Ch 25 - End of the Hermit Kingdom

Setting the Stage

With Western pressure mounting to open Korea, China's Viceroy Li Hongzhang began urging Korea to take the initiative in concluding commercial treaties with Western nations as a way to check the growing awareness of the potential Russian threat to Korean territory.

Military reform had to be an integral part of any Korean program of self-strengthening. In March 1881, King Kojong dispatched Yi Won-hoe and Yi Tong-in to Japan to observe that country's military establishment. Their reports, along with the later reports of the secret inspection mission to Japan conducted by the "gentlemen's sightseeing group," had a decided impact in Korea. The first attempts at streamlining the military structure came with the abolition of the Military Council and the incorporation of military affairs into the newly established lt'ongnigimu Amun. By 1881, King Kojong had already reorganized the traditional five-garrison structure of the army into two larger, special garrisons commanded by two of his closest confidants;  General Sin Chong-hui's Palace Guards and the Capital Guards under General Yi Kyong-ha.

China intervened in Korea's domestic affairs hoping to foster a "self-strengthening" movement on the peninsula while it developed its own naval and military power. China's Viceroy Li Hongzhang, offered King Kojong Chinese assistance in training Korea's new army, but the king relented to Hanabusa Yoshitada's repeated insistence that Japan provide the help. In May 1881, King Kojong engaged the services of a military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, 1st Lieutenant Horimoto Reizo, an officer from the Japanese Engineering Corps. The king ordered Lieutenant Reizo to instruct his newly formed Pyolgigun, or Special Skills Force, in the techniques of modern European warfare at the Korea Military Academy. Kojong took great pride in this group, which was better equipped and better paid than traditional military units. He lavished many special favors on its members, who were mostly wealthy young men of social standing, the youth of the yangban. Under the watchful eyes of Lieutenant Reizo and three Japanese non-commissioned officers, the elite Pyolgigun quickly became the most prestigious military outfit in Korea. It should be noted that King Kojong's motivation to strengthen the army was more likely due to his desire to protect and enhance the power of the throne rather than defend Korea from external aggression.

Japan's recent successful entry into Korean affairs and the possibility of Russia forcing its way into northeastern Korea continued to concern Li Hongzhang, who adamantly refused to give in to Russian encroachment on the peninsula. While the young Chinese navy had insufficient strength to help block a Russian attack on Korea, China still retained a considerable degree of influence over the Korean government. Japan's failure as an intermediary in Commodore Shufeldt's mission to Korea convinced Li Hongzhang that it was China's duty to lead its tributary to the conclusion of its first treaty with a Western nation. Li claimed the only way to counter a Russian move was a treaty to secure a Western counterbalance in the area, the ancient ploy of weak Eastern nations playing one strong power off against another.

Li Hongzhang considered it imperative to bring the United States and other Western powers into Korea at the earliest possible date as a way to forestall Russian action. He hoped that getting Korea into treaty relations with all the trading powers would create strong vested business interest in Korean independence. Li was determined to use Korea's prospective treaties with the West to protect, not weaken, China's position in Korea. His true aim was to protect China's eastern flank by strengthening Korea's security. Knowing that such treaties, if modeled on the Kanghwa Treaty, would undermine Chinese authority in Korea, Li Hongzhang intended to personally supervise Korea's treaty negotiations with Western countries.

Great Britain and Germany held generally guarded policies towards Korea in the 1870s. The political considerations of Korea's precarious position between Russia and Japan preoccupied both countries more than expanding markets. Although Japan continued to induce England and Germany to break ground for the West in Korea, neither country was disposed to do so. As late as 1880, Britain's minister in Beijing, Sir Thomas Wade, told Li Hongzhang that he had no intention of entering into relations with Korea. Harry S. Parkes, Britain's minister in Tokyo echoed a similar sentiment to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Germany's minister to Japan, Baron Karl von Eisendecher, disapproved of a separate action and sought to coordinate Germany's policy with that of the British.

In the early 1880s, a number of factors combined to stimulate both British and German interest in the Korean peninsula, not the least of which were Commodore Shufeldt's attempts to conclude a treaty with Korea. Reports reached London and Berlin that signaled a change of mood in Seoul regarding a treaty relationship with the West. Minister Parkes concluded from Tokyo that Korea's readiness to negotiate treaties was linked to its awareness of the Russian threat to Korean territory. He reasoned that should the Russian threat diminish, Korea might retreat back into its shell of seclusion. He recommended to London that Britain should take advantage of the favorable attitude in Seoul without delay. Minister von Eisendecher, particularly concerned about the large concentration of Russian warships in Nagasaki, thought that in case Shufeldt should reach his goal without having to use force, Germany should immediately follow suit.

