Ch 27 - Rebellion and Mounting Tensions

Who Invited You?

China and Japan continued to raise the stakes in their race to dominate Korea. Japan took used the Tonghak Rebellion as an opportunity to drive China off the peninsula and they felt strong enough to precipitate a war with China to do so.

With the ambitious Japanese threatening China's southern flank and increasing its intrigues and involvement in Korea, and the Russians making inroads from the north, Viceroy Li Hongzhang became painfully aware of China's weaknesses and shortcomings. Instead of challenging the Japanese directly, Li reverted to the more obvious and ancient strategy of playing one major power against the other, all the while trying to make Korea China's own in real and legal form.

Li had already assumed a distant supervision over Korea through his Resident in Seoul, General Yuan Shih-k'ai, a man with the suppleness of a mandarin and the readiness of a dictator to run roughshod over all opposition. Through him and the Chinese Customs Service Office, Li had taken the apparent first step toward a formal or informal annexation of Korea. Though China forced the pace of action in Korea, it did so with preventive rather than active measures.

Viceroy Li Hongzhang could not believe at the time that Japan was fully prepared to act the instant that China moved troops into Korea. Although Korea had not invited Japan to send troops, the Japanese got ready for a fight even before it had any clearly defined need to do so. Only three days after deciding to put troops in Korea, the Japanese government created a supreme military command under the Emperor and began mobilizing. Major General Oshima Yoshimasa commanded a mixed brigade formed at Hiroshima. His orders instructed him to show a maximum love of peace in his association with foreign officials in Korea and to make a special effort to win the goodwill of the Korean people. If asked to do so by Korea, he would aid in the suppression of the Tonghak Rebellion. If the rebels penetrated Seoul and threatened the foreign settlements, and the Korean government could not provide, or would not offer the necessary protection, General Oshima had instructions to act in agreement with chargé d'affaires Otori Keisuke. Finally, the military command warned Oshima to restrain the "impetuous bravery" of his young officers and not allow any collision with Chinese troops.

On June 6, 1894, a flotilla of Chinese ships left the naval port of Wei-hai-wei for Korea, loaded with about 3,000 armed troops under the command of General Yeh Chih-chao. Unknown to either Li Hongzhang or General Yeh at the time, Japan already had a military force on its way to Korea. As soon as Komura Jutaro's telegram of June 4 reached Tokyo with news that Chinese troops were deploying for the Korean peninsula, a battalion of Japanese infantry and a platoon of sappers departed Japan ahead of General Oshima's full mixed brigade. It arrived in Korea ahead of the Chinese.

The day General Yeh's expeditionary force left China, Minister Mutsu Munemitsu sent a telegram to chargé d'affaires Sugimura Fukashi in Seoul to alert him of Otori Keisuke's departure from Japan accompanied by a police escort and a detachment of marines. In accordance with his earlier instructions, Sugimura notified General Yuan of the imminent arrival of the Japanese minister and his escort, but said nothing of the marine detachment. Sugimura soon received a second telegram from Mutsu confirming that China had been properly informed of the dispatch of Japanese troops to Korea. On June 7 Sugimura met with Yi Hak-kyu, Secretary of the Korean Foreign Office, and informed him of Japan's decision. Through Yi's office, notification also reached Korean Foreign Minister Cho Pyong-jik.

Given the rapid pace of events in Korea at the time, news of the impending arrival of Japanese troops startled Minister Cho. He hurriedly sent Yi Hak-kyu to meet with Sugimura on June 8 to determine the motives behind the Japanese action. Cho vigorously protested the deployment, claiming that Seoul was peaceful and that the Tonghak uprising had subsided. He argued there was no justification for sending troops to Korea in peacetime and warned Sugimura the arrival of Japanese troops would create a disturbance in Seoul that would work to Japan's disadvantage. Prompted by General Yuan, Minister Cho asked for an immediate halt to the sending of troops. Sugimura calmly replied that he had no authority to discuss the matter and suggested that Cho take it up with the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo.

