Ch 29 - Twilight of the Yi Dynasty

The Spoiled Fruits of War

As young intellectuals and former bureaucrats agitate for modern reforms in Korea, the Great Powers start a mad scramble for territory in East Asia and maneuver to compete for concessions from the weakened Korean government.

Russia, like the rest of the Western world at the time, persisted in the mistaken belief that Japan was little more than a trifling inconvenience, a country that could be swept aside at will. Blinded by a self-assurance born from underestimating Japanese strength, Russia loomed large as a potential threat to the security of East Asia. Japan was not at all satisfied with the situation developing in Korea, and the rise of Russian influence in the Yi government further strained relations between Japan and Russia. After a series of successive negotiations on the matter, on May 14, 1896, Russian Minister Karl Waeber and Japanese Minister Komura signed a memorandum of agreement over how to deal with Korea.

Since neither Japan nor Russia felt sufficiently strong at the time to challenge the other over Korea's future, they jointly pledged to support King Kojong. Under the four principal articles of the Waeber-Komura Memorandum, both nations agreed to advise King Kojong to return to the Kyongbok Palace, though he was free to stay in the Russian legation or leave as he chose. Kojong retained the right to appoint ministers to the Korean cabinet from among suitable candidates.

With regard to maintaining order, Japan would be permitted to station no more than 200 of its troops in the countryside to protect Japanese facilities and they were to be withdrawn when order was restored. In addition, Japan was permitted to station no more than two battalions of legation troops in Seoul to protect its citizens, with a maximum of 200 men in each battalion. Two further battalions would be permitted in Pusan and Wonsan for similar purposes. Finally, Minister Komura formally agreed to get control of the Japanese criminal elements in Korea.

The coronation ceremonies for Tsar Nicholas II at Moscow in May 1896, provided the Japanese an opportune occasion to seek compromise with Russia over the issue of Korea's future. General Yamagata Aritomo, the dominant figure in Japan's army, represented Japan at the festivities. During a meeting with Foreign Minister Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovsky in June, Yamagata offered to split Korea across the 38th parallel, creating, in effect, two "spheres of influence";  the Russians having the north and the Japanese the south. The Russian minister balked at the suggestion, pointing out that such spheres could be agreed upon with the rise of actual contingency. No doubt he also believed that with Russia's foothold in Korea, in time Japan could be pushed out and no division would be necessary.

On June 9, the two men signed the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, which tacitly recognized the principle of Korean independence and renounced separate action on the peninsula. Though not a formal treaty, the agreement established what was in reality a joint Russo-Japanese protectorate over Korea. The two nations agreed to advise King Kojong to balance his budget and economize. If financial aid was necessary to enact reforms in Korea they would provide the needed loans. To enable Kojong to establish internal order, Russia and Japan agreed the raising and maintenance of Korea's military and police should be left to the Yi government. They jointly renounced separate action in Korea and agreed that the troops of both sides already on the peninsula would remain there until the Korean army was organized. In addition, each pledged that if it ever became necessary to station additional troops in Korea, there should be prior consultation to avoid the possibility of armed conflict between the two nations.

It was also understood that King Kojong would, for the time being at least, remain under Russian protection at the Russian Legation. Thus, while each power received temporary assurances that the other would not attempt to seize Korean territory, Japan retained the freedom to continue its commercial penetration of the peninsula while Russia gained the freedom to develop the area farther north.

Russia and Japan concluded this agreement without ever consulting King Kojong or the Korean government in Seoul. The agreement ultimately proved virtually worthless. Russian penetration continued unabated. In his memoirs, Finance Minister Sergei Iul'evich Witte wrote that with the conclusion of the Russo-Korean treaty, Russia secured for itself a dominant position in Korea.

A Korean delegation headed by Min Yeong-hwan and Yun Chi-ho also attended the tsar's coronation ceremonies in May 1896. After several meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovsky, the two men concluded an agreement with Russia that set forth the following terms:  Russia would protect King Kojong and, if required, send additional troops to Korea;  Russian officers would train the Korean army and Russian financial experts would be brought to Seoul under the guidance of the Russian foreign minister to advise the Yi government;  Korea and Russia would enter into a loan agreement if Korea needed economic aid, and;  Russia would be allowed to connect its telegraph lines with Korea's telegraph network. Russia wasted little time implementing the more aggressive terms of this agreement.

The aggressive policies of Russia and Japan shook the Korean government to its foundations. In response, a number of enlightened young intellectuals and former bureaucrats took action to push Korea towards modern reforms. By early 1897, many of the country's prominent government and civic leaders who had led Korea's modern reform movement and the struggle for independence had solidly united in condemning King Kojong's flight to the Russian Legation and the ongoing grants of economic concessions to foreigners.

