Ch 30 - The Last Hope for Freedom

A Hardening of Positions

While Western nations tried to secure their economic interests in Asia, Russian control over Manchuria and Japanese economic dominance in Korea set the two powers on a collision course in a competitive race for strategic supremacy on the Korean peninsula.

The United States was in the midst of a presidential election in the fall of 1900, and President McKinley feared any action concerning China that went beyond the immediate relief of the legations. Ever mindful of the criticism that would come with further involvement in Asia, McKinley was eager to get the American army off mainland China as soon as possible. Nevertheless, America had fought in its first real world war, a conflict that presaged the awakening of America as a global power and illustrated the power of international cooperation.

The United States, wary of the formation of western alliances, could do virtually nothing in the region. Instead, it sought to prevent the various powers from exploiting the crisis and further partitioning China. In early 1900, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce issued an optimistic report that described the opportunities for American exports to China if the United States was not excluded by the arbitrary actions of other nations. In July 1900, John Hay's second communique on the Open Door Policy underlined the economic footing underlined a cardinal goal in America's East Asian foreign policy,

"to bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Although the origin of the Open Door Policy was clearly British, it was also an American policy and for that reason America articulated it. The United States intervened in China to protect its own interests;  it was purely accidental if it also proved beneficial to the British. The same may be said for other important decisions and acts in American foreign relations through World War II.

It is almost a legend in American history that the Open Door Policy declaration saved China from partition. In truth, America was a second-class power among the nations of the world in 1899, and could not prevent anything the European Powers decided to do. If Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and France had decided to cut up China and had found a formula for division acceptable to all of them, they could easily have ignored the United States altogether. The United States would not have used force to deter them and, if it had tried, it would have failed ignominiously. Neither the Open Door Policy nor anything else the United States did or could have done at the time prevented China from being partitioned. Fundamentally, China maintained its nominal independence only because no power wanted to press its demands to the point where it might have found itself at war with rivals.

The Boxer Uprising signaled the beginning of a dramatic power shift in East Asia. No law or any accepted standard of morality could mitigate the fact that over the years China had been the victim of foreign interests. The sustained acts of injustice borne of that interest would have goaded any people to cold-hearted fury. As happened so often in the past, the conduct of the West produced an almost universal conviction in the East of Western man's capacity for greed and cynicism. Justified or not, that belief remained and many people suffered its consequences.

Russia ruled over a stretch of earth that spanned nearly 5,000 miles from west to east and from the time of the Romanov Czars virtually half the Asian continent lived under the Russian flag. For all its tremendous size however, nowhere in Asia could ships enter or leave a Russian seaport in the winter. Nowhere did this vast empire hold a port that was suitable for year-round naval operations. Because of this reality, the one unchanging feature of Russian foreign policy from the earliest beginnings of its empire was a ceaseless effort to reach an ice-free stretch of the Asian coast containing at least one good harbor. Although Russia held a fine harbor at Vladivostok, the port was ice-bound between November and March. It took several days of slow and laborious work for ice-breakers open a channel for the Russian Pacific fleet. The Yellow Sea further to the south was a naval jewel, particularly its eastern arm which extended between Korea and the Liaodong Peninsula.

In pursuit of its dream to acquire an ice-free seaport in the East, the line of least resistance went through Chinese territory. Russia obtained twenty-five year leaseholds on both Port Arthur and Dairen from China in 1898. Although both harbors were ice-free and well-suited to Russian requirements, they suffered one serious drawback;  they were isolated from the northern mainland of Russian territory by Manchuria. Russia concluded a secret military agreement with Qing China that gave them the right to extend the eastern end of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria to link up with the port at Vladivostok. Equally important, they gained the right to construct rail links between Port Arthur, Dairen and the Trans-Siberian Railway. These slender rights of way gave Russia a foot in the door in Manchuria and in time they would kick the door wide open. Once the Boxers became a serious problem in China, Russia's Minister of War, General Aleksei Kuropatkin, told Finance Minister Count Sergei Iul'evich Witte, "...this will give us our excuse for seizing Manchuria."

At the height of the Boxer Uprising near the end of June 1900, Chinese authorities in Manchuria wantonly declared war against Russia. The declaration set off a wave of panic among Russian civil and military administrations in the adjoining provinces. Russia's response was proportionately fierce in its attempt to restore its power and prestige. In the East Siberian town of Blagovyeshchensk, a principal city under the Amur government, Cossack troops brutally tossed some 5,000 Chinese men, women and children into the Amur River. Chinese resistance in the region was soon overcome and Russian forces occupied the entire province, including the treaty port at Niuchwang. Russia demonstrated an unmistakable intention of seizing the opportunity to secure a permanent hold on Manchuria.

