Ch 26 - Coup d`état and International Rivalries

Guess Who's Coming to Dinner

Kim Ok-kyun lead members of the Korean Progressive Party in an unsuccessful attempt to rapidly reform Korea by launching a coup d`état in December 1884 against Queen Min's conservative pro-Chinese faction.

While reform-minded Japanese busily adopted Western methods of administration at home, and the Russians busily pursued their eastward expansion, a more acute and complex problem developed in Korea. The historical curse of political factionalism and new problems caused by the flood of foreign influences quickly polarized Korean politics. Knowledge of the outside world spread throughout Korea despite intense opposition and "enlightenment thought" began to exert a growing influence on yangban officialdom. Enlightenment policies that favored a gradual approach to change began drawing support from both prominent political figures and members of the royal in-law family. Supporters of such policies looked to the Chinese for help in carrying out their reform plans. The Chinese however, viewed the entire Meiji Restoration in Japan with profound distrust and did their utmost to prevent the spread of any such reform ideas into Korea.

Standing in stark contrast to the older pro-Chinese faction in Seoul was a younger group of yangban officials whose political advancement had been blocked by the Min clan's tight grip on appointments to high government positions. Unwilling to move slowly, these progressive yangban pushed hard for a policy of rapid change. Secretive in nature and limited in numbers, the Progressive Party, or Independence Party, first became noticeable after the Military Mutiny of 1882. Led by the intelligent, ambitious patriot Kim Ok-kyun, a member of the Korean apology mission to Tokyo in September 1882, the Progressive Party soon became a conspicuous element in Korean politics. Despite his traditional Confucian education, Kim Ok-kyun appreciated the need for reforms in Korea. Emboldened by each new leap forward, Kim Ok-kyun's progressives stood ready to take whatever extreme steps might be necessary to effect their reform policies.

The Japanese strongly favored progress in Korea and advised King Kojong to accept their help in his planned reforms. Tokyo even offered to reduce its troop strength in Korea and return part of the indemnity as a goodwill gesture. Kim Ok-kyun felt a strong affinity with Japan and believed it would be a more likely source of aid than America. The Progressive Party sought Japanese support for their plans. Japan's bureaucrats wanted to reform Korea in order to restore peace and lessen the likelihood of foreign intervention. They did not favor the extension of popular rights in the process.

The conservative Japanese government was reluctant to support Kim's progressives. Japan's liberals however, were ideologically sympathetic with the progressives and actively supported and encouraged them as part of their own struggle for political reforms. Although they did not directly interfere in Korea's internal administration, they did use their influence to spread reform indirectly by supporting Kim Ok-kyun's newly emerging Progressive Party. Japanese Foreign Minister Takezoe Shinchiro went to Korea with the authority to supervise and aid the activities of the Progressive Party. He even arranged funding for the group through the Yokohama Specie Bank.

The progressives used their knowledge of the world beyond Korea to win the favor of King Kojong. As their influence grew, they succeeded in winning approval for a number of reforms. King Kojong proposed and enacted a number of reforms including the creation of the Office of Culture and Information, the publication of a tri-monthly newspaper (the HanSong Sunbo), the establishment of a postal administration to provide a modern mail delivery service, and the creation of a special military detachment at Kwangju near Seoul. In addition, Korea dismissed its Chinese military instructors and sent a number of its students to Japan to study military and technical subjects. Throughout the summer of 1884, the Progressive Party had high expectations of success. Their intense desire to foment rapid change however, earned them the enmity of the conservative Min clan faction.

Because the Min clan controlled government appointments, the progressives could not secure government posts in pivotal positions and could do little more than affect a few modest changes. By the autumn of 1884, the Min clan increasingly nullified King Kojong's reform efforts. Japan refused a loan request from the Progressive Party to fund some of its newly proposed reforms. The waning support of the Japanese only compounded their difficulties. It became virtually impossible for the Progressive Party to pursue its plans as it wished.

China withdrew three full battalions of the Anhwei Army from Korea in 1884 to deal with the French in a war over the tribute state of Annam (Vietnam). The sudden removal of these troops not only weakened China's military position in Korea, it also convinced the progressives that China would be in no position to aid the conservative pro-Chinese faction in the event of a major political crisis. The changed situation presented both the Progressive Party and the Japanese an opportunity to force changes in Korea. The only major obstacle standing in their way was the power of Queen Min and her pro-Chinese faction. Removing this obstacle would take careful planning and the right opportunity.

Kim Ok-kyun believed his party's goals could only be achieved through extraordinary measures. He decided to preempt the party's "treacherous" opponents. Members of the Progressive Party enlisted the help of twenty-year-old So Chae-pil, recently returned from the Japanese military academy, and hurriedly formulated a detailed plan for a political coup d`état (Kapsin Chongbyon) against Queen Min's conservative pro-Chinese faction. Whether or not Japan saw the plot as an expedient chance to replace Chinese influence in Korea with its own, Japanese Minister Takezoe did help secure funds for the plotters. He also promised that in the event of a coup, they could count on the positive assistance of Japanese legation troops in Seoul. Even with such assurances however, the plotters made a serious error in deciding to proceed with the planned coup d`état, for the fate of the entire venture hung on the promised support of no more than 140 Japanese soldiers.