Faced with mounting domestic pressure and shortly after Russia and Japan came to a negotiated understanding that the Japanese would not stage another coup attempt, the king decided to move out of the Russian Legation. On February 20, 1897, after spending more than a year with the Russians, Kojong took up residence in Kyongun Palace (today's Deoksugung, or Toksu Palace) in the legation quarter, not far from the Russians so he could easily return in case of trouble. To maintain close contact with his former hosts, a telephone line was set up that connected the King's private chambers to Kim Hong-nuik's home and then to the Russian Legation.

As an interpreter, Kim Hong-nuik's power grew in step with the increased importance of Russia in Korea. While King Kojong lived in the legation, Kim served as the direct liaison between the king and Russian Minister Karl Waeber. He used his position to amass a huge personal fortune and put family members and friends in powerful positions. He soon became on the most powerful men in the Korean government. At the height of his power, Kim held the title of Governor of Seoul, Chief of Nobility and the Vice Minister of Education, all while still maintaining his position of Russian interpreter at the legation.

With King Kojong out of the Russian legation and in response to growing pressure from Korean public opinion, the government took a new look at the king's ancient title. The traditional title for Korea kings was signified by a Chinese character that denoted the monarch as a subordinate of the Chinese Empire. The Japanese Emperor had already taken a new title that made him, in words at least, the equal of the Qing Emperor. Many in the Seoul government felt their king deserved as much;  a title to show that Korea was independent of both China and Japan and entitled to be treated as an equal.

In August 1897, Korea formally changed the title of its ruler to Emperor and changed the official name of the country from Korea to Taehan Cheguk. It means roughly the Great Han Empire. A royal coronation was held on October 12, 1897. Afterwards, Emperor Kojong received the congratulations of foreign diplomats who came to the palace to deliver messages of recognition from their governments. Also in October, a group of Russian training officers and a financial expert named K. Alexeyev arrived in Seoul to replace their Japanese counterparts in their respective departments.

Not long after the Triple Intervention, Germany began casting its eyes toward the acquisition of a naval base on the Yellow Sea. It asked the Qing court for such a base as a reward for its help in dealing with Japan and because each of the other powers already held bases in the region or leases on Chinese territory;  Britain at Hong Kong, France at Tongking, and Russia at Kiaochow, in Shandong Province. The German request was rejected. Undaunted in their ambition, the German Kaiser asked Tsar Nicholas II if he would object to Germany occupying Kiaochow, an excellent naval base which Admiral Tirpitz had already selected for acquisition. Russia was hardly in a position to object with any conviction.

On November 1, 1897, two Roman Catholic missionaries working in Shandong Province, were brutally murdered by Chinese hooligans. It was a flagrant outrage that in normal times would have been settled quickly by punishing the offenders and the district where they were killed would have payed a fine. These were not normal times however, and the two victims were German citizens. In response, a squadron from the German Navy steamed into port at Kiaochow and occupied the important harbor facility. The episode triggered a wave of demands for concessions throughout East Asia;  literally an excuse for the Western seizure of Chinese territory.

Any idea that compassionate motives lay behind Russia's apparent alliance with China was quickly dispelled. Encouraged by Germany's quick success, Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Nikolayevich Muraviev submitted a proposal to occupy either Port Arthur or Darien. The scheme won the Tsar's approval over the strong objections of Finance Minister Witte, who vainly argued that it was not in Russia's interest to dishonor its pledge to respect Chinese territorial integrity. The Russian naval minister also raised objections, although on more practical grounds;  he wanted a naval base in Korea.

Almost immediately after the coronation of Emperor Kojong, Russia demanded the use of Choryong Island (modern Yongdo Island) off Pusan as a coaling station. England asked the Seoul government for a lease on Komun-do Island for a similar purpose. In December 1897, less than a month after Germany moved into Kiaochow, a squadron of Russian warships arrived in the Yellow Sea. The ships dropped anchor at both Port Arthur (Lushun) and Darien (Talienwan) under the weak pretext of protecting China against the Germans.

The Russian land-grab was given further impetus on January 1, 1898, when the newly appointed Minister of War Aleksei N. Kuropatkin insisted on expanding Russia's occupation zone to include the territory surrounding the two seaports on the Liaodong Peninsula. After tough negotiations with Viceroy Li Hongzhang and Chang Yin-huan, influenced largely by the fact that Minister Sergei Witte bribed the two Chinese negotiators, the Chinese government ceded the Liaodong Peninsula to Russia, including both Darien and Port Arthur. The treaty signed on March, 27, 1898, granted Russia a twenty-five year leasehold on the Liaodong Peninsula and a concession for a South Manchurian Railway to be built from Harbin, on the Chinese Eastern Railway, south to Port Arthur. Barred from the spoils of war by the Triple Intervention, the Japanese could only watch as the three nations proceeded to take from China, without war, the fruits of victory they had denied the Japanese three years earlier.

