Ch 24 - Japanese Expansion into Korea

A New Relationship

The 1876 Kanghwa Treaty gave Japan all the leverage it needed to open new seaports in Korea and strengthen its foothold on the peninsula. Growing apprehension in China led to a new policy towards Korea.

As a symbolic of Japan's new East Asian diplomacy, the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 represented a major institutional challenge to the continued survival of East Asia's old order. It also undermined one of China's most dependable pillars of world order, the system of tributary relationships. Soon after concluding the treaty, the Yi government dispatched a traditional mission to Tokyo to observe Japanese "laws and customs" and affirm the restoration of the old friendship between the two countries. Special envoy Kim Ki-su headed the mission to Japan. The mission included Pusan's language officer Hyon Sog-un, a language specialist, interpreters, military personnel, a few clerks, and an artist. Kim and his party boarded the Japanese steamship Koryo Maru and sailed from Pusan on May 22, 1876. After reaching the port of Yokohama seven days later, they completed their journey to Tokyo by train.

Shortly after the Korean mission arrived in the Japanese capital, Kim Ki-su went to the Foreign Ministry, where he was received by Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori, Moriyama Shigeru and others. Kim also attended a special audience with the Meiji Emperor. Although Kim's hosts offered him every opportunity to observe Japanese life and institutions, he repeatedly asserted that he had come to Japan only to convey Korea's thanks for Kuroda Kiyotaka's mission.

The sights and sounds of Japan continually surprised Kim Ki-su;  novelties such as narrow gauge steam locomotives and trains, cameras and photography, and the marvel of the telegraph . While traveling in the city of Kobe, Kim got his first look at people from the West. Their physical appearance, their long noses, deep-set eyes and yellow hair amazed him. He also observed that Westerners seemed to live all over the country, built houses, held official Japanese positions, and even married Japanese women.

Kim's hosts proudly described the formula that fueled Japan's dramatic modernization effort, fukoku kyohei, "enrich the country, strengthen the military." With his limited understanding of a Western-style economy and foreign trade, Kim briefly reflected on the concept and then wrongly guessed it was based entirely on foreign trade. Kim convinced himself that Japan's current production could never meet foreign demand and that inflation would be the result. He wrongly concluded that foreign trade would only lead to calamity. For the first time in Korea's long history a Confucian yangban had an opportunity to observe first hand just how an Asian nation went about adopting Western technology. Kim, a man renowned for his knowledge of the classics and literature, apparently missed the point completely.

The Korean mission returned to Pusan on June 29. The following month, Kim Ki-su reported his observations to King Kojong, who listened eagerly to a first-hand account of the mission. Kim reported that Japan had sent its young men to Western nations to study and told the young king of how Japan had adopted Western agricultural techniques, telegraphy, steamships, and military weapons. Though well-reasoned, Kim's observations lacked personal insight and his report proved to be inexact and evasive. After personally observing a modernizing Japan in the process of adapting to Western ways, Kim saw little that appeared relevant to Korea's situation. Instead of building mutual trust and confidence, his rather negative assessment only confirmed the Yi government's general apprehension about Japanese intentions.

Ever-mindful of the potential commercial market in Korea, Japan concentrated on normalizing trade with Korea. Using Article 5 of the Kanghwa Treaty to justify its action, Japan moved to consolidate its position in Pusan. In a strict sense, the Kanghwa Treaty did not really "open" the port of Pusan, it merely reaffirmed Japan's right to trade in its traditional foothold, the Japan House, located in the nearby Choryang district.

On October 31, 1876, the Japanese Foreign Office appointed Kondo Masuki as Japan's first trade superintendent in Korea and vested him with full authority to communicate as an equal with the Tongnae magistrate. Kondo not only protected Japan's commercial interests and promoted trade, but as a Foreign Office consul he looked after Japan's diplomatic interests as well. Kondo Masuki and the Tongnae magistrate held detailed discussions over the next three months on preparing a settlement for the Japanese community in Pusan. They also established a division of administrative duties and responsibilities between Korea and Japan for the settlement. On January 30, 1877, the two men signed the "Agreement Concerning the Japanese Settlement at Pusan."

