Ch 26 - Coup d`état and International Rivalries

Turning Up the Heat

The British moved into Port Hamilton as Korea sought to engage Russia as a protective power to block continued intrusions by China, which desired to maintain the status quo in Korea, and Japan, which viewed Russian moves as an ominous sign.

In the spring of 1885, the British Admiralty selected Komundo as its forward naval base of operations against Russia;  a cluster of Korean islands strategically located about halfway between Hong Kong and Vladivostok. Komundo, named Port Hamilton by an English surveyor in 1845 after Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of the British Admiralty, is a small cluster of crescent-shaped islands off the southern coast of Cholla Province. The islands sit in the sea lanes along which Russian naval forces would have to steam when entering or leaving the East Sea through the Tsushima Strait. The Royal Commission agreed with the selection and even suggested that force might be used if the Koreans objected.

Located in the southernmost extent of the Korean Archipelago between Yosu and Cheju islands, Komundo is actually three small islets enclosing an expansive natural harbor:  Dong (East Islet), Seo (West Islet), and Go (Central Islet). On April 10, 1885, the same month Britain's treaty with Korea took effect, three Royal Navy ships from the British China Squadron dropped anchor at Port Hamilton to take control of one of Korea's best seaports. With the full knowledge of China and without seeking permission from or even giving notice to Korea, China, or Japan, a garrison of 100 British marines set up shop on the uninhabited small central islet they called Observation Island.

The British immediately began constructing permanent troop encampments and gun emplacements on the islands and gave every indication they planned a long term occupation. They constructed barracks, a hospital and other buildings, in addition to several jetties. At a cost of £85,000, the British laid a submarine telegraph cable from Port Hamilton to Woosung, China, just north of Shanghai. Strong currents in the area made telegraph communications difficult if not impossible most of the time.

While the occupation of Port Hamilton raised some eyebrows in the British Parliament and unsettled other regional powers, the islanders showed little hostility toward the British. Nevertheless, the sailors and marines at Port Hamilton were discouraged from communicating with Koreans on either of the two larger islands. Many of the local islanders had smallpox the virulent cholera epidemic of 1885-1886 made enforced segregation literally a matter of life and death.

The British suspended virtually all commercial operations at Port Hamilton during their occupation. The only evidence of prior commercial activity on Observation Island was a lone shack used by Japanese fishermen to dry their fish on the beach. In May 1866, a Japanese fisherman arrived with five female "assistants," intending perhaps to engage in the world's oldest commercial enterprise:  prostitution.

When news of the Japanese "fishing crew" reached the British garrison, Captain Keppel, the commanding officer, found it necessary to increase the guards to prevent his men from sneaking over to the Japanese camp. On the morning of May 12, twelve British marines stole a pair of patrol boats and set off for the Japanese camp. As soon as the watch commander discovered the missing men, he set out across the harbor in a boat to intercept them. In their rush to escape capture, one of the boats inadvertently capsized, dumping six men in the water. Five of the marines were rescued. Private Ward, unable to swim and with his pockets full of silver coins, drowned during the incident. Captain Keppel had the Japanese fisherman and his "crew" removed from Port Hamilton.

On June 8, the Austrian steam-powered warship SMS Nautilus dropped anchor at Port Hamilton on its Far East tour to show the Austrian-Hungarian flag. Captain Keppel welcomed Commander Spetzler and gave him a personal walking tour of the naval installation, including the island's fortifications and defenses. Commander Spetzler spent about 24 hours at Port Hamilton before sailing late in afternoon on June 9 en route to Pusan.

The following month, the arrival of the small American schooner Pearl triggered an interesting challenge to the British occupation of Port Hamilton. The schooner, under the command of Captain C.H. Anderson, departed San Francisco, California, and arrived in Pusan in mid-July, where it took on supplies and registered with the local government. Captain Anderson represented the business interests of Mr. H.A. Nowell, whose company had obtained an exclusive pearl-fishing franchise from the president of the Korean Foreign Affairs Office. The franchise, which was good for 20 years, granted Nowell's company a concession to fish for pearls along Korea's entire coast, including all islands except Cheju Island.

The Pearl anchored at Port Hamilton on July 18, and the following morning Captain Anderson made his way to Admiral Vessey's flagship, where he presented his documents and informed the admiral he intended to fish for pearls in the waters off Komundo. Admiral Vessey bluntly informed Captain Anderson that he would do no such thing. Anderson demanded to know how the admiral could deny him fishing rights when he carried an exclusive franchise from the Korean government that stated, "In all places, there must be no obstruction to the work of the company," and that he could harvest pearls "on all the coasts of Korea" exclusively for a period of 20 years. Admiral Vessey told him,

Port Hamilton belonged to England and not to Corea (Korea), and acting under instructions, (he) was obliged to refuse (Captain Anderson) permission to fish in the harbor of Port Hamilton, or within the territorial limits.

