Ch 29 - Twilight of the Yi Dynasty

Three Against One

After the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, France and Germany exerted forceful diplomatic pressure on Japan not to demand possession of the Liaodong Peninsula, fearing the consequences of a Japanese foothold in China.

The West had been unable to prevent the Sino-Japanese War. It could only stand on the sidelines and watch events unfold.The fact the Japanese shrouded their objectives and demands in total secrecy only intensified a general apprehension that the fighting would push China toward anarchy and leave Japan in a dominant position in East Asia. Even before the conclusion of treaty talks with China however, Japan considered the possibility, if not the probability, of some type of European intervention.

The aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War was both psychologically startling and politically historic. First, to the surprise of the world, Japan literally burst out of its obscure feudal past to claim a status equal to that of any other modern major power in East Asia and did so in the short span of a single generation. Second, by defeating its giant neighbor with relative ease, Japan revealed China to be little more than a hollow shell, a mighty paper dragon. These two discoveries had direct and immediate consequences in Asia. Flushed with its victory over China, Japan started down the path to preeminence as a great Asian Power and was in a mood to dictate, not to compromise. China's defeat also foreshadowed the end of the Qing dynasty and started China on its decline through a period of accelerated foreign imperialism and disruptive internal political movements.

The Tonghak rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War had two important consequences for Korea. The most obvious consequence was the Japanese gained a free hand in the peninsula and could do just about as they pleased. The not so obvious consequence was that the Treaty of Shimonoseki formally tied East Asia to European political affairs. The Sino-Japanese War over Korea's fate also demonstrated that China was a nation ripe for the plucking and showed that Japan, with the added advantage of proximity to the Celestial Kingdom, would have to be dealt with as a hardy contender for the bounty.

With the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan held sole rights to station troops in Korea. From then on, neither China nor any other country could send troops to Korea except as an act of war. The cession of territory on the Liaodong Peninsula also meant that no enemy could reach Korea except by sea or by marching across territory under Japanese control. Japan intended to encircle Korea with a Japanese zone on land and Japanese naval power at sea. This was one of the most significant turning points in Korea's long history, for the peninsula was again being gradually occupied by a foreign power.

The Russian Imperial Government's interest in the Korean peninsula focused largely on the serach for ice-free ports in the region. Without easy overland access through Siberia, Russia could not easily supply its Far Eastern territories except by sea. In 1857, the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia, Nikolay Muravyov-Amursky, proposed constructing a railway system to connect Russia with its Siberian settlements. Russia was a poor nation and the prohibitive cost of such a project and the formidable construction challenges it presented virtually guaranteed nothing would come of it. The Russian government expressed little interest in such proposals. The government in St. Petersburg feared increasing foreign influence in Siberia and Russia's Far East if they ever permitted foreign capitalists and industrialists to build railways there.

Russia did not have enough rail lines to connect its mining, manufacturing and urban centers and priority had to go to its vital interests. The first real step towards a Siberian railroad came in 1873, with the creation of the Ural Railway Company to link the rich iron and coal mines of the Ural Mountains with Central Russia. The matter of a trans-Siberian rail line languished in numerous committees for years until the arrival of Alexander III on the Russian throne. He knew that without reliable transportation and communication linking Siberia to the Russian empire, Siberia would be at the mercy of strong Asiatic powers. In 1886, in response to a proposal from the governor-general of Irkutsk, Tsar Alexander III wrote:

I have read so many reports from the Siberian governors that now I can admit with sadness that government did almost nothing to satisfy the needs of this rich, but neglected region. It is time to correct this mistake.

Prompted by the tsar, three major expeditions set out in 1887 to survey routes for new rail lines in the Far Eastern territories. The creation of the Siberian Railway Construction Committee in 1891 gave the matter more urgency. The committed declared that, "Siberian railway construction is a great national event;  it should be built by Russian people with Russian materials." The expensive railroad project would not produce any direct material benefits for years, but the great Russian famine of 1891 dramatically demonstrated the need to move grain rapidly across a vast empire.

