Ch 25 - End of the Hermit Kingdom

A Surgical Strike

The competition between China and Japan over their relative influence in Korea prompted China to remove the Taewongun from Korea and forced Japan to increase its demands against the Korean government, which led to a new treaty that gave Japan the right to introduce troops into Korea.

Once the rift in relations between China and Japan broke into the open, the two Asian powers began actively maneuvering against each other over the issue of Korea's status as either a suzerain or a sovereign state. Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru called an urgent government session on July 31, 1882, that quickly adopted a number of strong resolutions. Japan demanded an apology and an indemnity from Korea for the damage done during the military uprising. Japanese warships would be dispatched to Pusan and Wonsan to protect Japanese residents. Hanabusa, under personal instructions from Inoue, would be sent back to Seoul as a plenipotentiary envoy protected by a strong military guard. Although Hanabusa had orders not to use his military escort for offensive acts, the government gave him wide latitude to act depending on the situation in Korea.

Minister Li Shu-Chang telegraphed Beijing from Tokyo on August 1 and August 3 regarding Japan's preparations to dispatch troops to Korea. He urged the government to immediately send Chinese troops to Korea to investigate the situation. Kim Yun-sik and O Yun-jung, fearing the possibility of a second Ryukyu Islands incident, urged the Chinese government to send troops quickly in anticipation of Japanese operations. Chang Shu-sheng, acting governor-general of Chihli Province, accepted their recommendations. After receiving authorization from the Emperor on August 7, the Chinese Foreign Office ordered Admiral Ting Ju-chang and Ma Chien-chung, accompanied by O Yun-jung, to Korea with three Chinese warships.

Trade Consul Kondo Masuki arrived at Inchon on August 10 from Pusan aboard a Japanese warship to announce Hanabusa's impending mission to local authorities. When the three Chinese warships arrived later the same day, they were surprised to see a Japanese warship riding at anchor at Inchon. Ma Chien-chung immediately tried to get information about events in Seoul and the developing situation in Korea. In confidential conversations with O Yun-jung and others, Ma learned the Taewongun was at the heart of the trouble, the man responsible for insulating King Kojong from outside contacts, and the man responsible for ordering the execution of foreign affairs officials. He also heard a warning that if the Taewongun were not promptly removed, the Japanese would most probably take some kind of punitive action against Korea. The information was sketchy at best, but Ma learned enough to realize the seriousness of the situation. Two days later Ma dispatched Admiral Ting Ju-shang back to Tianjin to personally report his findings and request the Chinese throne to order six Chinese battalions to Korea. In preparation for the venture, six Anhwei Army battalions stationed in Shantung under the command of General Wu Chang-ching went on heightened alert.

The only question remaining was what to do with the Taewongun. Hsueh Fu-cheng, a member of Li Hongzhang's personal secretariat, proposed that he be arrested and brought to China. Hsueh believed that if the Taewongun resisted by force, the Queen dowager might order him put to death. Hsueh urged swift action, emphasizing that China had to forestall the anticipated Japanese move that might turn Korea into another Ryukyu Islands incident. Hsueh's recommendation, together with Ma's report from Korea, virtually sealed the Taewongun's fate.

Hanabusa's mission arrived at Inchon on August 13, backed by four warships and three troop transports carrying a battalion of Japanese infantry. Cho Yong-ha and Kim Hong-jip received Hanabusa and told him that in view of the still unsettled atmosphere in Seoul, the government requested he delay his entrance into the capital. Hanabusa took an unexpectedly firm stance, rejected the plea and brushed aside apprehensions about the size of his heavy military escort. Three days later, Hanabusa marched into Seoul under a military guard.

During a royal audience with Kojong on August 20, Hanabusa departed from diplomatic protocol and presented his stiff demands directly to the king. He demanded punishment of the culprits who attacked Japanese citizens within 15 days, a payment of ¥50,000 to the wounded and the families of the dead and adequate funerals for the victims. He also demanded Korea pay an indemnity for the damages inflicted on the Japanese and compensation for the maintenance of the Japanese troops.

Moving beyond the military uprising, Hanabusa demanded an extension of the travel limit at Inchon, Pusan and Wonsan to thirty miles;  inland travel for the Japanese minister, consuls and their staffs and dependents;  and stationing of one Japanese battalion for the protection of the Japanese legation for five years. One day later, Hanabusa added the demand that a Korean envoy travel to Japan to apologize for the events of July.

The day after the royal audience, the Taewongun met with Hanabusa and tried to reassure him and smooth the way for a peaceful accord with Japan by stating that, in view of the changing times, Korea would not necessarily return to its earlier exclusionist policy. The same day, Ma Chien-chung received an urgent message from the Taewongun informing him of the Japanese ultimatum and requesting that he come to Seoul to mediate between the Korean government and Hanabusa. The two men met on August 22 and had a cordial conversation.

The presence of a large contingent of armed Japanese combat troops in Seoul deeply disturbed the Qing Government. The Chinese realization of how serious things had become made it easy for Korea's envoy to China, Kim Yun-sik, to convince them of the need to send troops to challenge the Japanese position. The Qing Emperor dispatched a combined army and naval force of some 4,500 men to Korea with orders to safeguard the country and fulfill China's obligations under the treaty of 1871. Because several Japanese warships sat anchored at Inchon, the Chinese task force commanded by General Wu Chang-ching selected a landing area in south Kyonggi Province at Masanpo (Namyang). Chinese troops marched ashore at Masanpo the same day Hanabusa presented his demands to King Kojong. Their arrival effectively checkmated Japan's threatened show of military strength. Admiral Ting Ju-Chang, Kim Yun-sik and O Yun-jung, each having received the temporary appointment of "guide to the Chinese troops," proceeded to lead the Chinese forces into Seoul.

