Ch 24 - Japanese Expansion into Korea

In Search of an Opening

Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt led America's first serious attempt to engage Korea in treaty negotiations. Japan's Foreign Office gave polite, but minimal assistance to the effort, while Viceroy Li Hongzhang eagerly offered to help the United States gain entry to Korea.

A subtle change occurred in King Kojong's attitude in the aftermath of the Kanghwa Treaty, a change prompted by his natural youthful interests and his disillusionment with the top government leadership. As contacts with the outside world increased, so did the young king's interest in and knowledge of Japan and the West. Kojong became less receptive to conservative pressure from the senior government officials who once dominated him and more inclined to listen to younger officials, men who began to question the practicality, if not the wisdom, of Korea's continued isolation in a changing world.

Western diplomats saw the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa as an apparent break in Korea's long history of isolation. The first overt initiative to enter into a treaty with Korea came from the United States government, which had decided that good relations with Korea would be advantageous. In December 1878, the Navy Department ordered Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, commanding the USS Ticonderoga, to conduct a diplomatic mission to Africa and Asia, including Korea, to stimulate and expand American trade around the world. Instead of instructing Shufeldt to seek the assistance of the Chinese in making contact with the government of Korea, his orders directed him to contact the Japanese Foreign Office.

When American Minister John Bingham received word of Shufeldt's mission, he approached the Japanese Foreign Ministry to seek its good offices to ease Shufeldt's entry to Korea. Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru rejected Bingham's request, arguing that Korea was unfamiliar with foreign relations and still appeared disinclined to open itself to foreigners. By the time Shufeldt reached Nagasaki on April 15, 1880, Bingham had only been able to secure a letter of introduction from Minister Inoue to Kondo Masuki, the Japanese trade consul at Pusan.

On the day Commodore Shufeldt arrived in Japan aboard the Ticonderoga, he received a visit from Yu Ching, the Chinese consul at Nagasaki. Yu informed Shufeldt that the Chinese government was encouraging Korea to conclude treaties with the West and hinted that Shufeldt should ask for China's good offices in his Korean venture. Shufeldt's instructions bound him to dealing with the Japanese however, and he could not pursue the Chinese consul's advice at the time.

After departing Nagasaki, the Ticonderoga sailed into Pusan harbor on May 4. As the American frigate sailed into the harbor, a Japanese warship anchored nearby fired a cannon salute. The Ticonderoga fired a salute in return. The cannonade alarmed the local population, particularly when they realized the arriving ship was not a Japanese vessel.

Soon after his arrival, Commodore Shufeldt met with Kondo Masuki, the Japanese consul stationed at the Japan House and presented him with a letter of introduction from Japan's Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru. Consul Kondo's extensive knowledge of Korean culture and traditions had evolved into a good working relationship with local officials. He expressed an interest in helping the commodore and gladly accepted the American's letter to King Kojong and quickly presented it to Sim Tong-sin, the Tongnae Magistrate.

Sim refused to even meet with the Americans. He angrily denounced the Americans for attacking Kanghwa Island, calling them an enemy of Korea. He allegedly swore that he would never accept any proposal for friendly relations with the United States. When Kondo Masuki tried to present Sim with Shufeldt's letter, the Korean refused to accept it, claiming it was not addressed with sufficient respect. The letter had been addressed to the "King of Corai," not the "King of Choson," thus failing to hold to accepted protocol. Kondo urged Sim Tong-sin to forward the document to Seoul, but Sim refused, stating that he had no authorization to negotiate with any country other than Japan.

Shufeldt's brief, unfortunate visit ended when the magistrate decried the American project as "unreasonable" and ordered the Ticonderoga to depart immediately. At dawn on the morning of May 17, the USS Ticonderoga furled its sails and departed Pusan for Yokohama, Japan. As the frigate cleared the harbor area, Korean forts along the shoreline fired a volley of blank cartridges, not in salute, but in an attempt to convince the Korean people that the American vessel was leaving under a threat of force.