The Siberian railroad project bore all the markings of expansionism. It provided a way to accelerate the colonization of Siberia with peasants from the more overpopulated western provinces, a fact not lost on Count Sergei Iul'evich Witte, Russia's Minister of Finance. As chief advocate of the proposed railroad, Witte believed it would enable Russia to better penetrate the Chinese market and forestall British inroads. He also hoped it would carry a substantial share of the profitable trade between Europe and East Asia. Witte's arguments carried the tsar's favor and Russia's East Asian policy entered a new phase on March 17, 1891, when an imperial decree announced the decision to build a railway across Siberia.

"I order to start building the continuous railway across all the Siberia;  I want it to connect Siberian regions rich in nature resources with the rest of the Russian railway infrastructure. I want you to declare this as my will after my return from the countries of East. I also want you to start building in Vladivostok the Ussuriysk distance of Great Siberian Rail Way using the funds from Russian treasury."

Full time construction on the Trans-Siberian Railway began in May 1891. Similar to America's Trans-Continental Railroad, Russian engineers started construction at both ends (Chelyabinsk in the west and Vladivostok in the east) and worked towards the center, following Siberia's traditional trails, carriage and sleigh routes.

Although Japan had just defeated the largest nation in Asia and felt a justifiable claim to not only its position in Korea, but to the seizure of the Liaodong Peninsula, it regarded Russia as its primary enemy in the region. General Yamagata Aritomo carefully articulated this point in a foreign policy memorandum dated March 4, 1890. The Japanese considered consolidating their position in Korea before the Russians could complete the Trans-Siberian Railroad to be of utmost importance. Once completed, the rail line would dramatically increase Russia's ability to project its power in the region.

Although Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu preferred to reveal the Japanese government's actual terms to China to the Western powers and seek their tacit assent, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi disagreed, fearing that it would hand them an opportunity for "premature intervention." Ito and Mutsu agreed the safest approach would be to first "reap all the fruits of the war with China" and then, if the West raised objections, to convene a government council to decide what to do next.

Anxious about the possibility that China intended to leak the peace terms to Russian, English and French ministers in Beijing, Mutsu instructed his diplomats in Tokyo on April 3, 1895, to confidentially disclose Japan's demands to the representatives of Russia, England and France. Russian Minister Mikhail Aleksandrovich Hitrovo was visibly displeased to learn on April 4 that Japanese demands included the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula. Hitrovo warned privately that such a demand might hurt European sensibilities and provide a pretext for intervention. He also echoed the feelings of Russia's Foreign Minister, Aleksei Borisovich Lobanov-Rostovsky, that the acquisition of so much territory on the Asian mainland posed the gravest danger for Japan.

On April 6, Lobanov wrote a letter to Tsar Nicholas II which restated his belief that Japan's permanent occupation of the Liaodong Peninsula, including Port Arthur, would constitute a continuous menace to Beijing and even to Korea, whose independence would be proclaimed in the impending Sino-Japanese treaty. It would also be "highly undesirable," even prejudicial to Russia's future interests in the region. Lobanov indicated that about all Russia could do for the moment was to express its concern to the Japanese in the "most friendly terms" that the acquisition of Port Arthur would create a permanent roadblock to the restoration of good relations between Japan and China and a source of conflict in East Asia.

Japan was not alone in its interest in Korea and Liaodong. In response to Lobanov's communique, Tsar Nicholas II commented that "Russia absolutely needs a port, free and open all year round. This port must be on the mainland and without fail connected with our other possessions by a strip of land." Bypassing the basic question posed by Lobanov's memorandum, the Tsar sanctioned the idea of friendly diplomatic pressure on Japan. On April 8, Lobanov proposed to the other powers they jointly convey to Japan the view that annexing Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula would pose an obstacle to the reestablishment of good relations between China and Japan and create a permanent threat to East Asian peace.

Russia stood at a crossroad and had to make a basic decision regarding its future policy in East Asia. Japan's victory over China presented Russia with the prospect of either cooperating with the Japanese at China's expense, or defending China's interests against Japanese claims. Minister Lobanov wished to avoid needless conflict with Japan. Once it became known that Japan intended to demand the cession of the Liaodong Peninsula from China, Lobanov's first inclination was not to confront the Japanese, but to seek some compensating gain for Russia in Korea. An ice-free port on the Korean coast would more than counterbalance any Russian disadvantage should Japan manage to install itself in Manchuria. Russia coveted the ice-free seaports at the southern tip of the Liaodong Peninsula and had it in mind to turn the fine harbor at Port Arthur into a major naval base.