From their strong foothold on the Shandong peninsula, Germany compelled the Qing government to lease the excellent harbor at Kiaochow as a naval base for ninety-nine years and grant a concession to build two railways in Shandong Province. Not to be left out, the British leased Wei-hai-wei for twenty-five years and Kowloon for ninety-nine years. England also got the added bonus of a promise that China would not alienate the Yangtze Valley to any other power, thereby converting the region into a British sphere of influence. France secured a ninety-nine year lease in the Kwangchow Bay area in the south in 1899. The United States, then tied up in the Spanish-American War and the Cuban rebellion, did not participate in this mad scramble for territory. The Chinese land grab was but another in a series of events that did little to ease Japanese resentment against the Russians.

Port Arthur and Darien provided the Russians ice-free ports, but they were separated from Russia's only other Pacific outlet in Vladivostok by the Tsushima Strait between the southern tip of Korea and Japan. The Japanese were well-established on the peninsula and easily controlled this critical maritime passage. This was the very situation used by Russia's naval minister to argue the vital need for Russia to obtain a port in Korea. With the Russian Pacific fleet split between two locations and Japan in firm control of the crucial sea link between them, the Japanese government felt strong enough to enter new negotiations with Russia to secure a division of spheres of influence in Korea.

During the ensuing negotiations in Tokyo between Japan's Foreign Minister Baron Nishi and the Russian Foreign Minister Baron Rosen, Prime Minister Ito offered the Russian government complete freedom of action in Manchuria. He also agreed to recognize Russian supremacy in that region in exchange for Russian recognition of Japanese supremacy in Korea and freedom of action in the peninsula. The Russian government could not bring itself to accept such an arrangement and all that was accomplished was the signing of a convention.

On April 25, 1898, Baron Nishi and Baron Rosen signed the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, in which both Russian and Japan agreed to recognize Korea as an independent country and refrain from any direct interference in Korea's internal affairs. The agreement also provided that neither country would send either military or financial advisors to Korea without first consulting the other. Finally, Russia agreed to recognize and not impede Japan's established interests in the development of commercial and industrial relationships in the peninsula. Korea had again become a pawn in the larger game of Russia-Japanese rivalry in northeastern Asia.

Japan had defeated China, removed it from the peninsula and exacted an acknowledgement of Korea's independence. Yet for all the fervor surrounding Korea's internal drive for independence, there was still the matter of foreign influence in Seoul. Japan quickly resumed its previous efforts toward internal reforms. Japanese advisers were forced on the Yi government and their advice was refused or ignored at the peril of the ruling bureaucracy. As Japan increased its pressure, the Korean people stubbornly resisted or tried to sabotage the reforms, in part because they resented any form of alien dictation, but mainly because they simply resented change .

With the Russians firmly entrenched in Korea, the Yi government began to make a variety of economic concessions to foreign powers, something it had previously avoided except for the Japanese telegraph system. The Russians cleverly used the interpreter Kim Hong-nuik to persuade Emperor Kojong to grant them concessions, which he did through threats and verbal abuse. Kim implied to Emperor Kojong that if he failed to grant the concessions, Russia would remove its troops and advisors from Korea and leave the him to the mercy of the Japanese.

The race for possessions in East Asia was now well underway and the Great Powers were maneuvering to stake their claims. Japan, France, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain started a heated competition to win concessions from the weakened Korean government. Emperor Kojong's government began granting unconditional concessions without the usual specification of lease terms or setting of taxes. In effect, world powers began to deprive Korea of its property.

A few Russian adventurers with connections in the royal court received mining concessions along the Tumen River. Russian military instructors were engaged to train the Korea Army. In 1897, Russia tried to get control of the Korea Maritime Customs Service when the new Russian minister Baron Alexis de Speyer decided to dislodge the British director of Korea customs, Mr. J. McLeavy Brown. Although de Speyer persuaded the Yi government to replace Brown with Russian financial adviser K. Alexeyev, Mr. Brown adamantly refused to leave. When British warships appeared in the port of Inchon, the government in Seoul panicked and backed down and returned Mr. Brown to his post.

In April 1897, the German firm of Edward Meyer & Company obtained a concession to mine gold Kangwon Province. Another mining concession went to the English firm of Morgan in September. An American named Morse obtained the right to build a railway from Inchon to Seoul and the mineral rights to mine in Hamgyong Province.Also in September, Russia was granted logging rights on Ullong Island. It also got logging rights in the vast northern forests that stretched along the Tumen and Yalu Rivers from the Yellow Sea to the Pacific, a concession that later proved to be of great significance. A French firm was granted permission to build a railroad from Seoul to Uiju, and the British firm of Holmringer, an agent for the British-owned Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, established a banking branch at Inchon.