Under this agreement, the Japanese government would pay a rent of ¥50 per year for the settlement and assume the responsibility for maintaining the roads, sewers and drainage. Repairs connected with the breakwater frontage would remain the responsibility of the Korean government. Construction soon began to accommodate the rapidly growing number of Japanese traders. Pusan became Korea's first international port.

Japan's interest in Korea was driven by more than just economics. From a naval perspective, Japan understood that an aggressive and determined foreign power could take control of the fine and easily defended natural harbors along the Korean coast. Even a few men commanding a modest naval force could inflict appreciable losses. Such a situation would lead to constant anxiety among Japanese commercial interests in Korea. Persistent rumors of Russian troop movements along China's northeastern frontier led to the real fear that Russia would move toward Korea and the northern Japanese islands. In order to keep the peninsula beyond the reach of Western competition, the Meiji government invoked the Kanghwa Treaty, in part, to maintain the ancient status of Korea's harbors as undefended fishing ports. This would keep Korea's seaports free from the grip of any ambitious nation that might convert them into naval fortresses against Japanese interests. In a sense, the Meiji government sought to check Russian expansion in East Asia by expanding its own influence in Korea.

Ever since Japan first set its sights on opening Korea ports for trade, Japanese ships had been conducting sporadic surveys of the Korean coastline. Beginning in May 1877 however, Japan stepped up its maritime survey of the Korean peninsula, searching for ports that would not only be suitable for concessions and trade, but would also provide the military potential to block a Russian southward advance in the region. After reviewing survey and mapping data taken along Korea's northeastern coastline in Hamgyong Province, the Japanese Foreign Office selected the natural harbor at Munchon in the Bay of Yonghung as the best site. The Foreign Office next turned its attention to Korea's west coast and busily gathered data on the military and economic advantages of numerous ports.

Time was slowly running out for the selection of the two new treaty ports when the coastal survey mission headed by chargé d'affaires Hanabusa Yoshitada departed Pusan in October 1877. Bad weather and illness plagued the survey team from the beginning however, and the mission yielded less than satisfying results. By the time Hanabusa reached Seoul on November 25, he was ill-prepared for his scheduled negotiations with Vice Minister of the Department of Rites Hong U-chang. Neither side could agree on which ports to open and the entire issue of treaty ports became deadlocked. They could only agree upon the need for more surveying.

Japan intensified its coastal survey efforts beginning in April 1878, paying particular attention to the northeastern coastline. The inconclusive spring survey, which included repeat visits along Korea's west coast, ended in October without a firm choice of seaports. Nevertheless, after reviewing the data, the Foreign Office considered the port of Wonsan in the Bay of Yonghung on the northeast coast and the port of Inchon on the west coast to be the best choices.

The provision for opening ports in Korea became one of the most disputed points of the Kanghwa Treaty. When Hanabusa Yoshitada returned to Seoul on June 13, 1879, he took up residence in temporary quarters just outside Seoul's Great West gate at the chongsugwan. Once again, Hanabusa had a tough time negotiating with Vice Minister Hong U-chang. Hong objected to the port of Wonsan because of its proximity to Munchon, the ancestral burial grounds of King Taejo, founder of the Yi Dynasty. He also rejected Inchon because of its proximity to the capital in Seoul. Opening Inchon, he remarked, would not only divert much of the commercial activity from Seoul to the seacoast, but it would also disturb the population. Expanding on that theme, Hong effectively rejected virtually every port city in Kyonggi Province, even though it was one of the five provinces specified in the Kanghwa Treaty.

The debate over opening Korean seaports wore on day after day through the summer heat and humidity. On July 8, Hong suddenly stunned Hanabusa with news that, after mustering only the most fragile consensus, his government had relented and agreed to designate Wonsan as an open port. The arrangements for opening Wonsan would be modeled exactly like those in effect in Pusan. In addition, the government granted Japan special concessions that allowed a permanent lease on large tracts of land in Pusan and Wonsan, where Japanese nationals would enjoy extraterritorial privileges. Wonsan would open to the Japanese on May 1, 1880.

