Ch 23 - The Opening of Choson

Kicking in the Door

King Kojong believed the 1876 Treaty of Friendship had simply restored traditional neighborly relations with Japan. The Korean government failed to understand that Korea had opened its doors to the world through a modern diplomatic relationship that went far beyond altering traditional Japanese-Korea relations.

King Kojong and Queen Min learned about contemporary events in East Asia through their envoy's to Beijing and the information they received clearly showed a developing crisis in China. They were horrified by tales of encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, the direct result of contact with powerful and aggressive Western nations. The envoys reported the spread of Christianity on the continent, a belief system that subverted Confucian ideals. They heard how Western goods and the evils of opium were distorting China's economy. They also learned of the wonders of Western technology, especially its military weapons.

On January 30, 1875, the Council of State recommended without debate that Korea comply with Japanese demands to send high officials to negotiate. The government, no longer wishing to put off the Japanese with low-level language officers, appointed General Sin Hon, commander of the Oyong Regiment of the Royal Guard, as its chief negotiator and high reception officer. Minister of Rites Yun Cha-sung was appointed deputy reception officer.

General Sin had a brilliant career under the rule of the Taewongun and was temporarily elevated to the Board of Officials-without-Portfolio, presumably to match the stature of General Kuroda. It was the first time since the Meiji Restoration that a reception officer had been appointed to meet with a Japanese mission. After their appointment was relayed to the Japanese on February 2, Sin Hon and Yun Cha-sung were instructed to meet the Japanese at Kanghwa and renew "the old friendship." As before, neither man had the power to make important decisions. Their sole function was to receive the Japanese messages and report back to Seoul.

On February 5, while procedural details of the negotiations were being discussed, Kojong received the Qing Board of Rites letter urging him to exercise both caution and courtesy to the Japanese. The royal court had vainly tried to keep the Japanese away from the strategic Kanghwa Island altogether, but after a convincing argument from Sin Hon and Yun Cha-sung about the significance of the impending meeting with the Japanese, the government relented and allowed them to choose their own site. The Japanese insisted on meeting in Kanghwa City because of its proximity to Seoul and the vantage point it provided to exert pressure on the Korean government. The Japanese landed without approval on Kanghwa Island at Kapkwanjin on February 10, 1876. Escorted by four detachments of marines in full regalia, Lieutenatn General Kuroda Kiyotaka and Inoue marched into Kanghwa City and established their headquarters. Full-scale negotiations between Korea and Japan commenced the following day.

Now, with the Japanese sitting on Kanghwa Island, Seoul had to confront for the first time the Western concept of diplomatic relations based on equality instead of the customary tributary relationship. The royal court in Seoul faced the same terrible dilemma that challenged all East Asia during the nineteenth century;  how to acquire the advantages of Western civilization without falling victim to its people.

In Kanghwa City, the Japanese delegation laid its thirteen-article draft treaty before General Sin Hon and Yun Cha-sung. Inoue Kaoru made a special effort to explain that the draft was based on "international law" and Kuroda insisted that the best way to promote friendship and prevent future misunderstandings was to sign the treaty. Sin Hon exhibited complete ignorance of both Western international law and modern interstate relations and reminded Kuroda that Korea was unfamiliar with the diplomacy of the world. Kuroda replied that under international law Korea was an "independent state enjoying the same rights as Japan" - emphasizing by implication Korea's independence from China.

Sin asked Kuroda what he meant by "treaty" and was told that a treaty set down the rules under which Japan and Korea would open ports and trade with each other. Korea was a poor nation, Sin argued, with a limited number of goods. Korea and Japan had traded with each other for three centuries without a treaty, he said, and saw no reason why they should sign one now. He feared that an expansion of trade would only lure the peasants into profit-making ventures that would tempt them to violate the laws of the land. Sin's competence to negotiate quickly became suspicious when he concluded his remarks by telling Kuroda he had to report the matter to Seoul and wait for instructions.

