Ch 23 - The Opening of ChosonThe Great DebateJapanese Minister Mori Arinori's inconclusive diplomatic mission to Beijing failed to enlist Chinese help in opening Korea, but established that Korea possessed all the powers of an independent state and that China assumed a moral responsibility for Korea's safety. The Korean problem remained unsolved in Japan throughout the summer of 1875 and threatened to become an even larger source of frustration. Korea's "breach of faith" in negotiations and the attack on the Unyo Maru prompted calls to take stern retaliatory measures. In the hope of preventing similar incidents in the future, State Councillor Kido Koin, in cooperation with other moderate ministers, proposed a two-pronged approach to peacefully settle the impasse in Japanese-Korean relations. In October, he recommended that Japan send a plenipotentiary directly to Kanghwa Island with the following demands: an apology from Korea, punishment of those responsible for the attack on the Unyo Maru and a treaty of friendship between the two countries. Simultaneously, there should be an exploration of China's attitude Korea. The following month, on November 10, the Meiji government appointed Mori Arinori as Japan's minister to China. Educated in England and the United States, this son of a Satsuma samurai was described by his friend Ito Hirobumi as a "Westerner born of Japan." Not yet thirty, Mori's youthful enthusiasm, nationalistic zeal and confidence in his country's future fully prepared him to challenge China's traditional supremacy in East Asia. As Japan's former envoy to the United States and an experienced diplomat, Mori Arinori was a rising star in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Mori Arinori had a thoroughly Western perspective, perhaps the most enlightened among his contemporaries, and his approach toward Korea was refreshingly free of prejudice. Soon after his appointment, Mori advised the Meiji government that Korea had to be opened before it was seized by a Western power, which would be disastrous to both China and Japan. He warned that Japan would be ill-advised to make a major issue of either the Unyo Maru Incident or Korea's refusal to sign a treaty with Japan, adding that Korea was not solely to blame. To settle the dispute with the Korean government, Mori said, Japan had to seek the cooperation of China, not as Korea's suzerain, but as its neighbor. Japan, he said, should regard Korea as an independent state free to have or not to have relations with any country. Army Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka, Director of the Development Agency of Hokkaido, was appointed Japan's minister to Korea on December 9, 1875. Inoue Kaoru served as his deputy. Uncertain of Korea's response to the proposed mission, the Meiji government eagerly attempted to convince foreign diplomats of its peaceful intent. In a conversation with American Minister John Bingham, Foreign Minister Terashima compared Kuroda's proposed mission to Korea with Commodore Perry's earlier visit to Japan. German Minister Eisendecher reflected on the military implications of the mission. British ambassador Sir Harry S. Parkes was principally concerned with trade. Only the Russian minister came out in support of Japan, though not for purely altruistic reasons. He believed the Kuroda mission would help open Korea to the Russians. As the Japanese government continued its preparations, Hirotsu Hironobu arrived in Pusan on December 17 to announce Kuroda's arrival. Two days after reaching the Japan House in Pusan, Hirotsu delivered a letter to the language officer detailing Kuroda's appointment. Recognizing the seriousness of the letter's contents, the language officer hurried to Seoul to personally inform the royal court of the impending Japanese mission. Mori Arinori arrived in Beijing along with Japan's chargé d'affaires Tei Einei on January 4, 1876. Before contacting the Qing government, Mori contacted Britain's Ambassador Sir Thomas Wade, a man with considerable influence on Chinese foreign policy. He briefed Wade on recent developments and asserted Japan's peaceful intent. He also asked for the ambassador's good offices to help favorably influence the Zongli Yamen ministers to receive the Japanese demands. Ambassador Wade distrusted the young minister's manner more than his language and felt reluctant to commit himself. He refused to help. "I fancy that an expedition on Corea is determined on," Wade said, "and that the object of his [visit] was to ascertain whether objection to the expedition would be taken by England, or any other foreign country." Maximilian von Brandt, Germany's Minister to China, also viewed Mori's arrival in Beijing as a signal that Japan would pursue a more determined course of action, even war, against Korea. Six days later, on January 10, Mori and chargé