General Yuan Shih-k'ai held to the conviction that Japan feared China and would not provoke the Chinese "lightly." He confidently believed that chargé d'affaires Otori fully understood the importance of preserving friendly relations with China. According to Britain's acting consul general in Seoul, Christopher T. Gardner, who watched developments with a growing interest, General Yuan Shih-k'ai believed Japan had serious financial problems and depended on China for its food supply. Yuan depicted the dispatch of Chinese troops to Korea as "an act of friendship" consistent with the ancient relationship between the two countries. He felt there was no danger of Russia or Japan claiming the right to send troops to Korea because China had done so. Yuan boasted that he was on the best of terms with the Japanese and remarked that "the only party who would gain by a quarrel would be Russia." Yuan stated, "The landing of Russian and Japanese troops would be an act of war."

Like China, Japan saw an opportunity to expand its influence in Korea. It hoped to restore its position of political primacy and ensure a growing market for its economic output. Japanese exports to Korea relative to China steadily declined under China's growing influence and had begun to decrease in absolute terms as well. In 1885, Japan accounted for 81% of all Korean imports from China and Japan. By 1892, that advantage had dropped to only 55%. Since China exported goods largely produced elsewhere and Japan exported its own commodities, the Japanese felt the impact even more severely than statistics alone would indicate. In addition, Japanese merchants loathed the thought of giving up the exorbitant profits their usurious practices had provided them. Under such circumstances Japan felt it necessary to exert political and military pressure on Korea. For this reason, Japan viewed China's action of dispatching troops as a welcome opportunity.

On June 9, the Chinese Foreign Office repeated its point that Chinese troops were being sent to Korea at the specific request of King Kojong in accordance with its traditional practice of "protecting vassal states." Because Japan professed it was sending troops to protect its legation, consulates and merchants in Seoul, the Zongli Yamen argued it might not be necessary to send a large number of soldiers. Furthermore, since Korea had not appealed to the Japanese for help, it requested that Japanese troops not be sent to the interior of the kingdom. Neither Li's advice nor that of the Zongli Yamen swayed Foreign Minister Mutsu. When Mutsu sent a note to China's minister Wang Feng-ts'ao acknowledging receipt of the Foreign Office notification, he reiterated that Japan had never recognized Korea as a vassal state under China. He also assured Wang that Otori and the Japanese troop commander had strict orders to restrain their soldiers to prevent incidents.

The Japanese warship carrying Otori Keisuke, 405 well-armed Japanese marines, and two field guns anchored at Inchon on June 9. Otori's marine detachment hurried to the Japanese legation in Seoul the next day in the mistaken belief that the situation in Seoul was the same as in 1882 and 1884. Arriving under the escort of a Japanese police guard, the marines took up residence in houses and stores near the legation belonging to local Japanese subjects. Within twenty-four hours, Foreign Minister Cho Pyong-jik contacted Otori Keisuke to protest the arrival of the marine detachment in Seoul. Cho's claim that the Tonghak disturbance had already been quieted by Korean troops did not impress Otori. The fact there were no Chinese troops in the capital and that all was quiet, did.

The highly visible Japanese marines in Seoul were far more noticeable than the much larger Chinese force that landed at the port of Asan, about seventy miles southwest of Seoul. General Yeh entrenched his forces in the countryside near Asan Bay, where they remained in a garrison status within easy reach of the Tonghak rebel headquarters farther inland at Chonju. The two small armies from Japan and China assembled at close quarters to each other along the west coast of Korea, separated by less than a few hours steaming distance by sea or a few days march by land.

Otori cabled the Foreign Office in Tokyo to warn that sending a force much larger than a single battalion would likely inflame rather than calm local unrest. Furthermore, a large force might arouse the suspicions of China, Russia and the other Western powers and prompt them to send troops as well. Nevertheless, on June 12, 1894, a Japanese infantry brigade of nearly 4,000 soldiers backed by seven warships, arrived near Inchon. Ito Hirobumi's cabinet believed the dispatch of troops to Korea was in the interest of peace and Japan's diplomatic staff carried instructions to that effect. The Japanese general staff however, had been planning for a war with China ever since 1879. Vice Chief of Staff Soroku Kawakami deceived Minister Mutsu Munemitsu when he gained approval for a single brigade of 2,000 men. Instead, he sent nearly four times that number in a mixed brigade that included cavalry and artillery. The size of the force clearly indicated that Japan intended to do more than merely defend its interests. Vice Chief of Staff Kawakami exploited the opportunity at hand to precipitate a collision with China.

