Ch 26 - Coup d`état and International Rivalries

Lions and Tigers and Bears

Russia's expanded naval presence into the East Sea region at Vladivostok prompted Great Britain to challenge the expansion by establishing a forward operating base near Korea.

In the early 1850s, a religious dispute in the Ottoman Empire set in motion a chain of events that brought the British Royal Navy to Korea at the very time Russia began meddling in Korean affairs. Eighteenth century treaties established that France would be guardian of Roman Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. Orthodox Christians would be under Russian protection. For years, Catholic and Orthodox monks had been embroiled in heated arguments over possession of the Church of the Nativity and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and Nazereth. Both sides made demands that the Ottoman Sultan could not possibly satisfy simultaneously. In 1853, the Sultan finally decided in favor of the French.

Russia's Tsar Nicholas I demanded the right to protect Christian shrines in the Holy Land and backed up his claim by moving troops into the northern extent of the Turkish Ottoman Empire (modern Romania). Great Britain, constantly afraid of Russian domination over Constantinople and the Dardanelles Strait, which connected Istanbul to the Mediterranean Sea, refused to accept such a move against the Turks.

The French Emperor, who wanted to extend France's protection to the French monks in Jerusalem, allied himself with the British. In March 1854, a joint British-French expeditionary force moved into the Balkans and pushed the Russians out of the area by summer's end. The vast Russian naval base at Sevastopol presented a direct threat to the future security of the region. In September 1854, Great Britain and France landed troops on the Crimean Peninsula. At sea, British and French naval power forced Russia's inferior fleets into a defensive position trying to protect Russia's southern flank and the approaches to St. Petersburg. In early 1856, faced with the threat of another British naval offensive in the Baltic Sea, Russia acceded to allied peace terms.

Superior British and French sea power in the Black Sea and the Baltic left a strong impression on the Russian leaders in St Petersburg. The failure of Russia's European policy and its designs on Turkey encouraged Russian leaders to shift their attention elsewhere. Minister of Foreign Affairs Prince Gorchakov designed a new policy that guided Russia's steady push towards India and the Far East. Even the Russian navy took on a new tactic. In the late 1850s, Russian cruising squadrons sailed into the Mediterranean and Pacific to establish forward coaling bases. Instead of challenging the British for control of the seas, Russian warships began conducting raids against British commercial shipping.

By 1849, Russian Captain Gennady Nevelskoy had explored and surveyed the lower Amur River and the coastal areas of Russia's Far East. After securing the Amur River estuary, Captain Nevelskoy established several port settlements in 1850, including a small town located about 80 kilometers from the open estuary of the Amur. Nikolayevsky Post, known as Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, became the administrative center of the Khabarovsk Maritime Region and the home port of Russia's Siberian Flotilla and the Pacific squadron, both charged with defending the Russian Far East. Nikolayevsk-on-Amur soon became Russia's largest port in the Far East.

Following the creation of the Russian Pacific Hydrographic Office in October 1856, regional surveys proved the mouth of the Amur River to be navigable. Hydrographic surveys soon expanded in scope to include systematic meteorologic observations and coastal surveys around the scope of the East Sea to support exploration and defense of Russia's new possessions and neighboring regions.

Many Russian statesmen and naval officers, especially those close to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich Romanov, a younger brother of Emperor Alexander II, insisted that Russian had to expand beyond the geographical limits of the Amur River. The idea that Russia needed more southern ports found vigorous endorsement among former naval men, some of whom heatedly argued to extend Russian influence into Korea. In 1860, Rear Admiral Andrei Aleksandrovich Popov speculated, "... not satisfying ourselves with a pointless battle against the natural hindrances [in the Amur region] we will move farther south into Korea."

Rear Admiral Ivan Likhachev submitted a memorandum to Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolayevich in May 1860 that detailed his own evaluation of the situation confronting Russia in the Far East. He wrote that, despite the advantages ceded by the Treaty of Beijing, Russia's overall naval position in the Far East remained highly problematic. The increased coastline south of the Amur River was no real advantage for the navy, since it provided access only to the East Sea, which was cut off from the Pacific by the Japanese Islands. In that sense at least, the East Sea was a "closed sea," no different from the Baltic Sea or the Black Sea. The only way around this problem, he claimed, was for Russia to establish a naval base at what he called the "main gate" leading out of the East Sea;  Tsushima Island.

The Russian Foreign Ministry in St. Petersburg took a criticized Rear Admiral Likhachev's proposal, but the veteran admiral had Grand Duke Konstantin's strong support and managed to get the Tsar's consent to proceed with a landing on Tsushima. Likhachev surveyed the situation personally and wrote the Grand Duke in April 1861 that Russia's "future main military port on the Pacific should be on Tsu Shima." He ordered the landing should be made that spring and began making preparations to fortify Russia's position.