After returning to Japan, Shufeldt and Bingham jointly convinced Foreign Minister Inoue to send the American letter directly to the authorities in Seoul. Shufeldt agreed to wait in Nagasaki up to sixty days for a reply. In his communique to the Department of Rites, Inoue outlined American intentions and admonished the government to change its policy of seclusion and welcome foreigners into the country. When the communique reached the Department of Rites in Seoul, one look at the envelope convinced government ministers the document was unacceptable. Written on the envelope bearing America's hope for an opening into Korea was the word "Koryo," not "Korea." Ever conscious of style and protocol, the ministers never opened the envelope and the Americans never got a hearing.

Commodore Shufeldt became indignant when he learned that Korea had rejected the American letter and blamed the failure in part on the Japanese. Minister John Bingham considered Korea's reply an insult to both the United States and Japan. Both men immediately asked Minister Inoue to resubmit the letter. Unwilling to permit a break in its monopoly on relations with Korea, this time the Japanese government firmly, but politely refused the American's appeal.

In July 1880, with the issue of treaty ports still being hotly debated in Seoul, the Yi government dispatched a special mission to Japan to seek a tariff agreement. Kojong appointed Kim Hong-jip, a young and relatively junior official, to head the new mission. Indicative of the king's new attitude, he instructed Kim to obtain as much information about Japan as possible. Kim Hong-jip's Korean delegation of some sixty men departed Pusan for Tokyo aboard a Japanese steamship with the specific purpose of discovering Japanese intentions toward Korea in negotiating trade supplements to the Kanghwa Treaty. At the request of the Department of Rites, Kim also hand-carried Commodore Shufeldt's letter back to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

The fortuitous revival of official American interest in Korea soon came to the attention of China. When Li Hongzhang heard of Shufeldt's activities in Japan from Yu Ching, he quickly took advantage of his first real opportunity to execute his Korean strategy by deciding to mediate directly between Korea and the United States. Li wrote a cordial letter to Shufeldt on July 23, inviting him to Tianjin for a visit. Meanwhile, Commodore Shufeldt learned that Seoul had again rejected Japanese efforts at mediation when the Foreign ministry returned his unopened letter addressed to "Koryo." Several days later, Shufeldt accepted Li's invitation to Tianjin.

Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru met with Kim Hong-jip on August 16, and explained that supplementary trade regulations were needed to protect Japanese merchants against the future competition that would arise from the expected opening of Korean ports to Western trade. He told Kim that Japanese leaders had learned from personal experience that exclusion was no longer a viable policy for any country and that Korea should open its doors to the West.

Three days after Kim's meeting with Inoue, the USS Ticonderoga departed Nagasaki for Tianjin, China, and arriving six days later. During his visit in Tianjin, Commodore Shufeldt held long discussions with Viceroy Li Hongzhang regarding Korea's strategic position relative to China, Japan and Russia. Shufeldt expressed his own fear that Russia might indeed attempt to seize Korea. Li declared that he would "use his influence with the Government of Korea to accede to the friendly request of the United States." Pleased with the results of his visit, Shufeldt left for home early in September 1880 to seek further instructions from Washington.

Almost immediately after Commodore Shufeldt left Tianjin for the United States, Li Hongzhang began preparations to conclude a Korean-American treaty. Li was quite knowledgeable about the situation in Korea. Foreign Minister Ho Ju-chang and Councillor Huang Tsun-hsien had been stationed at the China Mission in Tokyo since the latter half of 1877. From their diplomatically strategic posts the two men paid close attention to Korea's relationship with Japan and dutifully collected every bit of intelligence possible on the subject for Li.

Minister Ho had numerous contacts with Japanese, Korean and Western diplomats in Tokyo and the information he gathered from them led him to develop his own views about how China should guide Korea's fate. Councillor Huang developed Ho's ideas further in his treatise entitled Chao-hsien ts'e-lueh, "A Strategy for Korea." During his month-long sojourn in Tokyo, Kim Hong-jip had more than half a dozen meetings with Minister Ho and Councillor Huang. The two Chinese ministers explained to Kim that, while opening Inchon and establishing a Japanese legation in Seoul would be inevitable, they regarded neither issue as urgent. Both men believed the expansionist policy of the Russian Empire represented the most serious threat facing Korea. They warned Kim against Russia's naval buildup at Vladivostok and its "unfathomable intentions," seeking to impress upon him the urgent need for Korea to take steps to ward off the threat.