Not long after the vanguard of Japanese forces arrived in Seoul, French charge d'affaires G. Lefèvre challenged Otori as to why Japan had brought such a considerable armed force into the capital. After all, Lefèvre noted, everything was absolutely tranquil and the disturbances in the southern provinces seemed to be over. Otori ceremoniously replied that Japan had it in mind to protect its subjects and their property in Korea. As the total number of troops began to approach the 10,000 mark, Lefèvre again went to the Japanese legation to express his astonishment. Otori knew his earlier explanation would no longer carry any weight with the Frenchman. He explained that when China notified Japan about the dispatch of its troops, the Chinese referred to Korea as a vassal state. Otori declared that Japan sent its troops to Seoul to protest that allegation and simultaneously begin negotiations with the Chinese government to "make it formally recognize the independence of this kingdom."

Convinced of the urgency to disperse the Tonghak army and appease its leaders by any means at hand, Korean troops marched south to the city of Chonju, about seventy miles southeast of the capital. Under the direct threat of force, government authorities proposed a negotiated truce with the Tonghak leadership. Chon Pong-jun regarded the government's willingness to listen as an opportunity to gain his objectives without continued warfare. The presence of some 3,000 Chinese troops near Asan Bay no doubt had a demoralizing effect as well.

Chon's main concerns sounded in many ways similar to the Progressive Party's proposed reform program outlined by Kim Ok-kyun some years before. Chon focused principally on bringing an end to the oppressive treatment of the Tonghak at the hands of the government and the yangban. In order to prevent the further drain on the life-blood of the peasantry, he demanded an end illegal extortions by the yangban and their excessive economic exploitation of the peasants. He also demanded that discrimination based on social class status be abolished. With regards to the presence of foreigners in the country, Chon demanded the government block the inroads of foreign merchants and punish those guilty of collusion with the Japanese in pursuit of their aggressive designs. In this regard at least, Tonghak demands remained unchanged from when they first took up arms against the government. As a result of these talks, the government agreed to end its misrule and pursue a program of reforms. Chon agreed he would cease hostilities.

The peasant-soldiers withdrew from Chonju and returned to their homes, where they set out to reinforce the presence of the Tonghak movement in Korea. An organized network of Tonghak followers soon extended into area after area with the announced aim of establishing congregations in every village. In the fifty-three counties of Cholla province, they established so-called Local Directorates that existed in parallel with the formal county administration and set about reforming local government abuses. In the provincial capital of Chonju, Chon Pong-jun established and led a Headquarters Directorate. The powerful appeal of the Tonghak movement spread far beyond Cholla Province into the other southern provinces, even to the northern provinces of Pyongan and Hamgyong. The suppression of the Tonghak Rebellion and the dispersal of the peasant army from around Chonju eliminated the ostensible reason for stationing Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea. Nevertheless, the Tonghak Rebellion provided the Japanese an opportunity to drive the Chinese out of Korea altogether and at the time they felt strong enough to face China in a war if necessary to do so.

Privately, King Kojong was "very agitated" about the increasing number of Japanese troops and tried to stop the Japanese force buildup in mid-June by notifying foreign representatives in Seoul that the Tonghak agitation had ended. Before the reality of the situation could sink in however, the Japanese Cabinet made a decision that effectively raised the stakes in the tense standoff in Korea.