At the time, the West knew next to nothing about Tsushima. Except for the occasional warship, the island rarely had visitors. Great Britain's Minister to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock, heard rumors in August 1861 that Russians had established a position on Tsushima Island. The Japanese government fatly refused to investigate the rumors fearing that a war between Russia and England would endanger Japanese neutrality. Minister Alcock needed a strong man to investigate the matter and immediately thought of Laurence Oliphant, the newly arrived First Secretary of the British Legation. Oliphant certainly had the mettle for such a task. Just weeks after arriving in Japan to assume his new post, he fought off a sword-wielding Japanese assassin with a little more than a riding whip.

The British warship H.M.S. Ringdove carried Secretary Oliphant to Tsushima and anchored off the coast at Izuhara, the island's capital. After local islanders tried to block him from coming ashore, the Secretary threatened to bring a detail of British Marines along as his personal bodyguards. The Magistrate of Izuhara sent his first minister to meet with the Englishman. During a late night meeting, the Japanese minister reluctantly revealed the fact that the Russian warship Posadnik had arrived in February and that Russian soldiers had indeed established a military base on the far side of the island. He added that the Russians had warned the islanders to the keep their presence a secret. The minister assured Secretary Oliphant that the Tsushima islanders would be happy to see the unwelcome Russians driven off the island, but were too afraid to do it themselves.

According to one Japanese historian, the Lord of Tsushima wanted Russian assistance during the civil unrest underway in Japan during the Meiji Restoration and had made an earlier agreement with the Russians that allowed them to build a military base. It would seem the demand for secrecy was mutual.

When Secretary Oliphant reached the other side of the island, he quickly spotted the Russian warship and their encampment. The Russians had built a comfortable settlement in their short six months on the island, with small cottages, vegetable gardens, domesticated animals, a hospital, five stone-lined water wells, even a sauna.

Secretary Oliphant met with Captain Nikolai Alekseevich Birilev, commander of the screw frigate Posadnik, and asked him to explain the Russian presence. Birilev told Oliphant that he had come to Tsushima to conduct coastal surveys and his mission was almost finished. When Oliphant asked him to explain the "semi-permanent" nature of the settlement if his mission was only temporary, Captain Birilev reluctantly explained that he had orders to stay on Tsushima and would stay until he received orders to the contrary.

Oliphant also questioned Captain Birilev about the alleged killing of some islanders by the Russians. The captain denied any such thing, stating that they had never "had any dispute of importance with the natives" and declared that his men were on very good terms with them. Birilev also revealed to Oliphant that he was "heartily sick of his exile" on the island and looked forward to leaving. After explaining that continued occupation of the island could lead to serious trouble between England and Russia, Oliphant suggested that Captain Birilev send word to Admiral Likhachev and appraise him of the political ramifications of remaining on Tsushima. Not long after this meeting, support for the Tsushima base began to collapse in St. Petersburg and Rear Admiral Likhachev received orders to return to St. Petersburg and abandon Tsushima by December 1861.

Peter the Great Bay stretches 115 miles (185 km) northeast from the mouth of the Tumen River to Cape Povorotny. When the Governor-General of East Siberia, N. N. Muraviov-Amurski, first visited the bay in 1859, he paid particular attention to a well-sheltered inlet surrounded by tall mountains at the northeastern extent of the bay. He named the site "Golden Horn Inlet" and ordered the construction of a military post on its shores.

On the morning of June 20, 1860, the Russian transport ship Manchzhur slowly steamed into Golden Horn under the command of Lieutenant-Captain Alexei Karlovich Shefner. After studying the coastline, Captain Shefner selected a small inlet for an anchorage near the base of a coastal ridge and rowed ashore to find a suitable landing beach for the 40 soldiers of the 3rd Company, 4th East Siberian Battalion still aboard ship. The ships log for the day reported:  "Sent to shore this day: one officer, two noncoms and thirty-seven privates of 4th battalion to take up post."

Within hours of their arrival ashore, soldiers had already cleared the area for a new encampment. White tents went up accompanied by the rhythmic sounds of axes and saws echoing across the landscape. Near the center of the camp, soldiers erected a tall flag pole made from a tree trunk and hoisted the Russian Tricolor flag. With all eyes focused on the flag, Ensign N. V. Komarov raised his sword in salute to mark the establishment of a new Russian military post named Vladivostok, "Lord of the East." By December 1860, the soldiers had completed construction of a military post complete with barracks, a kitchen, warehouses, a mechanical shop, a bath house and officers quarters. The corvette Griden anchored offshore to protect the newly established post and provide the small garrison with needed supplies.

Vladivostok grew slowly at first, but by October 1867, the town had expanded along more than 3,500 feet of shoreline and included many new structures, including about fifty government-owned and private houses plus two dozen clay cottages. About 510 military and civilians lived in the town. Beginning in 1869-1870, the town's population began a period of rapid growth.