While in Pusan, Captain Anderson learned that the British had taken control of Komundo despite protests from Seoul and that they had no real authority beyond the force of arms to refuse him permission to harvest pearls in the waters off Komundo. In response to the admiral, Anderson said he understood that Komundo belonged to Korea, not England and that he did not believe the United States recognized any change of ownership. The admiral stood his ground, stating that was a matter between governments and until he received orders to the contrary, he would not permit foreign nationals to settle or trade at Port Hamilton.

In the presence of two American crewmen from the Pearl, Captain Anderson filed a formal complaint against Admiral Vessey. After tensions had cooled a bit, Vessey paid a visit to the Pearl. Upon inspection of the schooner, he agreed that it was "bona fide for pearl-fishing" and permitted Captain Anderson to remain in the area for forty-eight hours to determine whether or not there were any pearls to be had. Soon afterwards, the Pearl sailed out of Port Hamilton. The British government later noted that Admiral Vessey had overstepped "the mere assertion of British authority" when he claimed that "Port Hamilton belonged to England."

The sudden occupation of Port Hamilton played directly into the hands of von Mollendorff, who had long been warning the Russians of British designs on Korea. King Kojong feared that the Komundo Incident might trigger a similar action by other powers. He also feared that negotiations between China and Japan at Tianjin might collapse and result in a resumption of hostilities.

King Kojong dispatched a secret mission to Vladivostok to appeal directly to the Russians for protection. There were indications in 1885, never confirmed, that King Kojong and Queen Min had been conducting secret negotiations with Russia through von Mollendorff. Some even believed that a secret agreement had already been reached which granted Russia access to a warm water harbor on Korea's northeastern coast in exchange for Russian advisers to train a Korean army. As can best be determined, Korea signed no treaty with Russia before 1888 that granted it any such special territorial privileges.

Since chargé d'affaires Karl Waeber was not expected in Korea until the autumn, Russian First Secretary Alexis de Speyer rushed to Seoul to check the British by establishing closer relations with the Yi government. While de Speyer traveled to Seoul, a delegation of Korean officials, including von Mollendorff, sailed to Port Hamilton to verify the British presence. The party discovered eight British ships anchored in port and the British flag flying atop a nearby hill. The British admiral ordered the British flag displayed because his government had learned that Russia wanted to take the island themselves.

The British told von Mollendorff on May 16 that their government had "found it necessary, in view of certain eventualities," to authorize the temporary occupation of Komundo. They were only temporarily "guarding" Port Hamilton as a "measure of self defense." Two days later, von Mollendorff sailed to Nagasaki and protested the occupation of Port Hamilton directly to British Vice Admiral Sir William Dowell, Commander-in-Chief of the British China Squadron. After returning to Seoul, von Mollendorff threatened Britain's acting consul general that if England did not evacuate Port Hamilton, the treaty between Korea and Britain would be revoked.

In late May 1885, Baron von Korff, Governor-General of the Amur Region, received a letter from von Mollendorff outlining a proposal to send 4 senior and 16 junior Russian officers to Korea to train 2,000 Korean troops. The Russian Foreign Ministry sent diplomatic instructions approved by Tsar Alexander III on June 7 were telegraphed to Russia's first chargé d'affaires in Korea, Karl I. Waeber, expressing confidence that all of von Mollendorff's proposals to the Russian government had been executed with the approval of King Kojong. Though unknown at the time, Paul George von Mollendorff was acting entirely on his own, without the consent of either King Kojong or the Korean Foreign Office.

In June 1885, First Secretary Alexis de Speyer and von Mollendorff held a number of meetings in June to review von Mollendorff's plan for a Russian-Korean alliance. The entire plan hinged on Korea accepting Russian military instructors in exchange for Russian protection. Although China had expressed the desire that Korea hire German instructors to train the Korean Army, von Mollendorff never recommended it to King Kojong. He believed that whoever provided military instructors to Korea would also play a dominant role in Korea's diplomatic and political affairs. In his opinion, that country should be nearby Russia, not distant Germany. Secretary de Speyer wrote the details of this "agreement" in a note and von Mollendorff translated it into Chinese for submission to King Kojong and Kim Yun-sik, head of the Foreign Office.