In July 1900, while the Allies argued over the size, composition and mission of the China Relief Expedition to Beijing, Russian troops swept north into Manchuria, manning garrisons at principal points all along their eastern railways. Railroad officials and merchants followed close behind and established themselves around depots and whistle-stops, gradually transforming their small settlements into booming frontier towns and establishing Russian culture in the region. Russian businessmen gained concessions to harvest timber to supply railroad ties and construction materials to build new housing for a growing Russian population. Mining rights were granted to supply the growing demand for coal to fuel thier locomotives.

Under the flimsy pretext of protecting its two rail lines, restoring order and suppressing "rioters," city after city fell in rapid succession to Russian troops. Mukden, the principal city of the Manchurian provinces, fell under Russian control within a matter of weeks. By the time the Boxers had been quelled in Beijing, Manchuria was wholly under Russian domination. Once Russia solidified its position in Manchuria, it launched a powerful drive to penetrate Korea as well.

With its railway rights, two ice-free seaports and the continued construction of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, Russia held a strong foothold in the region and dramatically transformed the strategic situation in Northeast Asia. At the very time the Russians were joining the Allies in the rescue of the Beijing Legation Quarter, they were conducting their own aggressive action in Manchuria and Korea with no one to keep them in check.

The anti-foreigner activity that erupted in Manchuria in the aftermath of the Boxer Uprising gave Russia yet another opportunity to act. They brought a huge force of some 180,000 troops into the area under the pretext of protecting their rail lines and Russian citizens. The Russians secured the railroads and achieved effective control throughout nearly three-fourths of Manchuria by October 1, 1900. Russia held Manchuria hostage, refusing to return the civil administration of the country to China without also getting permission to retain its troops in Mukden and along the railroad linking Harbin and Dairen on the Liaodong Peninsula. They also refused to remove their troops from Manchuria stating that they were necessary to preserve order, even though it was no longer being disturbed by anyone except them. Russia had no intention of leaving Manchuria.

On October 11, 1900, Russian troops escorted Li Hongzhang, the one senior minister of the Qing government still available, from Tianjin to Beijing to negotiate a settlement of the Boxer Uprising with representatives of the eight-nation allied forces. After intense, protracted meetings filled with debate and argument on both sides, the parties reached a tentative agreement on terms of the settlement on December 24. Acting under orders from the Imperial Court, Prince Ching and Li Hongzhang signed a protocol draft on January 14, 1901, affirming China's pledge to accept the settlement terms in principal. Beginning almost immediately, the parties met again to discuss the specific form and terms under which the agreement would be fulfilled. The eight months of talks that followed proved to be even more contentious and protracted than those which led to the protocol draft.

Simultaneous with Allied negotiations to seek a settlement to the Boxer Uprising, Admiral Evgenii Ivanovich Alexeiev, commander of the Pacific Squadron and governor-general of the newly-established Kwantung district, which included Port Arthur and Dairen, began a series of secret talks in early November 1900 with General Tseng-Chi, the highest ranking Chinese official in Manchuria. The talks in Mukden focused on Russia's current status in Manchuria. Admiral Alexeiev, one of several high-ranking Russian officers, had long advocated the annexation of Manchuria after it was occupied by Russian troops. He applied strong pressure on the Manchu general, but Tseng-Chi refused to sign any agreement without authorization from his government. For its part, the Qing court, torn between resentment and fear, could not bring itself to a decision on the matter.

Russian Count Witte brusquely informed Tseng-Chi that unless China agreed to the terms of Manchuria's new status, Russia would annex it outright. The Russians persevered and by November 30 managed to coerce Tseng-Chi into signing a provisional agreement that virtually preempted Chinese rule in Manchuria. The agreement provided for the eventual return of Chinese administrative control over Manchuria, but permitted the Russians to appoint a resident governor with a seat in Mukden. It also allowed Russia to maintain troops at Mukden and along every Russian controlled rail line. The Alexeiev-Tseng Agreement contradicted simultaneous negotiations between the Russian and Chinese governments underway on Manchuria's status and, in effect, made Manchuria a Russian protectorate, the first step toward formal possession.

Angered and humiliated by the outcome of the talks with Russia, the Chinese resorted to a strategy that had frequently proven useful and leaked the entire text of the Alexeiev-T'seng Agreement. In January 1901, the London Times printed the text of the document almost in its entirety. News of this previously secret agreement caused much anxiety in the West. Russian advances could not go entirely unchallenged and consultations among the governments of the Great Powers began in earnest. Great Britain, France and the United States literally bombarded Chinese ministers in Paris, Berlin, London, and Tokyo with admonitions against signing any agreement with Russia. When it became obvious to the Russians they could not continue their plans in Manchuria without antagonizing all the Powers, they suddenly withdrew the Alexeiev-Tseng Agreement. Russian troops were not withdrawn. Russia merely sat back, bided its time and waited for another opportunity.