Korea modeled its postal system after Western systems previously adopted by both the Japanese and Chinese. The Progressive Party strongly advocated such a modern innovation in the face of bitter opposition to any outside influences from the powerful conservative faction. King Kojong appointed Progressive Party member Hong Yong-sik as Director of the newly established Postal Administration on March 27, 1884. He proceeded to order a printing of five stamp designs from Japan and began creating a postal system centered at Seoul, with branch offices in Pusan, Inchon and Wonsan.

Hong Yong-sik organized a sumptuous banquet for the evening of December 4, 1884, to celebrate the opening of the new agency. Among the invited guests of honor at this banquet were German special adviser Paul George von Mollendorff, China's Commissioner Chen, Kim Ok-kyun, Seoul's Mayor Pak Yong-hyo, and So Kwang-pom. Generals Min Yong-ik, Han Kyu-jik and Yi Cho-yon, commanding officers of the Four Barracks Commands, attended. Also on the guest list were America's minister to Seoul, Lucius Foote, Council General W.G. Aston of Great Britain, the Chinese chargé d'affaires T'an Keng-yao, and the Japanese secretary Shimamura Hisashi. Noticeably absent was Japanese Foreign Minister Shinchiro.

Kim Ok-kyun left the dinner table several times during the banquet. Toward mid-evening, while the guests enjoyed their dinner, Kim left the building. Shortly after his departure, a group of conspirators set fire to the small detached palace in Anguk-tong not far from the new building housing the Bureau of the Post Office and sounded an alarm. The plotters anticipated that upon hearing news of the fire, the officials would leave the banquet and immediately report to King Kojong, as they were expected to do when anything out of the ordinary occurred. A number of young Korean military officers along with a contingent of Japanese legation troops waited for them in the darkness beneath the Forbidden Stream Bridge.

The plot began to fall apart almost immediately. Not all the officials left the banquet as expected and the planned ambush failed. Nonetheless, several officials were caught and later killed in the confusion resulting from the fire. General Min Yong-ik, a member of the queen's family who had just returned from a diplomatic mission to the United States, rushed outside and through the inner gate to supervise battling the fire. A man dressed in Japanese clothes suddenly stepped out of the shadows and impaled him with a sword. The elder leader of the "slow growth" reform faction and the most important official attending the banquet that night, General Min managed to escape with severe wounds. While von Mollendorff carried the badly wounded Min back into the banquet hall, the remaining officials fled screaming into the courtyard and bolted over the back wall.

Kim Ok-kyun thought the street ambush was succeeding and rushed to Changdok Palace with a group of his followers backed by Japanese legation guards. As soon as they arrived, they falsely reported to King Kojong that Chinese troops had created a disturbance in the streets. They urged the king to move to Kyongu Palace for his own protection, a site much better suited for defense against attack. With King Kojong under Japanese escort, the conspirators hurried to Kyongu Palace. Kim next sent runners back to the banquet hall to summon the Four Barracks Garrison commanders in the name of the king. As the officers and six high-ranking Korean cabinet ministers left the banquet to help defend the king, attackers ambushed them in the streets and decapitated them one by one as they appeared, including Hong Yong-sik, the man who arranged the evening's fatal banquet. Shortly afterward, his father invited all eighteen of his relatives to dinner and poisoned them and himself for the dishonor his son's actions had brought to the family name.

Still controlling the fate of King Kojong, the progressives returned to Changdok Palace and forced the king to create a new progressive cabinet. The cabinet immediately announced a newly formulated program of fourteen political reforms sought by the Progressive Party. The first of these reforms sought the immediate return of the Taewongun and an end to the empty formalities of Korea's tributary relationship with China. The reformers called for the abolition of ruling class privilege, the establishment of equal rights for all citizens, and the punishment of the most notorious government officials whose criminal acts, past and present, had seriously affected the financial status of the country. The progressives also demanded the revision of land tax laws for every region of the country and termination of the extortionate practices of petty officials who administered the tax laws. They called for the cancellation of all outstanding grain loan debts owed the government and demanded that all internal fiscal administration be put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Taxation, abolishing all other fiscal agencies.

Kim Ok-kyun and his supporters proposed some far-reaching reforms, but Queen Min and her clan had other plans for Seoul. General Yuan Shih-k'ai, Queen Min's staunch supporter and ally, still had at least 1,500 Chinese troops under his command in the capital. He attempted to counter Japan's rising influence in Seoul by allying himself and his troops with Queen Min. Their combined power base dominated the Yi Government.