d'affaires Tei presented a memorandum to the Zongli Yamen that briefly recounted Korea's recent attack on the Unyo Maru and its past stubborn refusal to receive Japanese communications and establish friendly relations with Japan. The note also indicated that even though the Japanese public was aroused against Korea, the Meiji government favored a peaceful settlement. In a meeting with Yamen spokesman Shen Baozhen, Mori announced that because Japan wished to be sincere and candid, it was informing China of its intention to send a plenary mission to Korea under the protection of two warships to guard its envoys. If Korea received the mission courteously and complied with Japanese demands, there would be peace and friendship between the two nations. If Korea did otherwise, "it would draw to itself incalculable calamity." Prince Gong was indignant about Japan's pretense of peace while simultaneously speculating about the possibility of a conflict with Korea. Japan gained certain advantages by following proper diplomatic protocol and referring the Korean issue to the Zongli Yamen instead of simply settling the issue themselves. First, by giving some recognition to China's suzerain status over Korea, Japan hoped the Chinese would offer their good offices to help open Korea. More importantly, this approach would deflect any suspicions or public protests that might grab the attention of western diplomats who had tried in vain to open Korea. Diplomatic niceties aside, the memorandum implied that Japan was willing to take matters into its own hands if the Chinese proved unable or unwilling to reach a satisfactory solution to the matter. The Chinese government faced a growing dilemma. It could take an aggressive stance regarding Korea and assume responsibility for Korea's foreign relations, but its military was had incapable of safeguarding Chinese interests on the peninsula. It could pressure the Seoul government to adopt a more open policy in its dealings with foreign powers, but that would be tantamount to imposing conditions on a tributary state that China itself did not favor. In either case, the traditional relationship between Korea and China was soon to be seriously altered. Mori Arinori received a reply to his memorandum on January 14. Instead of adopting a strong attitude and warning the Meiji government not to complicate the Korean situation, the Zongli Yamen took no direct action. Instead, it reverted to its customary passive stance regarding tributary states, stating Ever since Korea has existed as a nation, she has guarded herself with care. Our country, China, has allowed her to be self-administered, and has not ordered the Chinese there to govern, for we believe that Korea is contented with her lot, making constraint unnecessary. ... Although China's attitude toward Korea is not to interfere with the latter's governmental affairs, yet China is eager for her [Korea's] security. ... The Chinese government believed that the non-aggression clause of the 1871 Sino-Japanese treaty covered territories and tributary states such as Korea. The treaty contained no explicit reference to Korea however, only "dependent nations and territories," a fact which Mori Arinori used to openly challenge the validity of Korea's tributary status with China. After bluntly restating China's policy since 1860, Shen Baozhen defended Korea's action and urged moderation. He said that Korea had done nothing wrong, had not invaded any foreign territory and that Japan was not the only country with which Korea refused to have treaty relations.
Lieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka, Inoue Kaoru and dozens of civilian aides and army and navy officers had assembled at the port of Shinagawa in southeastern Tokyo by January 13. The mission, escorted by some 250 soldiers and marines, consisted of more than 800 men, four transport ships and the corvette Nisshin Maru and the gunboat Moshun Maru for convoy protection. Despite the mission's ominous appearance, the Japanese government instructed Kuroda and Inoue that their primary task was to seek a peaceful settlement with Korea. A formal apology from Korea for the Unyo Maru Incident, acceptance of normal relations and expanded trade with Japan might be considered adequate compensation for the "damage" caused by the attack on Commander Inoue Yoshika's ship. Kuroda and Inoue were not bound by precedent in their effort to establish new relations. They were instructed to demand a treaty of friendship based on the equality of the two countries, freedom of navigation and surveying for Japanese vessels in Korea waters, and an open port in the vicinity of Kanghwa Island. They were also given tactical orders; if subjected to insult or violence, they were to withdraw to Tsushima and request further instructions from Tokyo. If Korea refused to receive them