Lobanov detailed the Tsar's options in a memorandum attached to his letter. Should the Tsar remain satisfied with Russia's present position in East Asia and decide to pursue a passive policy, Lobanov stated that China would be an ideal ally. If however, he felt compelled to satisfy Russia's vital needs in East Asia by more aggressive measures, China would hardly be an active or useful ally. Lobanov acknowledged that Britain was Russia's most dangerous antagonist in Asia and stated his belief that sooner or later the two maritime powers of Japan and England would become rivals, at least in Japanese waters. He also believed that Japan would likely be in need of Russian support for some time, if not against China, then against the dominant influence of the British navy. Lobanov noted that "an agreement with the great power who has emerged in the East appears not entirely impossible." He concluded that Russia could, of course, "see to it together with the other powers, and especially with Great Britain, that Japan does not become excessively strong as the result of the present war ...."

At a ministerial conference held in St. Petersburg on April 11, 1895, the expected Japanese occupation of the Liaodong Peninsula took center stage. Minister Lobanov announced that both France and Germany were prepared to join Russia in whatever steps it deemed necessary to pressure Japan to relinquish the southern portion of Manchuria, including Port Arthur. Russian Fleet Admiral Grand Duke Aleksei Aleksandrovich focused on the importance of acquiring an ice-free port. Minister of War Peter Vannovskii contended that Korea's independence and Japan's acquisition of the Liaodong Peninsula were of the greatest importance to Russia. He pressed for a Japanese guarantee that it would evacuate Korea. So long as Japanese troops occupied Korean soil, he claimed, the peninsula's independence would be only an illusion. Vannovskii added that if Japan chose to remain, Russia was ready to take whatever action it felt necessary to protect its perceived national interests in the region, including the bombardment of Japanese seaports.

Minister of Finance Count Sergei Witte argued strongly that if Russia let Japan have its way in Manchuria, Russia would risk losing everything it had accomplished so far to put its finances in order. He claimed that if the Japanese ever established a presence on the Asian mainland, they would quickly build their power and Russia would find it extremely difficult to dislodge them later. Witte firmly believed that Japan realized that China would be divided in the near future and that the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad would significantly improve Russia's position in East Asia in the event of such a partition. He concluded that the railway construction project had prompted Japan's attack on China. Russia's principal task was to buy time until the railroad could be completed. Only then could Russia make its presence felt in East Asia. Until then, Russia must prevent any annexation of Chinese territory by any other nation.

Minister of War Vannovskii noted that even if Russia could not refrain from action in East Asia, no firm policy could be conducted with the guarantee that it would not come to war. The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Admiral of the Navy agreed that Russia was then unprepared to conduct a war with Japan and under no circumstances should Russia become involved in a war. The Chief of the Army General Staff argued that Japan's effort was directed less against China than against Russia and all of Europe. He predicted that Japan would not rest with the occupation of the Liaodong, but would push its colonization further north into Manchuria. Count Sergei Witte openly proclaimed that, "it was imperative not to allow Japan to penetrate into the very heart of China and secure a footing in the Liaodong Peninsula."

The ministers conference concluded in unanimous agreement to submit a number of recommendations to Tsar Nicholas II. First, Russia should move to maintain the pre-war status of the area north of the Chinese Empire and politely advise Japan to refrain from occupying any part of the Liaodong Peninsula. If Japan decisively refused to heed this advice, Russia should announce its intent to proceed according to its own regional interests. Second, Russia should announce to the outside world it harbored no territorial ambitions in the region and considered it necessary to protect its interests by insisting that Japan give up its occupation of the southern part of Manchuria. Minister Lobanov presented the minutes of the ministerial conference to Tsar Nicholas II on April 15. Key members of the meeting met with the tsar at the Imperial Palace the following afternoon to discuss their content. After a rather long discussion, Nicholas II approved the conference minutes and agreed that Russia would join with Germany and France to intervene in the issue of the Liaodong Peninsula.