The Russian advanture in Manchuria caused the greatest anxiety in Japan, which had for years watched the slow and unrelenting Russian advance across Asia toward Vladivostok and the Korea Peninsula with great apprehension. The Japanese clearly saw that unless Russia were stopped by force, all Manchuria and Korea would fall under its control. Also evident to the Japanese was the fact that a race for paramountcy in East Asia was on in earnest, and that one or more foreign powers could presumably establish themselves within easy striking distance of Japan and Korea.

A Russian Manchuria would create a permanent first-class naval and military state in an excellent position to exercise sea power over the northern and western Pacific, place a potential enemy of vast strength in the most favorable position to attack Japan should trouble ever arise, and extinguish Japan's last hope of gaining an influential position in East Asian affairs. It is little wonder that Japan, more than any other nation, viewed Russian maneuvering in East Asia with grave concern.

Russia remained evasive and elusive regarding its plans in East Asia, but it plainly wanted everything. On February 16, 1901, the Russians proposed a twelve-article treaty with China to replace the aborted Alexeiev-T'seng Agreement. The proposed pact would return Manchuria to China in name, but would effectively legalize the presence of Russian occupation troops in Manchuria disguised as "railway guards." It would also prohibit China from sending arms to Manchuria or granting railroad and mining concessions to other powers without Russia's consent. In addition, the proposal sought to acquire preferential rights over every outlying Chinese province in Asia that shared a border with Russia. The final insult came in the form of a stipulation that China indemnify Russia for occupation costs and damages to railways and properties of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and grant Russia the right to construct a rail line from the existing railroad to the Great Wall in the direction of Beijing.

The proposed treaty provoked a great deal of opposition from not only China, but from the other foreign powers in Asia. The Allies tried everything possible to stiffen Chinese resistance to Russia's proposed withdrawal terms. The United States, Austria, and Italy urged China to resist Russian demands. Germany and Great Britain admonished China against signing any agreement with Russia while collective negotiations to settle the Boxer Uprising were underway in Beijing. Great Britain pressed the Russians for more information regarding the exact nature of the proposed convention on Manchuria's status.

Needing little stimulation to act, Japan took the initiative;  as if by reflex action, Japan reasoned that China's end was rapidly approaching. Komura Jutaro, Japan's minister in Beijing, warned Prince Qing that any concession to the Russian occupation of Manchuria could quickly lead to the partition of China. Britain was certain to follow such an act by occupying the Yangtze River Valley. Germany would in turn occupy Shandong Province and Japan would be left with no choice but to reserve for itself freedom of action in the region.

Russia's Count Sergei Witte threatened that a Chinese rejection of the proposed pact would lead to Russian incorporation of Manchuria. Caught in a diplomatic tug-of-war, the hapless Qing court could not come to a definite decision. Unwilling to offend either the Allied Powers or Russia, all the court could do was order Prince Qing and Li Hongzhang to devise some way out of the dilemma that would neither arouse the anger of the Russians nor aggravate the already indignant Allies. Unfortunately, Li Hongzhang's pro-Russian tendencies got the better of him. Instead of turning the international jealousies to China's advantage, he advised the court to sign the treaty to avoid a perilous break.

In China, two viceroys from the lower Yangtze region, Chang Chih-tung and Liu Kun-yi, urged the Qing government in the strongest terms to reject the Russian talks and warned the government they would not recognize the convention, even if it were ultimately ratified. A majority of high-ranking Chinese provincial officials endorsed their protestations as did many influential guilds and associations. They argued that, whether China accepted the treaty or not, Russia would never return Manchuria and warned that bowing to the Russian threat risked the partitioning of China.

Caught in the middle, the Qing Imperial Court was totally incapable of making up its mind. Under intense pressure from the Allies, on March 23, the court finally decided to reject the Russian treaty proposal and instructed the Chinese minister in St. Petersburg not to sign the proposed agreement.

Faced with international opposition, the Russian government issued a disgruntled statement on April 3 that stated since their "generous intentions" had been so badly misconstrued, they would withdraw the proposed convention. They also added that, much as they would like to leave Manchuria, the realities of international politics would not allow it at the moment.

In Beijing, the Boxer Protocol conference exposed considerable friction between the various parties and demonstrated the potential dangers inherent in a multi-lateral occupation. The greatest friction arose over the subject of indemnities. Each of the allies submitted their own claim against China. Great Britain, the United States and Japan displayed great moderation in their demands, but the other powers, particularly Germany and Italy, submitted claims that were far out of proportion to the services rendered by their land and naval forces. Nevertheless, by late summer, the protocol was finally drafted in a form satisfactory to all the powers and the Chinese imperial court.