Japan's Imperial Cabinet approved a plan on June 14, submitted by Ito Hirobumi, that called for the creation of a joint Chinese-Japanese commission for Korean reforms. Ito designed his proposal to not only eliminate the current upheaval in Korea, but to remove the root causes of future disturbances which tended to endanger friendly relations among Japan, China and Korea. He proposed that once peace had been restored in Korea, Japan and China would then cooperate to improve the peninsula's internal administration. He argued that peace in East Asia depended on preventing a recurrence of the Tonghak Rebellion. Reform was essential if internal unrest was not again to flare into open rebellion. Minister Mutsu modified Ito's idea by specifically stating that if China refused to go along with the proposed reform program, Japan would take the initiative and assume the responsibility for implementing reforms all by itself.

Since the Tonghak rebellion had calmed to a level where the Korean government could cope by itself, Russian Minister Count Artur Cassini told Li Hongzhang on June 20 that Chinese and Japanese troops should be removed from Korea. By this time, Viceroy Li fully realized that Japan wanted a war and that China was in no position to oblige them. He again asked for Russian mediation to get the Japanese to simultaneously withdraw their soldiers along with those of China;   the Chinese to the north and the Japanese to the south, leaving a neutral zone in the middle of the country around the capital of Seoul. Li added that the Chinese government recognized Russia's direct interest in the matter and gave it the exclusive right to be the mediator. Cassini declared that inasmuch as Russia and Korea were direct neighbors, his government could not tolerate Japanese interference in Korea's affairs and voiced the hope that their countries could work together. Favorably impressed with Li's request, Cassini cabled St Petersburg and urged that Russia must avail itself of the opportunity offered by the Chinese. Not only would Russian mediation stop an otherwise inevitable armed conflict in Korea, but it would greatly expand Russian influence in the peninsula and all of East Asia. Tsar Alexander III agreed.

Two days after Tokyo approved the plan for a joint Chinese-Japanese commission for Korean reforms, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu informed the Zongli Yamen through Minister Wang Feng-ts'ao and Minister Komura Jutaro in Beijing. The Qing government responded to the Japanese proposal on June 22 in a cablegram to Minister Wang in Tokyo. Wang stated that the end of the peasant disturbance meant there was no further need to deploy Chinese troops on Korea's behalf. Just a day earlier, Wang conceded to Russian Minister Mikhail Hitrovo that the Tonghak uprising was no longer the issue in Korea. Therefore, there was no need to even consider a joint effort to deal with the unrest in Korea. The provisions of the 1885 Convention of Tianjin covered the issue of withdrawing troops from Korea, said Wang, and there was no cause for further discussion of the matter. Wang also claimed that the future of Korean affairs, "must be left to Korea herself." Viceroy Li Hongzhang commented that,

Even China, whose vassal Korea has always been, would not interfere in the internal administration of the Kingdom;   Japan, having from the beginning recognized Korea as an independent state, cannot claim any right to interfere.

Considering what China had been doing in Korea to date, Li's statement could certainly not have been intended to mollify the Japanese. Li issued instructions to the Yi Government to stall the Japanese by declaring that reform "might" be carried out after Japan withdrew its troops.

Japan's reaction to this response came quickly. Minister Mutsu directly challenged China's overly optimistic opinion of the situation in Korea in a message to Minister Wang Feng-ts'ao. He wrote,

Sad experience teaches us that [Korea] is the theatre [sic] of political intrigues and civil revolts and disturbances of such frequent recurrence as to justify the conclusion that the Government of that country is lacking in some of the elements which are essential to responsible independence.

Noting Japan's extensive commercial interests in Korea and its geographic proximity, Mutsu declared that, under the circumstances, Japan could not "disregard the law of self-preservation." He made it very clear that Japan would not remove its troops without an understanding that guaranteed future peace, order and good government in Korea.

Foreign Minister Giers telegraphed instructions to Minister Hitrovo in Tokyo on June 23 ordering him to use all his efforts to persuade the Japanese government to come to an agreement with the Chinese on the simultaneous withdrawal of troops. Hitrovo met frequently over the next few days with Foreign Minister Mutsu in an effort to divert the Japanese from their impending collision with China. He described his proposal for the simultaneous troop withdrawal in a lengthy note to Mutsu. The message detailed the "serious responsibility" which Japan would assume if it made war in East Asia unavoidable by hindering the joint troop withdrawal from Korea. Despite his efforts however, internal events in Japan presented Minister Hitrovo with an insurmountable challenge. The night after Mutsu Munemitsu showed the Russian note to Premier Ito Hirobumi, the Premier cabled his diplomats in St. Petersburg and Seoul, "Ito and I are at one that Japan should never obey the dictate of Russia."