Councillor Huang's intimate knowledge of the long history of Russian territorial encroachment along China's frontiers caused him to feel quite apprehensive about Russian intentions in the Far East. He reminded Kim of China's very special attitude toward the Korean peninsula and said that "the world situation today is without precedent in 4,000 years ... and that it is no longer possible to cure today's ills with ancient remedies." No country on earth, he warned, could permanently seclude itself and refuse contact with foreigners. The peninsula's geographical position as the "screen of the Three Eastern Provinces," predestined Korea to keep a check on Russia.

The Qing government had been aware of the growing danger to Korea and Manchuria ever since China ceded the Maritime Provinces to Russia in 1860 and Russia began establishing colonial rule and building up its military in the Amur River region and the Maritime Territory. The sporadic incidents involving Russian military incursions on the peninsula did not worry Beijing, Tokyo or Seoul. The Russian desire for an ice-free port on Korea's east coast however, was a constant source of great concern to China, Japan and Korea. Russia's continued encouragement, even enticement, of local peasants to flee into the Maritime Territory became a particular worry of the Seoul government. By the late 1870s, the number of "renegade" Korean peasants had reputedly reached 20,000 to 30,000, ample evidence to Seoul of Russian plans for future territorial encroachment.

When Kim asked the Chinese ministers who Korea could turn to for help against the Russian threat, Ho suggested the "balance of power" principle, a Western strategy whereby a threatened country would ally itself with other countries. By late 1876, Li Hongzhang had developed the view that Korea's best hope of warding off the threat from Japan and Russia would be to adopt a "treaty-system policy," whereby it would enter into diplomatic and commercial relations with those Western powers chiefly interested in trade with East Asia, not territorial conquest. Kim could only reply that, while the whole country admired and respected Viceroy Li and China, Korea knew only how to adhere to the ancient teachings and could not change overnight.

Councillor Huang Tsun-hsien repeatedly emphasized the gravity of the Russian threat and urged that Korea should sign a treaty with the United States, "the only Western power that has never sought selfish gains." The councillor told Kim that the United States could be trusted. It had the respect of all other nations and was interested in preserving peace in the Pacific region. Huang added that Korea should open trade relations with the West, seek prosperity by applying Western technology to its domestic industry, send its students to China and Japan, and invite Western technical and scientific teachers to Korea.

On September 6, just two days before Kim Hong-jip's mission departed Tokyo, Ho Ju-chang presented Kim with copies of two treatises. The first was Huang's Chao-hsien ts'e-lueh, "A Strategy for Korea." The second treatise, written by the Qing philosopher Cheng Kuan-ying, asserted that to strengthen a country like Korea, it was not enough to import Western technology. Korea had to also adopt the underlying political and social institutions that supported such technological development.

Councillor Huang Tsun-hsien wrote in his treatise that Korea's pivotal position in the geography of East Asia made it the primary target of Russian territorial ambition in the region. Viceroy Li Hongzhang long suspected that Russia was trying to isolate Korea with the aim of seizing the peninsula at an opportune moment. He feared that after the Russo-Turkish War, Russia would turn its undivided attention toward Korea. The close geographical and historical ties between Korea and Japan made them interdependent in the face of this common threat. If Russia seized either country, Huang wrote, the other would not be able to survive. Korea should therefore free itself of "small dislikes" and conceive a grand policy for Japan, renew its ancient relations of friendship and find allies abroad. He suggested that Wonsan should be opened to Japanese commerce and that Seoul should accept British overtures for a treaty as means of thwarting Russian designs.

Councillor Huang felt that Japan was too weak economically to seriously challenge Korea's security. As for America, he stated that it "has always upheld justice" and "never permitted the European powers to freely perpetrate their evil deeds." Huang believed the European Powers would follow the lead if the United States signed a treaty with Korea. Afterward, if Russia attacked Korea, it could not achieve its aggressive ambitions because other Western powers would not permit it. To meet the Russian threat, Huang recommended that Korea must remain close to China, unite with Japan, ally itself with the United States, and promote its own self-strengthening.