Fearing that Seoul was trying to draw-out the talks, General Kuroda repeated his demand the following day. Referring to a recently arrived supply ship, Kuroda told the Korean envoys it carried additional troops. Reinforcements would follow soon. He warned that if Seoul failed to send someone with the authority to negotiate and rejected the treaty, Japanese soldiers accompanied by civilian radicals might land on Korea soil and the Japanese government would be unable to control them. General Sin rebuked Kuroda, reminding him that it was highly improper to speak of an invasion when he should be discussing restoration of the old friendship between their two countries. Kuroda agreed to wait ten days for a reply.

On February 14, King Kojong convened a conference of his ministers to discuss how to deal with the Kuroda mission and formulate a policy. Their deliberations were vague and inconclusive. Yi Yu-won, Kim Pyong-hak, Kim Pyong-guk, Hong Sun-mok, and Yi Choe-ung agreed that Kuroda's arrival with warships proved that Japan wanted war, not friendship. Pak Kyu-su lost little time in disavowing Korea's policy of seclusion. He deplored the unpreparedness that had invited this Japanese outrage. Inasmuch as Japan was at least professing a desire for peace, he counseled patience and urged accommodation.

Regardless of Kojong's desire to find an alternative, Korea's historic and carefully guarded tradition of seclusion was a retarding influence not easily altered. While the government faced the bluffing Japanese delegation on Kanghwa Island, in Seoul it faced the the formidable Taewongun and the militant yangban literati, both of whom vehemently opposed any accommodation with Japan. The Taewongun voiced his abject disdain for the government's decision and charged that the government's weakness had invited the willful and massive Japanese intrusions. If the government submitted to Japan's outrageous demands, he wrote, it would ruin the nation. He even threatened to lead his own supporters to sacrifice themselves in a war against the Japanese.

Perhaps the most vocal government adversary was Choe Ik-hyon, whose lengthy memorial of February 17 accused the government of lacking a determined policy and of seeking an easy peace with the enemy. Choe cautioned the king not to mistake the present Japanese for those of earlier times and ominously demanded that compromisers within the bureaucracy be severely punished. The government was not impressed with such tirades and reacted to such dissenting voices promptly and harshly. Opposition memorials were returned and Choe was immediately arrested, convicted, and banished. The outrage of men like Choe was a reflection of the general mood of the country at the time. The brash advance of the Japanese onto Kanghwa Island, once the impenetrable sanctuary of Korean kings, terrified the peasants and fanned the flames of anti-foreign feelings.

The next day, Kojong and his ministers unexpectedly received Sin Hon's report of the Kanghwa talks along with a copy of the draft treaty. Under pressure from the proximity of the Japanese and mounting vocal opposition from outside the government, the ministers moved with surprising speed. After secret deliberations were held to discuss the treaty points, the Council of State reached a momentous decision on February 18: "the time has come for a continuation of the good relations with Japan, and it is no longer necessary to reject their trade treaty." The following day, the Council of State suggested that Sin Hon reluctantly accept the power to continue negotiating so long as the items of the treaty benefited the people and profited the country. The stage was set for actual treaty negotiations between Korea and Japan.

Aside from a general commitment to maintain peace with Japan, neither Kojong nor any of his ministers had a policy. The government felt itself unprepared for war and, despite strong domestic opposition and with no other practical alternatives, it decided on accommodation. High on the list of factors that contributed to this decision was Japan's apparent readiness to use its growing military strength. The recent Japanese incursion in Taiwan was well known and only at the risk of an instant invasion could Seoul ignore the presence of a powerful naval squadron with a reported 4,000 troops in Kanghwa Bay. Though inadequate for a full-scale invasion of the peninsula, the troops accompanying the Kuroda mission, 400 of whom were already on Kanghwa Island, could have occupied the entire island and held it indefinitely. Such a move would have cut the sea and river routes which brought Seoul's food supplies from the southern provinces.