Mutsu's declaration to Chinese Minister Wang that Japanese troops should remain in Korea to "renovate Korean home affairs" was an admittedly flimsy bluff, but the Japanese never expected China to accept it. The Japanese purposely took the position they did to raise an issue they knew China would reject. Japan could then seize upon China's reaction as an excuse to open hostilities. When Mutsu told Otori of the cabinet's decision to take advantage of the Tonghak Rebellion to demand that China join with Japan in the reform of the Korean government, he warned him to keep the information completely secret, "not only from Yuan Shih-k'ai, but from all the others."

Minister Mutsu noted that Li Hongzhang seemed very eager to force the withdrawal of Japanese troops, even to the extent of removing his own troops to achieve it. He further stated the necessity of maintaining a Japanese military presence in Seoul under any pretense possible during the negotiations with the Chinese. Mutsu made a show of being conciliatory, but held that "negotiating with the Chinese is no more productive than drawing well water with a bottomless bucket." The Chinese, for their part, looked upon Japan "as a tiny island of barbarians who have recklessly and impudently rushed forward in a mad effort to imitate the external trappings of Western civilization."

In a cable to Otori, Minister Mutsu Munemitsu suggested that a group of legation or consulate personnel be sent into Cholla Province "in a most open and public manner" to investigate the actual state of affairs with regard to the Tonghak situation. He pointedly stated that the investigators should drag the process out as long as possible to stall for time. Minister Mutsu wanted to rebuff the charge that Japanese troops were no longer needed and ordered Otori to ensure that his final report showed conditions in the most "unfavorable light" and that the rebels were indeed still active.

While the special inspector was in Cholla Province, another group of Japanese agents secretly made contact with the Tonghak leader Chon Pong-jun and tried to convince him that Japan strongly opposed the Seoul government and actually supported the Tonghak. The agents knew the Tonghak were violently anti-Japanese, but they hoped to provoke some kind of major incident they could use later to justify maintaining a Japanese presence in Korea.

Meanwhile, Mutsu continued, if the Yi government should ask for the withdrawal of Japanese troops because they believed that order had been restored, Otori should say that he had to wait for the investigative reports on the situation to satisfy both the Korean and Japanese governments. Otori not only agreed to Mutsu's plan, but added that it would be "very impolitic" to withdraw all Japanese troops without having them do anything. He felt compelled to find some reason for effectively employing their talents.

Otori suggested to Mutsu that Japan demand of both Korea and China that Chinese troops be withdrawn first. They could then regard a Chinese refusal as an attempt on the part of the Qing government to maintain its suzerainty over Korea. That way, he argued, Japan would have "every reason" to push the Chinese out by force. Otori, apparently eager to engage the Chinese, asked of Mutsu, "May I resort to such energetic measures if after all amicable arrangement cannot be reached without impairing our dignity?" Otori got his answer before the end of the month. In a handwritten note personally carried to Otori in Seoul on June 27, Mutsu asserted that war with China was inevitable. The note instructed Otori to "manufacture any kind of pretext to start a war."

Great Britain's legation secretary in Beijing, Sir Nicholas-Roderick O'Conor, flatly rejected Komura Jutaro's contention that Japan had sent troops to Korea solely to protect Japanese citizens and property. In his frankly expressed opinion, Japan's actions had little to do with advancing understanding with either China or Korea. They had been calculated to bring about a grave situation in the area.