The debate over where to establish Russia's main naval port in the Far East continued until the winter of 1871, when the government finally decided to transfer all naval operations from Nikolaevsk-on-the Amur to Vladivostok. All maritime institutions, including the military governor's residence and all ships of the Siberian Flotilla and the Pacific squadron relocated to Vladivostok by February 25, 1871. Although the decision continued to spark debates in Russian naval circles, the move stood no chance of being reversed. Navy commanders continued to seek out convenient locations and good harbors for Russian warships around the East Sea. The active search provided the Russians with a wealth of valuable hydrographic and coastal survey data, particularly from Korea's east coast.

Great Britain and Russia had been chronically hostile to each other ever since the Crimean War of 1856. The British saw the expanding Russian Empire not just as a threat to its own economic interests, but as a real threat to the balance of power in Europe. When Russian armies threatened the Ottoman Empire by advancing into Caucasia and the Balkans in 1877, the British saw yet another challenge in the making. In January 1878, with a Russian army sitting outside Constantinople, Great Britain called up its reserves, ordered 7,000 Indian troops to Malta and gathered a powerful naval force for fleet operations in the Baltic. On February 13, Vice Admiral Hornby's Mediterranean Squadron steamed through the Dardanelles and threatened to shell Constantinople if Turkey opened the city to the Russian army. The Turks reinforced their defensive positions around Constantinople.

The Russians, already exhausted financially and militarily, feared that a continuing confrontation with the British fleet could ignite a general war. The tension broke when the Russian government agreed to a joint withdrawal of forces from the area. Meanwhile, Britain responded to Russia's diversionary activities in Afghanistan by launching its second invasion of the country and forced Russia to abandon its short-lived Afghan alliance.

In a move to divert British attention, 20,000 Russian troops moved to the Afghan and Pamir borders and sent a military mission to Kabul under General Stotielov to sign a secret agreement with the Amir of Afghanistan. General Stotielov conducted a special military mission to the Afghan capital of Kabul to sign a secret alliance with the Amir of Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, the Royal Navy's China Squadron received orders to prepare to use Chinese and Japanese ports as forward bases for naval operations in the East Sea against targets in Russia's new maritime provinces. The principal target would be Vladivostok, home port of Russia's Pacific Fleet.

Russia's clash with the British in 1878 underlined for Russian leaders the need for a powerful Black Sea fleet capable of blocking the passage of British ships through the Dardanelles and able to act as a mobile flanking force for the army. The Russian Admiralty well understood the importance of restoring the Black Sea Fleet and strengthening the Baltic Fleet. Tsar Alexander III demanded that new ships would have to be capable of engaging enemy ships on the open sea. In 1882, he approved a new shipbuilding program to launch sixteen battleships, four large cruisers and two small cruisers for the Baltic. The Black Sea Fleet would get eight new battleships, two small cruisers and nineteen torpedo boats.

Not a single Russian leader in St Petersburg believed Russia could ever realistically launch a war of conquest against British possessions in India from Central Asia. Diplomats and military leaders in London knew this as well. George Nathaniel Curzon, a well-traveled man of vision with an unequalled knowledge of Asian affairs and a reputation as a shrewd observer and foreign policy analyst wrote that Russia's goal was "not Calcutta, but Constantinople, not the Ganges but the Golden Horn [Vladivostok]." Curzon believed that Russia's real policy was to keep the British quiet in Europe by keeping them tied down in Asia.

In pursuit of its new Central Asian policy, Russia seized a strategically important oasis close to the border of the British protectorate of Afghanistan in February 1884. This move and the renewed fighting against British-backed Afghan rebels along the border region convinced England to start yet another military build up in anticipation of defending India. England mobilized its naval forces to send an expeditionary force through the Dardanelles and disrupt communications with Russian forces in Turkestan. This time however, Germany led a chorus of international opposition to any British naval action in the Black Sea. In London, Vladivostok suddenly assumed a new level of importance.

The British Admiralty, in discussions with the Royal Commission on Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad highlighted the need for a forward naval base of operations against Russia. The Russian Far East home port of the Pacific Fleet at Vladivostok was almost entirely dependent on shipping for supplies, a fact which made it vulnerable to naval blockade. Many in the British Admiralty believed that the same policy that exhausted the Russian's at Sebastopol in the Crimea could now be applied to Vladivostok and possibly prevent the Russians from taking a port on Korea's northeastern coast.

Politicians and military planners alike saw Vladivostok as the "only vulnerable point of the Russian Empire in the event of a war with Great Britain." Britain believed that threatening a blockade of Russian ports in East Asia would keep Russia from advancing south into Afghanistan. As expressed by a viceroy of India, the move into Port Hamilton was to "make the dog drop his bone by squeezing his throat."