Negotiations between Kojong and Hanabusa stalled in the tense atmosphere in Seoul. With a battle-ready combat brigade in place at Fukuoka in Kyushu and troop ships on standby, Japan had already demonstrated its ability to mount war operations at any moment if required. Hanabusa remained adamant in his demands and indicated that Japan had not ruled out the option to resort to military force. Should the opportunity present itself, Japan stood fully prepared to demand the outright cession of the Korean islands of Koje and Ullung.

Minister Hanabusa broke the deadlock in negotiations by suddenly delivering Kojong's government an ultimatum. He stated that if Japanese demands were not met within three days, Japan would attack the port of Inchon. When Hanabusa learned that the Chief State Councillor planned to leave town to participate in "mourning services for Queen Min" and that negotiations would be postponed until his return, he felt slighted and accused the government of a lack of good faith. Leaving Kondo Masuki in charge, Hanabusa and his delegation angrily left Seoul in protest during the morning of August 23 and traveled to the port city of Inchon.

Hanabusa's retreat from the capital left the field to the Chinese. General Wu Chang-ching entered Seoul on the evening of August 23 at the head of long columns of Chinese troops and proceeded to station a number of his men in strategic locations throughout the capital. That same evening, Ma Chien-chung rushed to Inchon to confer with Hanabusa, urging him to reconsider his hasty action. Ma assured him the Korean government did not want to rupture its relations with Japan. Tactically the master of the situation, Ma took the opportunity to tell the Japanese delegation his own scheme for restoring the king's freedom of action. It was his intention and that of the Qing government to remove the Taewongun from power.

With both China and Japan now physically intervening in Korea, the Taewongun's resurgent power stood little chance of surviving. Ma Chien-chung returned to Seoul on August 25 and, with General Wu and Admiral Ting Ju-shang, carefully laid out his plans. The next day, the two Chinese commanders paid a cordial courtesy visit to the Taewongun at his residence. Ma invited the Taewongun to come to Inchon to pay a courtesy call on the Chinese headquarters and inspect General Wu's flagship. Late in the afternoon of August 26, 1882, the Taewongun returned their call. Shortly after he stepped aboard, in the course of another conversation, Ma launched into a serious reprimand against him for usurping power from the king, the only ruler vested with legitimate authority by the Qing emperor. Ma then bluntly disclosed to the Taewongun the plans for immediately taking him to Tianjin to await imperial sanction, a scheme which enjoyed the favor of the Qing government. Chinese soldiers arrested the Taewongun, forcibly placed him into a sedan chair, and whisked him away under the cover of night. The following day he was placed aboard a Chinese warship ship at Masanpo bound for China. The Chinese effectively removed the once powerful regent from the scene and held him in detention in the small town of Baoding near Tianjin.

Removing the Taewongun solved only half the problem. Rebel forces under the command of his eldest son still presented a formidable threat. King Kojong sent Cho Yong-ha to General Wu's headquarters with a message of thanks and and a secret request to initiate a pacification program in Korea. With the Taewongun in detention, General Yuan Shih-k'ai led Chinese troops against rebel strongholds in the villages of Itaewon and Wangsim-ni. Warned in advance, many of the rebels managed to escape the attack and the Chinese captured only 170 prisoners. Chinese troops hunted down and executed the leaders of the military rebellion and returned Queen Min to Changdok Palace in triumph, thereby reinstalling the powerful Min faction in office. The successful termination of the campaign earned Generals Wu and Yuan high honors from King Kojong.

Outnumbered and unwilling to confront the quickly mobilized Chinese force, Minister Hanabusa realized his rash actions had placed him in a difficult situation. The sudden abduction of the Taewongun triggered a marked change in the once high-handed attitude of the Japanese and cleared the way to resume negotiations at Inchon. Ma Chien-chung remained in the background during the two days of intense bargaining which began on August 28 aboard the Japanese warship Hiei.

Hanabusa and Korea's negotiators quickly reached a compromise and drafted the text of a new treaty. They signed the Treaty of Chemulpo (Inchon) on the evening of August 30, 1882. This new treaty included a number of provisions that later had repercussions for both parties. The agreement dealt with the military mutiny by specifying that its leaders would be punished and a ¥50,000 indemnity would be paid to the families of the Japanese killed during the revolt. In addition, the Japanese government would receive an indemnity of ¥500,000 and Korea would send a mission of formal apology to Tokyo. Finally, the Japanese would be permitted to construct barracks at their diplomatic legation in Seoul and station troops there to protect the legation. Korea agreed to permit Japanese merchants to travel within a predefined radius of each of the treaty ports, open another of its ports to trade, and allow the Japanese Foreign Minister and his staff travel freely anywhere in Korea.

Hanabusa Yoshitada exacted fewer demands from Korea than the Chinese had feared and, on the whole, failed to achieve Japan's principal aim of strengthening its position in Korea. The final treaty settlement was a face-saving device that secured a number of advantages and represented a significant victory for Japanese diplomacy, principally because it gave Japan the right to introduce troops into Korea. Despite his knowledge of international law, the elder Chinese statesman Ma Chien-chung completely missed this one item, an oversight that later caused a good deal of turmoil.