Before Kim Ok-kyun and his followers could make their proposals public, Queen Min appealed to General Yuan to provide protection, thereby sealing the fate of the progressives holding out at the Kyongu Palace. After surrounding the palace, General Yuan issued an immediate demand to evacuate the palace. When the Japanese failed to reply, he ordered some 5,000 Chinese and Korean troops into the palace grounds to liberate the king. General Yuan's troops engaged the small Japanese detachment in a pitched running battle. A number of Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed as the Japanese fought their way back to the Japanese legation building. King Kojong managed to escape in the confusion of the hasty retreat.

Forced to withdraw from the palace, Kim Ok-kyun, Pak Yong-hyo and So Kwang-pom, along with a few of their compatriots, joined with and sought the protection of the fleeing Japanese legation troops. Those progressives who were left behind suffered the wrath of their countrymen. During the heavy street fighting that followed, angry Koreans hacked to pieces a number of the coup participants. Eleven men were tortured, tried and executed on the streets of Seoul. Their bodies were dismembered and scattered about the streets for public exposure.

With the rapid collapse of the "Three Day Cabinet," Foreign Minister Takezoe Shinchiro quickly realized that his troops faced imminent annihilation. To create a diversion, he ordered the Japanese legation building set ablaze. With the legation guards formed into a square to protect the wounded and women gathered in the center, the beleaguered Japanese fought their way out of Seoul. On a cold winter's night, the Japanese trekked to Inchon where they and the surviving coup plotters boarded ships and sailed for Japan.

The coup was finished. In one sense, it never stood a chance of succeeding because the reformers never managed to get the support of the people. When word of the coup attempt spread, common Koreans saw the "post office massacre" as a bloody coup attempt against a legitimate government. Worse perhaps, their attempt to retain power by involving Japanese legation troops only served to stain the reformers' reputations with the claim they were "pro-Japanese" and increased the danger of betrayal.

Though short in duration, the attempted coup d`état was serious enough to precipitate an open war. News that China had extended protection to King Kojong after he escaped from the Japanese increased the tension between China and Japan. Both countries spoke of war, but neither side was yet ready for a full-scale fight. The situation in Seoul remained highly abnormal and dangerous with Chinese and Japanese military garrisons facing each other in the Korean capital. In an angry protest to Tokyo, the Yi government denounced Minister Takezoe's participation in the coup and insisted he be held accountable. Although the Japanese government was dissatisfied with the coup results, it did not disavow the action. Tokyo lost no time in rushing an expeditionary force of six hundred men to Korea under Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru, who carried a letter demanding an apology from Korea and payment for the outrages committed against the Japanese in Seoul. Inoue was also determined to find out the extent of Chinese involvement in the incident and press for the withdrawal of Chinese troops.

Well-aware of Minister Takezoe's ill-advised actions, Minister Inoue assumed a negotiating stance with Kim Hong-jip that tried to defuse, even sidestep the central issue. He concentrated instead on getting Korea to pay a $110,000 indemnity for the loss of Japanese lives and property and $20,000 to rebuild the legation building, even though Minister Takezoe had torched the structure in the first place. Thus, Japan worked toward a solution that emphasized compensation for damages rather than accountability for the original violence that led to those losses. The talks concluded in January 1885, when Korea and Japan signed the Treaty of Seoul (HanSong). Both parties agreed the Yi government would indemnify Japanese victims of the coup attempt and supply finances to build a new Japanese legation.

Japan saw a great opportunity in this episode to weaken China's paramount position on the peninsula. Taking advantage of the moment, Japanese Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, later Prince Ito and for a time probably Japan's most influential leader, traveled to Tianjin in the spring of 1885 to pay a visit to his powerful Chinese counterpart, Viceroy Li Hongzhang. Japan wanted to reach an agreement that would achieve a mutual withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops from Korea. Preoccupied with the French War in Southeast Asia, Li readily compromised with Ito, and on April 18, 1885, the two statesmen signed the Li-Ito Convention of Tianjin.

The historic Li-Ito Convention stipulated the complete removal of all forces under the command of the Chinese resident General Yuan Shih-k'ai and all Japanese legation guards from Korea by the end of August 1885. Neither China nor Japan would train the Korean army, but would jointly urge the Korean government to hire instructors from a third country. In case any serious disturbance in Korea made it necessary for either China or Japan to send troops onto the peninsula in the future, the signatories would notify each other in advance and in writing of their intention to do so. The troops should be withdrawn after the restoration of order.

While the Li-Ito Convention provided for the removal of troops, it did nothing to assure the future independence of Korea. China, even without the presence of its troops, lost no ground in Korea. The convention did weaken Japan's position however, and it became the object of derision and condemnation among those who dominated the Seoul government. The concessions Li Hongzhang made to IIto Hirobumi had grave repercussions for the future, because the agreement reduced Korea's status to a virtual joint-protectorate under China and Japan and forever eliminated China's claim to exclusive suzerainty. Worse yet, it reaffirmed Japan's right to send troops to Korea. War had been averted, but only for a time.