The members of Kim Hong-jip's mission to Japan not only observed startling evidence of Japanese progress, they also developed an increased awareness of developments elsewhere in the world. During Kim's farewell visit with Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru on September 7, he heard an astonishing, if unintended, reinforcement of the information presented by the two Chinese diplomats. Inoue told Kim that Russia had assembled sixteen warships at Vladivostok, just northeast of the Korean border. If Russia ever decided to seek an ice-free port for its fleet in preparation for a naval attack against China, Korea would be the logical place to look. Because Korea had no treaties with the West and did not subscribe to international law, Inoue said, if another country attacked Korea it would be difficult for any country to intervene. With the United States in mind, Minister Inoue urged Kim that should Korea be approached by a Western power for a treaty, it should respond in a friendly manner.

Although Japan's goals in Korea ran counter to those of China, in the face of the common threat from Russia, the two rival powers adopted an identical strategy;  to persuade Korea to enter into treaty relations with Western powers to check Russian designs on the peninsula. Given Korea's deep-seated distrust of Japan, Inoue's effort to help Commodore Shufeldt must have reminded Kim Hong-jip and his party of the warning they received from Li Hongzhang the previous October about possible Japanese collusion with the United States or another Western power. It is unlikely that Kim found Minister Inoue's sincerity very convincing. Similar advice from Chinese Minister Huang and Councillor Ho deeply influenced Kim, however.

Kim Hong-jip returned to Seoul on October 2, 1880, and presented Huang Tsun-hsien's books to King Kojong along with his own report. The king read them with great interest and asked that all his ministers of state read them as well. At a court conference of top government leaders on October 11, Kojong asked for comments on Huang's treatise. Chief State Councilor Yi Choe-ung stated that many of Huang's ideas coincided with his own and that some of Huang's suggestions might be adopted. With regard to the West, he commented that, while its "evil religion" must be rejected, "this should not necessarily lead to quarrels" with the West.

At the king's command, government officials deliberated the matter further and made a number of recommendations. First, since relations with the Qing dynasty were already "intimate," there was no need to change the policy toward China. Second, the opening of Inchon and the establishment of a permanent Japanese legation in Seoul should be rejected. Final decisions on those matters should be deferred until after the arrival of a Japanese envoy. Finally, since it would not be "bad policy to sign a treaty with the United States," should such a message again be received, "a friendly reply will be given." King Kojong promptly approved the recommendations. The results of this October conference marked the beginning of an epoch-making policy that led to the end of Korea's long period of isolation and brought about revolutionary changes in its foreign relations, including those with China.

The China Mission had high hopes as the two diplomats eagerly awaited a letter from Kim announcing the royal court's acceptance of Ho's policy suggestions. In October 1880, Yi Tong-in visited Ho and delivered transcripts of Kojong's discussion of Huang's treatise with Chief State Councillor Yi Choe-ung and his high ministers. Yi also passed along an allegedly secret personal message from Kojong asserting the opinion that the royal court was favorably disposed toward concluding treaties with the West.

King Kojong's message explained that Kim Hong-jip would soon be ordered to write a letter urging Ho to encourage the Americans to send an envoy to Korea for the conclusion of a treaty. Councillor Ho relayed this new information to the Chinese Foreign Office and urged that China follow one of two policy alternatives:  either negotiate the conclusion of a Korean-American treaty directly, or ask for an imperial edict ordering Korea to enter into a treaty with another country. Li Hongzhang opposed the proposed policy as being too interventionist and feared that Seoul might not be receptive to such an order. Furthermore, Li argued, to dispatch a Chinese envoy to Seoul might induce the Westerners to use their treaties with China as the blueprint for their treaties with Korea. This would not only be disadvantageous to Korea, but the West would hold China directly responsible for the fulfillment of such treaties.