In December, the American Standard Oil Co. constructed an oil storage depot on Wolini-do Island in Inchon harbor. In February 1898, an American firm obtained contracts to build a streetcar line, a water works, and a power plant in Seoul. European and American investments in Korea were small in comparison to the massive economic penetration Japan had made and retained despite political reverses.

Many of these foreign investments were somewhat unsuccessful and in short order many firms wanted to give them up. This suited Japanese plans very well. Japanese businessmen were always glad to buy up concessions and contracts to further their economic hold in Korea. In Seoul and the treaty ports there were twenty branches of Japanese banks and the Daiichi Bank of Japan virtually became the central bank of Korea.

The signing of the Nishi-Rosen Convention in April 1898 created a balance of power between Russia and Japan regarding Korea. It did not however, prevent these two powers from competing with each other to secure strategic positions on the peninsula. The Korean government actually contributed to the competition by encouraging foreign powers to purchase port facilities and railroads in the hope it would help establish a new balance of power in Korea among foreign interests. The United States received the most lucrative economic concessions from the Korean court, including the right to develop the Unsan gold mine. Emperor Kojong hoped it would not only deepen American involvement in the Korea, but secure its political commitment to the country as well.

Among the Korean government's many foreign policy problems its naive expectation that the United States would support Korean neutrality and independence. Emperor Kojong and his supporters in Seoul never gave up their expectations about the benevolent role of the United States in Korean independence. Ever since the signing of the American-Korean treaty of 1882, they believed that the United States would faithfully execute the good offices clause of the treaty, which declared that both parties would offer their "good office" in case of a dispute with other states. Unfortunately, after seeing the rise of imperial rivalries over Korea, the American government looked upon that clause as little more than a diplomatic nicety.

A large part of this belief in American benevolence could be attributed to the rather active diplomacy of America's resident minister and consul general in Korea, Horace N. Allen. When he became the United States' minister to Korea, replacing John Mahelm Sill in September 1897, Emperor Kojong confided in him, "we feel that America is to us as our "Elder Brother." Washington consistently maintained a non-committal position regarding Korea, going so far as to remind Allen in November 1897 that the United States government had no protective alliance with Korea and urging him to maintain strict neutrality in Korean affairs. Still, Allen often sidestepped Washington's instructions and extended help to Emperor Kojong whenever the Korean court faced a diplomatic or political threat.

Russia and Japan became fierce competitors in the heated race to acquire strategic locations and facilities in Korea. Russian minister Alexis de Speyer alarmed Japan in 1898 when he attempted to lease Jeoryeongdo (modern Yeongdo Island) off Pusan as a coaling station. The outspoken Seo Jae-pil of the Independence Club helped quash that concession, which ultimately led to the Russian government reassigning de Speyer to a post in Brazil.

In October 1898, Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu instructed the Japanese Consul General in Seoul to begin purchasing all the strategic sites around the port of Masampo. The following May, Russia began making an aggressive effort to purchase the land for a coaling station in Masampo. It had good reason to do so. Chinese resistance along the Chinese Eastern Railway line from Mukden to Port Arthur had seriously delayed construction. In addition, the harbor at Port Arthur partially froze during the winter of 1898-1899, forcing the Russians to base part of their Far Eastern Fleet in Nagasaki.

Russo-Japanese competition heated up again in 1899, when both nations set out to lease territory in the strategic ports of Masampo (modern Masan), Mokpo and Kojedo island along Korea's southern coast. The most serious confrontation erupted over the port of Masampo, one of the finest Asian harbors of the time. Located just fifty miles from Tsushima, halfway between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, Masampo was likened to "the Gibraltar of the Orient," an ice-free port and an ideal naval base large enough to shelter a large fleet.

The Russian's heavy-handed pressure on the Korean government to force local landlords to sell their land alarmed the Japanese, who accelerated their own efforts to acquire land in Masampo. By indirectly purchasing land through local Japanese merchants, they were able to acquire more property than the Russians and frustrated Russian efforts to secure a coaling station. Furthermore, the Japanese persuaded the Korean government to not make any concessions at Kojedo Island, a move which pre-empted any further move by Russia to acquire a coaling station in Korean waters. The clash over land rights gradually faded by 1900, when the increased violence of the Boxer Rebellion refocused Russia's attention on Manchuria. Still, the brief confrontation over Masampo alarmed Japan and demonstrated just how strong the potential for a war with Russia remained.

The tumultuous events of the period following the Sino-Japanese War and the brutal assassination of Queen Min did not bring down the Yi dynasty. In one sense, they only tended to postpone the inevitable. As foreign powers attempted to use Emperor Kojong to maneuver Korea firmly under their control however, it became increasingly apparent that Korea could no longer control or even decisively influence the major events that were deciding its future. With the international tide of imperialism running high, it was no longer a question of whether Korea would be under the dominant influence of some foreign state, but which foreign state and under what conditions.