Li Hongzhang used Korea envoys traveling between Seoul and Beijing as his secret couriers to prepare for the conclusion of an American treaty with Korea. Less than a month after Commodore Shufeldt's departure, Pyon Won-gyu arrived in Tianjin and became the first Korean to whom Li Hongzhang conveyed his plan for Korea to take the initiative in concluding commercial treaties with Western countries. Pyon found a receptive audience when he explained Li's plan to the Korean government in January 1881. The following month, on February 18, Yi Yong-suk presented Li with a letter from Chief State Councillor Yi Choe-ung that expressed regrets for rejecting the American letter in the summer of 1880 and announced Korea's readiness to conclude a treaty with the United States. This turn of events would indicate that Huang's treatise, "A Strategy for Korea," which triggered such violent opposition from the Confucian literati in Korea, had indeed had an impact on the Seoul government. Li took the opportunity to again warn Yi Yong-suk of not only the Russian danger from the north, but also the threat from Japan.

Later that February, Tak Chong-sik, a "secret agent" from Korea, visited Foreign Minister Ho Ju-chang and indicated that King Kojong and his ministers wanted to conclude a treaty with the Americans, but were afraid the announcement of such a decision would trigger a violent public uproar. Tak explained that China should support the royal decision with an imperial edict from the Qing Emperor. He also informed Minister Ho that the king had secretly instructed him to say that Korea would not reject a second attempt by the United States to conclude a treaty. After the meeting, Minister Ho contacted America's ambassador in Tokyo, John Bingham, and confidently told him that China would advise Korea to conclude its first treaty of commerce with the United States.

Ho Ju-chang's concept of a Korean policy based on the "balance of power" principle was not only rejected by the Chinese government however, it could not be implemented in Korea. King Kojong received Li Hongzhang's communications and a copy of his draft treaty on May 4, 1881. Shortly afterward, in another meeting with Minister Ho, Tak Chong-sik asserted that despite Kojong's position, the political climate in Korea had changed little since his earlier visit. Minister Ho soon received confirmation in a secret letter from Kim Hong-jip and passed the information along to Ambassador Bingham with his apologies stating that, "at present, my proposal on that matter cannot yet be carried out." With behind the scenes preparations well underway, the center of dialogue between China and the United States shifted from Japan to northern China and ended Minister Ho Ju-chang's opportunity to pursue his own Korean policy.

Commodore Shufeldt returned to Tianjin in June with instructions to get Li Hongzhang to fulfill his promise made the previous year and finish the American treaty project. Li had not yet received any word from Seoul however, and Shufeldt found the Viceroy quite reluctant to start negotiations. At a meeting between the two men on July 1, Li counseled patience in an apparent attempt to convince the commodore that Korea's royal court had yet to settle on a common policy. He assured Shufeldt that the United States would eventually realize its wishes in Korea, but for the moment Shufeldt should be patient and remain in Tianjin.

Throughout the summer of 1881, the intense protest movement against the policies of both China and Japan greatly hindered swift action on the American treaty issue by the Seoul government. As a result, King Kojong and his ministers had to continuously maneuver in nearly total secrecy. The court's difficulty in transmitting its own thinking to Viceroy Li in Tianjin further complicated the situation.

Li Hongzhang sent an emissary to Seoul in late summer with a secret communique urging King Kojong to dispatch an accredited representative to Tianjin. The unexplained delays in opening negotiations with Korea raised suspicions in the minds of Commodore Shufeldt and James B. Angell, America's minister to Beijing. The men began to suspect that the February 1881 Sino-Russian Treaty of St. Petersburg had somehow lessened China's concern about the Russian threat to Korea. Actually, Li's hesitancy stemmed from nothing more than the lack of a high Korean official with whom to negotiate.

Korea's indecision had become quite annoying to Li and he was getting equally impatient with the fact that his call for a representative had not yet been answered. Finally, on January 16, 1882, Korean envoys Kim Yun-sik and Pyon Won-gyu arrived in Baoding, where they had several meetings with Li Hongzhang over the next few days. Kim gave Li a secret letter that described the perilous situation in Seoul and implored the Chinese to back the king's position with an imperial edict. Li rejected the appeal as unacceptable and declined to act on it. Pyon Won-gyu immediately returned to Seoul to repeat the Chinese order to urgently dispatch an accredited representative to Tianjin. Kim Yun-sik remained in Baoding and, though he lacked the authority to officially speak for Korea, assumed the role of an unofficial consultant. Kim Yun-sik became the only Korean to witness the birth of the Korean-American treaty.