When Secretary de Speyer arrived in Seoul in late June, he expected a great welcome at the Foreign Office. In his meeting with Kim Yun-sik on June 20, de Speyer was stunned to hear Kim disclaim any knowledge of the Korean mission to Vladivostok or of von Mollendorff's repeated appeals for Russian military aid. Furthermore, de Speyer learned that Kim had carried his note to the Chinese Commissioner of Trade Chen Shutang.

Soon after the failed coup d`état of 1884, when the danger of a Korean occupation by foreign troops became a real possibility, Russia mobilized its naval presence in the Yellow Sea and the Pacific to demonstrate its readiness to protect Korean integrity. The Russian government did not want to upset the status quo in Korea and several times rejected proposals to establish a "protectorate" over Korea. Russian interest in Korea at this time focused principally on the introduction of military instructors.

Secretary de Speyer told Kim Yun-sik that he had been instructed to consolidate friendly relations with Korea. He added that von Mollendorff's requests had been forwarded to St. Petersburg and that his government had already agreed to send Russian military instructors to Korea. When Kim firmly replied that King Kojong had already applied to the United States for military instructors, de Speyer's mood became exasperated and menacing. When Kim brushed aside his threat to break off relations with Korea, he continued:

My country never yields to any power ... and will not on any account put up with any slight or rudeness. Your government must simply accept Russian drill instructors and you will not be allowed to dispense with their services, even though you may wish it.

Neither Paul George von Mollendorff nor Alexis de Speyer had the authority to conduct such secretive negotiations with Korea. Once word of a possible secret deal with Russia became known, China, Japan and Great Britain reacted with great alarm. Feelings ran high among Korean, Japanese and Chinese officials in Seoul who believed that von Mollendorff had acted without King Kojong's knowledge or authorization or that of the Korean government. In response, King Kojong banished the hapless officials who traveled to Vladivostok and hinted at putting von Mollendorff on trial for high treason. Paul George von Mollendorff served at the pleasure of an absolute monarch in an Asian country and could do nothing without the king's permission. As the executor of King Kojong's plans, the constraints of von Mollendorff's official duties limited his independence to act. Making bad decisions was not an option for him.

King Kojong dismissed von Mollendorff from the Korean Foreign Office on July 27 and forced to resign from the Maritime Customs Service in September. King Kojong did not have sufficient power to pursue an independent foreign policy, which made von Mollendorff's forced dismissal somewhat of a personal failure. To soften the blow and prevent him from seeking employment with the Russians, the Yi government requested Li Hongzhang to recall von Mollendorff to China. Paul George von Mollendorff returned to China in December 1885, where he resumed his services as Li's private secretary.

The efforts of von Mollendorff and de Speyer to bring Russia into Korea failed. The attempt did not however, go unnoticed by other major powers in the region. On October 16, 1885, in recognition of his cooperation in concluding the Russian-Korean Treaty of 1884, chargé d'affaires Karl Waeber awarded Paul George von Mollendorff one of Russia's highest awards, the Order of St.Anna (2nd grade), given for great deeds in civil service and labor. The award would indicate that the Russian government certainly appreciated the German diplomat's activities in Korea.

In view of the weakness of her naval forces in the region, Russia closed Vladivostok to foreign shipping and laid mines in preparation for a British assault. Japan's position in Seoul at the time was little more than that of a bystander and it viewed the Russian move as an ominous sign. Japanese concerns heightened when secret intelligence revealed that under the most-favored-nation clause of the Convention of Tianjin, Russia was about to claim the privilege as a neighbor to send troops into Korea under certain circumstances. First, Secretary de Speyer's close friendship with von Mollendorff accentuated Britain's apprehension of developments in Seoul along with the fact that de Speyer had,

...instructions to take steps for the annexation of ten times as much Corean territory as had been occupied by Great Britain unless the latter withdraws from Port Hamilton.

Viceroy Li Hongzhang undertook to strengthen China's grip in Korea from the Tsungli Yamen in Tianjin. The possibility of seeing Russian military personnel in Korea heightened Li's anxiety and he strongly pressed for the hiring of American instructors. After the dismal tenure of von Mollendorff, the growing fear of a developing anti-Qing policy in Seoul prompted both Kojong and Li to appoint a Western advisor to replace him. This time, Li Hongzhang wanted someone who would follow his suggestions.