Another factor in Seoul's decision was less obvious, but equally important;  China's attitude. On February 12, not long after Kojong learned of Kuroda's mission, Yi Yu-won returned from his mission to Beijing. His personal report on the views and attitudes of Li Hongzhang and other Chinese officials about the desirability of opening Korea to the outside world undoubtedly influenced Kojong and his ministers. Just days later, Chi-ho and Hsi-Chung-a, Chinese envoys from the Board of Rites, arrived in Seoul bearing the imperial edict of investiture for the Crown Prince. On February 17, ignoring the tradition that discouraged discussing political matters on such an occasion, Kojong met with the two men and brought up the Korea-Japanese dispute.

The king's interpreter explained to the envoys that the dispute with Japan stemmed from Japan's insistence on using preposterous terminology in its official communications. Kojong asked if the imperial envoys were aware of the fact that a Japanese squadron was anchored in the waters at Kanghwa. After informing the king of the Zongli Yamen's position, Mori Arinori's presence in Beijing and Japan's intention to conclude a treaty with Korea, the envoys replied that they were concerned about the matter and expressed the hope that Korea would take steps to avoid trouble with Japan.

Even after being told that Korea was ultimately free to make its own decisions, no king or government could or would lightly reject explicit Chinese advice, especially when faced with a serious external threat. Kojong expressed his gratitude for the Zongli Yamen's advice. In the face of stiff opposition from the Taewongun and his supporters, the young king shortly decided in favor of accommodation with Japan. Two days later, as the imperial envoys left Seoul, the government of Korea sent its final instructions to the negotiators at Kanghwa.

Final negotiations for the treaty settlement began on February 18. Both sides maneuvered, proposed and counter-proposed various additions and deletions to the document. After mutual concessions, the final treaty text was prepared. Negotiations nearly came to a halt during an evening meeting on February 20 when the Japanese requested the king personally sign and seal the treaty. Sin Hon conveyed Seoul's objection to such a procedure and the talks stalemated for two days. Kuroda warned the Korea envoys he was about to leave for Japan and gave them five days to get an answer to this problem from Seoul. The dramatic gesture was effective.

Within two days a new state seal was cast with the words "the seal of the King of Great Korea" and affixed to the ratification text in place of King Kojong's personal signature. The various documents were rushed back to Kanghwa City on February 25 and handed to the Japanese. Kuroda and Inoue, accompanied by their staff and escorted by an honor guard dressed in formal attire, left their headquarters on the morning of February 27 and met the Korean delegation in Yonmu Hall. In a brief formal ceremony, Sin Hon presented Kojong's ratification, a letter from the Council of State and gifts to the envoys from Japan. Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka presented the king with a cannon, two thousand rounds of ammunition, pistols, a gold watch, a thermometer, a compass, and numerous other gifts. His historic mission concluded, Kuroda left for Japan the following day, arriving in Tokyo to an enthusiastic welcome, where he was honored in an audience with the Emperor.

The 1876 Treaty of Friendship, also known as the Treaty of Kanghwa, was officially signed by Korea on February 24, 1876 - dated February 26 and exchanged on February 27. A sizable majority disliked the idea of signing such a document and the government tried to placate their fears by arguing that Korea had not opened its doors to the world, only Japan, a close neighbor with whom Korea was now restoring traditional relations. The reasoning was weak, because Korea had not restored traditional "neighborly relations" with Japan, it had entered into a modern, and extremely disadvantageous diplomatic relationship.

Japan failed in its earlier attempt to revise the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871 and was making little headway in its efforts to revise its own unequal treaties with Western powers. Through the Treaty of Kanghwa however, Japan succeeded in imposing an "unequal' treaty" of its own design modeled directly after those so recently imposed on China by the West. The most significant aspect of this twelve-article treaty was Article 1, which stated that Korea was a free nation, "...an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as does Japan." The Japanese included this seemingly harmless statement in an attempt to detach Korea once and for all from its traditional tributary relationship with China. Even though Japan asserted the treaty acknowledgment of Korea's autonomous status constituted proof of its peaceful intent, its real purpose was just the opposite.