While negotiations continued in Seoul over opening Korean seaports, China's Zongli Yamen (Foreign Office) made a stark proposal August 21, 1879, that dramatically departed from China's traditional position of non-interference in Korean affairs. The memorial submitted indicated a heightened Chinese vigilance toward Japanese designs on Korea. The document argued for a new policy, one that encouraged Korea to enter into treaty relations with the West so that their combined interests would serve to check Japanese designs in Korea. Britain's Minister Wade had suggested a similar approach to the Zongli Yamen earlier, warning that if Korea failed to establish relations with Western countries, its fate would certainly follow that of the Ryukyu Islands.

Li Hongzhang carefully guided China's foreign policy on Korea through his personal correspondence with Chief State Councillor Yi Yu-won. This useful device enabled the Qing government to implement its new Korea policy without "officially" interfering. In a long letter written to Yi Yu-won on August 26, Li Hongzhang went to great lengths explaining the urgent need for Korea to sign treaties with Western countries. He expressed his fear that Korea, a nation of literary tradition, would be no match for Japan's military. If trouble came, he wrote, China would extend aid to Korea, but it might not reach the peninsula in time. Regarding the possibility of Japanese-Western collusion against Korea, Li pointed out that the irreversible trend toward global relations then underway had grown beyond anyone's power to check. The best guarantee for Korea's future safety from Russian and Japanese aggression, he argued, would be treaties with Britain, Germany and the United States.

Vice Minister Hong U-chang and Hanabusa Yoshitada signed the "Convention Regarding the Opening of the Port of Wonsan" on August 30. The opening of Pusan and Wonsan gave the Japanese two commercially and strategically important footholds on the Korean peninsula. Japan had achieved its immediate "strategic objectives" in Korea.

The political situation in Korea in the fall of 1879 was not as favorable as Li hoped. The increase in Japan's characteristic aggressive attitude alarmed many government officials in Seoul. Furthermore, in the years since signing the Treaty of Kanghwa with Japan, xenophobia and exclusionist sentiments in Korea had increased rather than decreased. Choe Ik-hyon, the fiery literati leader who had been exiled for his opposition to the Kanghwa Treaty, had been pardon in March 1879. The pardon did nothing to appease him or his supporters. They turned against the government's foreign policy and made common cause with the Taewongun, whose own brooding presence continued to threaten Queen Min and her relatives. The literati strongly identified Japan with the West and had become more vehemently opposed than ever to expanding relations with Japan and opening Korea to the West.

In Seoul, the outrage over the possible opening of the port of Inchon continued unabated and built to crisis levels. The government pinned responsibility for the current state of affairs squarely on Chief State Councillor Yi Yu-won, who was forced to retire from his post. Depressed and discouraged with the government, Yi left the capital for his "native mountains," where he received Li Hongzhang's letter in early October.

Li's great powers of persuasion apparently had little positive effect on Yi Yu-won's opinion of the West. In his reply to Li, written on December 24, 1879, he politely cited the fundamental reasons why Korea could not enter into treaty relations with Western nations:  Korea's traditional seclusion and its aversion to Christianity. With regard to Li's suggestion to "use an enemy to control an enemy," Yi wrote that it might work for a larger nation, but not for a small country like Korea, which might be destroyed before it could ever manage to use an enemy. International law was of no help since it had not saved the Ryukyu Islands. Yi remained unconvinced of the advantage of foreign trade, arguing that it had nearly bankrupted Japan, instead of enriching it. He concluded his argument by saying that Korea could always count on Chinese protection in time of need.

It is not known if Yi Yu-won ever consulted the government in Seoul before writing his letter to Li Hongzhang, but in view of the nature of his correspondence and the gravity of the subject, it is hard to believe that he wrote anything contrary to the prevailing views of those in power. By politely, but firmly rejecting Li's advice, Korea asserted its traditional political independence from China. The letter disappointed Li Hongzhang. It did not dishearten him and he did not have long to wait before another opportunity arose to implement his new Korean policy.