The final signature of the protocol was delayed at the last moment by an incident involving Emperor Kwang-su's half-brother, Prince Chun. Germany demanded satisfaction from China after the brutal murder of minister Baron von Ketteler in June 1900. China not only had to pay a huge reparation for the minister's death, but the young prince had to personally apologize to German Emperor Wilhelm II on behalf of the Qing Government. When Prince Chun reached Basel, Switzerland, in August on his way to Germany, he suddenly learned that he and his entourage would be required to kowtow before the German emperor. The prince deeply resented the demand and referred to Beijing for further instructions. Once the Germans learned that the prince would not perform a kowtow to Wilhelm II, they realized their mistake. They could not exact from a Chinese prince a form of homage that no Western diplomat had extended to a Chinese emperor for over half a century. In the end, the point was waived and Prince Chun was warmly received in Potsdam, Germany, on September 4 in a solemn audience. Just three days later, the Boxer Protocol was formally signed.

Li Hongzhang and Yikuang, the Prince Qing, signed the Boxer Protocol for China along with the representatives of eleven Western Powers on September 7, 1901, thus ending a mad episode in the history of East Asia, one that brought no credit to any of the parties involved. The Chinese called it the Xinchou Treaty of 1901. The Boxer Protocol however, was not an international treaty, but a multi-lateral diplomatic protocol that set forth the terms and conditions under which the Boxer Uprising would be settled.

China did not get off easy and later considered the agreement as one more in a series of "unequal treaties" which it signed since the First Opium War. The twelve article document called for a number of punitive measures against China, including severe punishment for twelve Chinese officials responsible for supporting and inciting the Boxers. There was little unanimity among the allies regarding who should be punished and how, even for those officials whose guilt was beyond dispute. Prince Tuan and General Tung-fu-hsiang, two of the most conspicuous offenders, were spared the death penalty, yet the notorious Governor Yu-hsien, President of the Board of Rites Chi Hsiu, and the former Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments Hsu Cheng-yu, were condemned to death. Provincial officials deemed responsible for many of the massacres were dealt with separately. Russia adamantly rejected attempts to debate the question of Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi's complicity in the uprising, declining to introduce any discussion of the "dynastic question."

Under the protocol, China agreed not to import arms or ammunition, or any materiel used in the manufacture of weapons for a period of two years. Official civil service examinations were suspended for five years in every city ( nearly 45) where foreigners had been massacred or submitted to cruel treatment. The Legation Quarter in Beijing was reserved for use by the allies and under their exclusive control and defense and Chinese would not have the right to live there. China was required to destroy the Taku Forts and other fortresses in the area, maintain open communications between the capital and the sea and allow the stationing of foreign troops in key locations between Beijing and the Yellow Sea . China agreed to pay for navigation improvements along the Huangpu and Peiho rivers and to pay 60,000 taels of silver per year to maintain them.

Finally, China agreed to pay a huge indemnity to the combined allied powers amounting to 450,000,000 taels of silver ($335,000,000). The debt, which carried a 4% interest rate, was amortized over thirty-nine years, payable in gold to a commission of bankers in Shanghai. The payments began on January 1, 1902, and continued each year until the end of 1940. Already carrying long-term indemnities from the Sino-Japanese War, this new debt became a huge economic burden on China.

Perhaps the most tragic victim of the entire episode was the venerable seventy-eight-year-old Chinese statesman, Li Hongzhang. Pressured from without by the Russians and harassed and ridiculed by his own countrymen from within, Li Hongzhang, old, weak and ashamed, died suddenly on November 7, 1901.

Until now, China had been the chief point of disagreement among the Great Powers in East Asia. Manchuria was a rich and potentially lucrative market ripe for investment and the prospect of Russian domination threatened the vital commercial interests of a number of nations whose subjects were engaged in business enterprises in East Asia. Great Britain had firmly established a commercial and diplomatic preeminence there based upon its naval power. In the south, France and Britain had acquired Indo-China and Burma indirectly at China's expense and both were fully capable of penetrating southern China. Germany and other European powers had numerous foreign concessions and commercial establishments in Shanghai and other great Chinese cities, eloquent testimony to the economic stakes at issue.

Equally important, the Japanese had strong economic and commercial interests in Korea. The Allies disagreed among themselves over how to deal with China and how to preserve both the integrity and policy of free trade in China. Russia however, overtly favored the amputation of outlying areas and opposed the "open door" for commerce. Russia's position constituted the principal obstacle to a prompt settlement of the Boxer Uprising and remained the biggest threat to the Open Door Policy in East Asia.