Huang Tsun-hsien's "A Strategy for Korea" proved uniquely important in influencing the attitudes of King Kojong and his ministers toward Japan and the West principally because it stimulated their interest in reform and modernization. The government later printed the text of Councillor Huang's document and distributed the work to yangban scholars throughout the country in the vain hope of securing a consensus for policies that, one way or another, Korea would be forced to adopt. Unfortunately, yangban scholars opposed opening the country from the beginning and not even the arguments of a shrewd Chinese diplomat like Huang Tsun-hsien could change their minds. Nevertheless, after they digested the material and agreed that it gave an accurate picture of the situation, it seemed clear to them that Korea's policies would have to change to adapt to the changing international situation. Moved by such influences, the Korean government gradually turned toward a policy of enlightenment. Japan was an immediate beneficiary of this policy.

In October 1880, the Japanese government again ordered its chargé d'affaires, Hanabusa Yoshitada, to Seoul. The foreign ministry instructed him to secure consent to open the port of Inchon and establish a Japanese legation in Seoul. As an imperial appointee, Hanabusa carried a letter of accreditation from the Japanese emperor to be given directly to King Kojong. Hanabusa left Tokyo on November 24, and his party reached Seoul on December 17. Instead of meeting with Department of Rites Minister Hong U-chang, the chargé d'affaires immediately requested a royal audience with King Kojong to present his letter of accreditation.

Hanabusa Yoshitada's demand to present his accreditation directly to the king shocked the sensibilities of a Confucian government still holding to old habits. Top government leaders hotly debated the wording of the message. This time however, the debate focused not on whether the Japanese message should be accepted, but rather in what form it should be answered. After a flurry of activity in the Department of Rites, Kojong announced on December 24 that he would personally accept the Japanese message. Three days later, King Kojong received Hanabusa Yoshitada in Changdok Palace, the first Japanese diplomat ever to be received by a Korean king.

Without having made formal arrangements to do so, Hanabusa and his staff settled down in Seoul for an indefinite stay, thus solving the issue of a resident minister. The government never challenged the Japanese on this matter, nor did they ever formally acknowledge the de facto creation of a Japanese legation, they merely accepted the obvious. This was a real breakthrough in Japan's long effort to modernize its relations with Korea and expand its influence on the peninsula. Ironically, China's influence proved to be the important, if not decisive factor that made it all possible.

Hanabusa met with Kim Hong-jip on January 4, 1881, to seek a solution to the long-running debate over opening the port of Inchon to the Japanese. For centuries, Inchon occupied a unique position in the collective Korean mind. The heavy fortifications that commanded the port city emphasized its strategic importance as the "gateway to the capital." The year before, while Department of Rites Minister Hong U-chang and Hanabusa talked of treaty ports, new gun batteries were being completed around Inchon and nearby Pupyong. Korea would not give up Inchon without stubborn resistance. With the controversy over the opening of the port of Inchon still raging, Hanabusa made it clear he would not tolerate further delays. His demand to open Inchon triggered an immediate controversy in the Yi government and created a crisis atmosphere in Seoul.

Korea wanted to postpone the opening of Inchon for as much as seven years. Japan, on the other hand, wanted the opening to occur as soon as possible and bristled at the suggestion that Inchon would be opened only if Japan located its legation in the port city instead of Seoul. There is no indication as to what changed the mind of the Yi government on this issue, but on January 28, Kim Hong-jip surprised the Japanese by announcing that his superiors, with certain qualifications, had agreed to open Inchon to trade. After both sides made concessions on the timing, the two parties reached a final agreement on February 28 that Inchon would open in September 1882.

The bitter, five-year struggle over the opening of treaty ports clearly demonstrated Korea's lack of experience in world diplomacy. Bound by ancient traditions, the Korea government futilely attempted to make the old policy of containment work. In the process, it failed to develop a new policy toward Japan. Government officials saw diplomacy only in ceremonial terms and were unprepared to agree to demands that went beyond tradition-bound precedent. They made decisions only in reaction to Japanese demands and then only after the most bitter arguments.

Conservative opponents loudly denounced compromise and branded those who dealt with the Japanese as traitors. Officials accused each other of allowing the Japanese to win further diplomatic advantages. The Japanese, on the other hand, content with seeking the fulfillment of the treaty terms, had given diplomacy a chance and diplomacy had won out.