Article 2 stipulated that Japan and Korea would exchange envoys within fifteen months and permanently maintain diplomatic missions in each country. The Japanese would confer with the Ministry of Rites;  the Korean envoy would be received by the Foreign Office.

Under Article 3, Japan would use the Japanese and Chinese languages in diplomatic communiques, while Korea would use only Chinese.

Article 4 terminated Tsushima's centuries-old role as a diplomatic intermediary by abolishing all agreements then existing between Korea and Tsushima.

In addition to the open port of Pusan, Article 5 authorized the search in Kyongsang, Kyonggi, Chungchong, Cholla, and Hamgydng Provinces for two more suitable seaports for Japanese trade to be opened in October 1877.

Article 6 secured aid and support for ships stranded or wrecked along the Korea or Japanese coasts.

Article 7 permitted any Japanese mariner to conduct surveys and mapping operations at will in the seas off the Korean peninsula's coastline.

Article 8 permitted Japanese merchants residence, unhindered trade, and the right to lease land and buildings for those purposes in the open ports.

Article 9 guaranteed the freedom to conduct business without interference from either government and to trade without restrictions or prohibitions.

Article 10 granted Japan the right of extraterritoriality, the one feature of previous Western treaties that was most widely resented in Asia. It not only gave foreigners a free rein to commit crimes with relative impunity, but its inclusion implied the grantor nation's system of law was either primitive, unjust, or both.

Less than twenty years before, Japan had signed a number of "unequal treaties" with Western powers and complained bitterly during the intervening years of the injustice done. Japan now entered into a treaty with an Asiatic power and one of its first demands was for extraterritorial privileges that placed Japanese nationals under Japanese law as applied by Japanese consular courts outside Korean legal jurisdiction. Few foreigners saw the danger embedded in extraterritoriality, either then or later, yet this one clause was an omen with sinister portent.

The Treaty of Kanghwa was an "unequal treaty" for many of the same reasons that China's treaties with the West were unequal. The fact that Japan negotiated this treaty under force of arms is ample evidence to suggest the one-sided nature of the agreement. Western in concept and form, the Treaty of Kanghwa was based on the principle of equality among sovereign states. Through this treaty, Japan repudiated East Asia's traditional concept of tributary relations and redefined its own relationship with Korea in terms of Western international law. Although the Meiji government failed to establish titular superiority over Korea, it succeeded in securing for itself the same privileged position in Korea the West held in China and Japan. Kojong and his advisers failed to understand the treaty went far beyond permanently altering traditional Japanese-Korea relations.

Chinese leaders were not as ignorant about what had happened. They realized the epoch-making significance of such a treaty for traditional Sino-Korean relations as well as for China's future position in Korea. Any other alternative to the treaty involved the very real risk of war between Japan and Korea. Faced with numerous internal and external problems, China was ill prepared for a war with Japan. The situation was all the more alarming because of the very real possibility of Russian military intervention in Korea in the event of war between Korea and Japan. Distasteful as it may have been to China and regardless of its long-term implications, the Treaty of Kanghwa was a necessity for China if it was to preserve peace on the peninsula.

The historical significance of the Treaty of Kanghwa rests on the single fact that it pulled the peninsula out of total isolation and into the international arena. Signing the treaty gave Japan a free hand in the future exploitation of Korea without interference from China and kicked open the door to further Japanese aggression. It provided the impetus that led the West to gradually begin trading with Korea and opened the peninsula to the outside world. Following the conclusion of the Treaty of Kanghwa, Japan approached every aspect of its relationship with Korea from the perspective of advancing its aims of political, military and economic aggression. The Japanese penetration of Korea had begun.