horace Allen, the American minister in Seoul, that Emperor Kojong had developed a false sense of security.

Horace Allen made his own assessments of Korea's stability in the numerous messages he sent to the State Department and his friends during 1902. He observed that an ineffective centralized government, rampant corruption and oppressive policies were bleeding the country. Kojong's government exacted unbelievably high taxes from the population then spent the money on extravagant luxuries while hundreds of people were dying of starvation.

In late 1902 Allen wrote, "There seem to be millions for celebration and other things that please the vanity of the ruler, but not one cent for supporting proper enterprises or for paying off obligations." To celebrate the 40th anniversary of Kojong's accession to the throne, the court planned to spend nearly $3,000,000, an amount which included the purchase of 350 horses from the United States for a parade. Allen predicted that Korea's "present chaotic state will sooner or later end in interference from the outside, which will probably give to Korea the guiding hand she greatly needs."

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance gave the Tsar some pause, but only a pause. Russian troops remained firmly entrenched in Manchuria and Russian expansion into Korea continued unabated. Tsar Nicholas II was a weak-willed autocrat who was strongly influenced by various competing interests within the Russian government. Because of his irresolute nature, Russian foreign policy tended to oscillate violently as each special interest group competed to get his attention.

Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, whose principal interests were in Europe, not East Asia, wished to avoid war. Finance Minister Count Sergei Iul'evich Witte sought to engineer Russian domination of the trade and economic resources of northern China. Russian War Minister General Aleksei N. Kuropatkin also wished to avoid a war in East Asia, but promoted the maintenance of Russian military strength to face potential dangers that might arise in Europe. Even so, it was Kuropatkin who preferred to reach an agreement with Japan that ensured the security of Russian rail lines and shortened the eastern frontier by annexing the northern half of Manchuria. The three Chief Ministers of State, each for his own reasons, were united in their desire for a peaceful settlement in East Asia, but a strange combination of political and economic forces was building which in time overwhelmed them all.