In the short time preceding the military build-up in Korea, Japan bought a large number of steamships along with all the Cardif coal they could find in the market. They had been "hunting right and left for nautical charts of the China coast." From O'Conor's perspective in Beijing, he warned Komura that China had no choice but to increase its own military presence in Korea. O'Conor believed that a collision between the two countries was highly probable and that the distance to a state of open hostility, perhaps actual war, was very, very short. Komura never shared his government's proposal to China with O'Conor out of a concern for secrecy, fearing the Russian legation in Beijing would soon learn the details. He did evoke the menacing specter of Russia however, implying to O'Conor that Japan sought a joint guarantee of Korea's integrity and independence with China to protect the kingdom from falling prey to the ambitious designs of Russia at some future date.

The sharpest international conflict at the time was that between Great Britain and Russia, and Asia was the main field of contention. Britain's strong interest in the Korean problem stemmed from the fact that it provided Russia with an opportunity to intervene in Asia. Russia was on the march eastward across the Asian continent, and Korea, which bordered the Siberian Maritime Province, sat directly in its path. If Russia took Korea, then China would fall and India would be surrounded. This would leave the British vulnerable to a Russian attack. British diplomats pressured the respective governments in both Beijing and Tokyo to abstain from hostilities and seek to reform Korea through friendly negotiations.

The British government left the impression with the Japanese that it would welcome any arrangement they could reach with China regarding Korea, "if it was directly or indirectly intended as a precaution against Russian invasion." England genuinely feared that if China and Japan could not settle their differences peacefully, then Russia would undoubtedly call for a joint intervention of the European Powers. The British hardly needed the Japanese to prompt apprehensions about Russian interests in East Asia.

As China faced Western and Japanese threats, Korea's strategic importance became a major factor in the calculations of Chinese policy-makers in the late nineteenth century. By itself, Korea never threatened either China or Japan, but in the hands of an actual or potential enemy, Korea could pose a serious threat to both. China had learned little or nothing from the turbulent events of the nineteenth century. Still retaining a firm grip on its past, China had also not forgotten anything. Though China helped civilize the island empire of Japan over the centuries, it remained openly contemptuous of the rapidly modernizing Japanese and regarded them as primitive and negligible. Traditionally, China was highly concerned with the physical threat of any strong aggressive power along its lengthy, undefended borders.

By the mid-1890s, Japanese progress gave China an unmistakable view of the island empire's intentions in East Asia. Korea's status became a test case for the Qing and Meiji empires alike, if only because each was the other's weakest potential opponent. If China could not even stare down Japan in its own sphere of influence, it could hardly hope to resist the inroads of European imperialists. If Japan could not even intimidate China, it could hardly command respect as an equal of the white nations. As the justifiable fear in Japan and China that the other would win outright ascendancy in Korea escalated their mutual tensions, these two great empires pushed the old controversy over Korea to the limit.

At the suggestion of Britain's legation secretary O'Conor, the British government attempted to prevent a three-cornered arrangement between Russia, China and Japan by advancing the idea of a five-power intervention by England, Germany, France, the United States, and Russia to bring about an agreement over Korea. The initiative failed for lack of support. The German government refused to participate, fearing involvement in a conflict of interests between England and Russia. The ill-informed French government believed, like Germany, that the issue was of more concern to England and Russia and chose not to interfere officially. American President Grover Cleveland recoiled at the very idea of a joint intervention. Without flatly turning down the British, the United States government declined to participate on the grounds that it had already strongly protested Japan's attitude toward Korea. Japan recognized that the United States had a very weak position in East Asia and totally ignored the American appeal for a peaceful settlement.

Officials of the Zongli Yamen formally rejected the Japanese proposal for joint action in Korea on July 9. They also declined Great Britain's offer to help mediate their differences with Japan. Instead, they insisted again that the Japanese retire from Korea. Chargé d'affaires Komura Jutaro delivered Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu's reply to the Foreign Office in Beijing. It charged the Qing government with being "disposed to precipitate complications" and declared that the Japanese government therefore found itself "relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality that may ... arise out of the situation." The Japanese foreign minister knew what was coming when he cabled Komura on July 12 that war was apparently unavoidable and to watch out for anything that could be used as a pretext for action against China.