The Western Powers reacted to events in East Asia almost before the ink had dried on the Treaty of Shimonoseki. On the afternoon of April 23, 1895, representatives from the Russian, French and German embassies went to the Foreign Office in Tokyo to make their joint appeal to Japan. To give added force to their message, Russia pulled twenty-nine of its warships out of Chinese and Japanese harbors and assembled combat troops in Vladivostok. The Japanese consul and residents in the port city became gravely alarmed when Russia declared Vladivostok a war zone.

Because Foreign Minister Mutsu was ill and staying in Maiko, near Kobe, the diplomats met individually with Vice Minister Hayashi Tadasu. Though each message was worded differently, each was identical in substance. The three powers requested the Japanese Emperor to waive that part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that provided for the surrender of the Liaodong Peninsula. If Japan renounced control of this territory, China's war indemnity would be increased by 30,000,000 Kuping taels of silver and Japan could retain control over Wei-hai-Wei until China paid the entire sum.

Russian Minister Hitrovo met with Hayashi first and told him that Tsar Nicholas beleived that possession of the Liaodong Peninsula would pose a menace to Beijing, render the independence of Korea an illusion, and would "henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace of the Far East." French Minister Jules Harmand spoke next and accompanied his message with general advice and reassurances of France's friendship.

The last to deliver his message was German Minister Baron Felix von Gutschmid and the translation of his remarks left the strongest impression on Hayashi. He said the Japanese peace terms were excessive and injured European and German interests. The German government would not fail to back its protest with "the necessary pressure" if need be. Japan should give in, von Gutschmid concluded, because fighting with three great powers was hopeless.

After receiving written statements from each of the three diplomats, Hayashi telegraphed everything to Mutsu in Maiko and Ito in Hiroshima. War Minister Yamagata, Navy Minster Saigo, and Prime Minister Ito met with the Meiji emperor on April 24 to discuss Japan's response. All agreed that they could not simply dismiss the advice of the powers out of hand without risking a war against the three intervening powers. Without the assistance of Great Britain, which it never saw fit to offer, the odds against victory were too great. Before reaching a final decision, Ito met with Mutsu Munemitsu. After hearing his views on the matter, Ito decided to ask Russia to reconsider its position and, if it remained unmoved, to offer a counter-proposal to the three Western ministers.

On May 1, Japan offered to return all the Liaodong Peninsula except for Port Arthur. Japan soon learned however, that Tsar Nicholas' position had hardened in the interim and Russia would not budge from its original position of removing Japan entirely from southern Manchuria. Within three days the Japanese cabinet abandoned efforts to retain a foothold on the continent. The Foreign Office announced on May 5 that Japan had renounced the "definitive possession of the Peninsula." The Japanese capitulated entirely on the matter by agreeing to amend Article 4 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and return the entire peninsula in exchange for a larger indemnity from China.

Thirty minutes before midnight on May 8, 1895, Japan and China exchanged ratifications of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in the Chinese port city of Chefoo (modern Yantai). Anchored at Chefoo that night were some twenty-two heavily-armed Russian warships, painted battle grey and stripped for action. Although Russia's tone had remained friendly, behind the scenes it had already begun mobilizing its land forces in far eastern Russia and was prepared to invade Manchuria if Japan rejected the demands and war broke out.

In June 1895, British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury faced the problem of how to avert the partitioning of the crumbling Qing Empire and contain Russia's expanding influence in northeast Asia, an area where British ground forces were weak. The Russians maintained four divisions in Central Asia and two divisions in the Irkutsk and Amur Military Districts. Once the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed, Russia could rapidly reinforce these units with men and equipment from 48 infantry and 22 cavalry divisions stationed in Europe. France, Russia's ally, maintained two army divisions in Indochina. Great Britain had only one battalion in Hong Kong and one in Singapore. The nearest reinforcements were the nine British divisions stationed in India, and they could only reach the Far East by sea.

Although Japan yielded to the combined demands and implied threats from Russia, France and Germany, it understood the confrontation had essentially been with Russia. Japan's victory over China led to the unforeseen result of an abrupt collision with an adversary far more dangerous than the one it had just defeated. Vice Minister Hayashi confidently supposed that China would soon compensate Russia for its help by giving her a strip of land through Manchuria for the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway. The Russian naval survey parties actively cruising the Chinese and Korean coastlines in search of a naval port convinced Hayashi that Russia's "real ambition" was an ice-free port in Korea.