On October 14, 1885, Li appointed a thirty-two-year old American, Henry F. Merrill, to head the Maritime Customs Service. Merrill had been recommended by Robert Hart, Head of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and, although Hart and Li had their differences, both men strongly believed that the Qing government should totally control Korean affairs. Because of his mistrust of Robert Hart and the experience with von Mollendorff however, Li decided it was too dangerous make the Korean Foreign Office and the Maritime Customs Service a concurrent appointment. He chose instead to place his own friend of many years in the Foreign Office, Judge Owen Nickerson Denny of Portland, Oregon. Although Kojong and his government were a bit apprehensive about increasing China's power in the peninsula, they relented because of the nationality of the two men.

Owen Denny comfortably settled into his new quarters in Seoul by mid-June 1886, contemplating his future role in Korea. In a letter to a friend in Shanghai, Denny wrote that,

Things have been quiet here ever since I came, but how long they will stay so is hard to tell. I hope that it is not "the calm before the storm."

Owen Denny's concern proved to be prophetic, because he soon found himself embroiled in the struggle between Russia and Britain over the occupation of Port Hamilton. As the months passed without evidence of a British move to withdraw from Komundo Island, Denny received an unsigned letter that clearly described the Russian opinion of the situation. The letter made it ominously clear that Britain's action would not be tolerated and continued British occupation would force Russia to occupy Yonghung-hang (Port Lazereff), only a few miles from the treaty port of Wonsan on the north side of Wonsan Bay.

It is believed the letter came from Karl Waeber, a long time friend of Denny's from their days together in Tianjin, a man known to have been highly critical of the British occupation. Denny forwarded a copy of the letter to Li Hongzhang along with his own estimate of the situation and urged the viceroy to make it known to England that China remained determined to protect Korea from unfriendly occupation by other nations. Denny's position toward the British hardened during the course of the summer. In mid-August he sent a telegram to Li's German adviser in Tianjin urging him to tell Li that,

... it is absolutely necessary that the English without delay depart from [Port] Hamilton or give some assurance that they will, as it is the only remedy for trouble with Russia over Lazereff.

In July, Russia's Foreign Minister Giers assured the British ambassador in St. Petersburg that recurrent rumors about Russian plans to seize Port Lazereff were unfounded. The following month, Russia's chargé d'affaires in Beijing, Nikolai F. Ladyzhenskii, assured Li Hongzhang by telegram that Russia would not occupy Port Hamilton if the British evacuated. In late August, Ladyzhenskii traveled to Tianjin at Li's request to personally discuss the Korean situation. In a series of meetings, Ladyzhenskii repeated his denial of a secret treaty between Russia and Korea. Li told him that Britain had demanded a Chinese guarantee that, if they withdrew, no third power would occupy Port Hamilton. Li wanted a Russian pledge that it would not do so. Ladyzhenskii answered that Russia could give no such guarantee;   first, because it never intended to occupy Korean territory, and second, because the British still sat in Port Hamilton.

Ladyzhenskii proposed that he and Li exchange plans for a nonaggression treaty between Russia and China in Korea. The Russian chargé d'affaires handed Li his draft of a treaty with China on September 4, and for nearly a month the two men negotiated the fine points of its three articles. Ladyzhenskii tried to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Korea. Li tried to preserve China's position and deter Russia from occupying any part of the peninsula. Once Li felt assured of Russian intentions not to occupy Korea territory, he agreed to insist on the British evacuation of Port Hamilton.

Although the Qing Court refused to permit Li to sign the treaty draft, Li informed the British minister in Beijing on November 3 that the Chinese Foreign Office would soon communicate to him the assurances that Russia had no scheme for a protectorate over Korea and that once Britain withdrew from Port Hamilton, it would not occupy Korean territory under any circumstances. Leery of giving up its position however, Britain dragged out its departure. On February 27, 1887, the last British forces departed Komundo. The impact of the occupation lingered long afterward however, for it clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Russia's Pacific fleet.

Korea faced a true predicament. The actions taken by Great Britain after it moved onto Komundo Island served well to restrain the further advances of Russia onto the peninsula. Even so, it was no real blessing, because the Komundo Incident triggered a four-way dispute over Korea between Russia, England, China, and Japan. As much as any other major event in Korea's long history, the British occupation of Port Hamilton made it very clear that Korea no longer controlled its own destiny, if indeed it ever did. It showed that Korea would not be deciding its own fate. That would be decided by the particular selfish interests and motivations of foreign powers. Though no one understood it at the time, the Komundo Incident portended things to come, not only in Korea, but elsewhere in East Asia. It represented the first clear demonstration of territorial infringement for its own sake or as a counterbalance to encroachment by another Great Power.