and their communications remained unanswered, they were to lodge a strong protest, remain on Korea soil, and await new instructions from Tokyo. Should Korea wish to consult China before granting Japanese demands, Kuroda and Inoue were instructed to point out that China had never interfered in Japanese-Korean relations. Moreover, the envoys should demand to know if China had approved recent Korean actions toward Japan, including the attack on the Unyo Maru. Should Korea still insist on consulting China, Kuroda and Inoue were to demand the right to station Japanese troops in Seoul and on Kanghwa Island until China replied. Finally, should Korea reject the Japanese demands with "false arguments," Kuroda and Inoue were to break off negotiations and return home, but only after warning Korea that Japan would take "appropriate action" later. Mori Arinori found little satisfaction in the Zongli Yamen's January 14 response. In his reply to Prince Gong, written on January 15, he directly questioned China's right of sovereignty over Korea by citing an alleged statement from the Zongli Yamen. He wrote, Although Korea is called a tributary state, assuredly the territory does not belong to China, and this is evident because China has not been involved in Korea's internal politics; as for [Korea's] dealing with foreign nations, China has even acknowledged that state's self-determination, and that she cannot be compelled by force, ... He continued, Judging from this, Korea is an independent state, and Your Country's characterization of her as a tributary state is simply an empty term. Since she is our neighbour and has done us violence, we cannot but dispatch now a representative to hold them responsible. ... Thus whatever affairs go on between Korea and Japan, these have no connection with the treaty drawn up between China and Japan. Meanwhile, in Korea, the Kuroda mission dropped anchor in Pusan harbor on January 15. The envoys immediately notified local officials they were proceeding to Kanghwa Island within a week and added that if they were not met there by responsible ministers, they would proceed directly to Seoul. Kuroda remained in Pusan for eight days while advance ships surveyed the route to Kanghwa Island. The survey team, led by the gunboat Moshun Maru, proceeded slowly northward, searching its way through the countless small islands and inlets along the west coast. The Japanese ships were spotted a few days later as they slowly plied the waters off Kyonggi Province. Daily reports were sent to Seoul concerning the "strange ships" moving up the coast. Since no arrival date had been announced for Kuroda's mission, the sudden appearance of the ships caught the government completely by surprise. While Seoul hurriedly reinforced its defenses along the Han River, the Pusan language officer and his colleagues rushed to the coast to investigate "ships of unknown origin." Mori Arinori's challenge to the Zongli Yamen forced China into an extremely delicate position and its response was anything but forceful. On January 17, the Qing Board of Rites received instructions to warn Korea that it should temper its dealings with Japan. The next day, Prince Gong forcefully denied the Zongli Yamen ever told Mori that, "the territory [of Korea] does not belong to China." The prince restated his earlier position that Korea was a tributary state of China covered by the non-aggression clause in the 1871 treaty and refuted the claim that Korea was not a tributary state by explaining that, "belonging is the condition of being tributary." The Zongli Yamen stated that, being a tributary state, "it cannot be said that it [Korea] is not attached to China." The irreconcilable differences between Mori Arinori and the Zongli Yamen left Mori unsatisfied and the Chinese apprehensive. In his next message to the Zongli Yamen on January 19, Mori brought up specific problems that needed answers. Mori questioned, In our future negotiations with the Korean state in whatever matters of the said government and people may concern us, will not Your Government itself assume the responsibility [on behalf of the Korean Government] ? ... If it is maintained that [the Beijing Government] cannot assume the responsibility, even though Korea is called a tributary state, it is simply an empty term. The most crucial difference between China and Japan centered on the interpretation of Korea's status. Shen Baozhen held that Korea was a Chinese tribute state and if it ever got into conflict with a foreign country, China would discuss the matter only under the terms of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871. Mori insisted that the Sino-Japanese treaty was non-binding in the case of a conflict between Korea and Japan and that any treaty between the two would be of no concern to China. He argued that because Korea was sovereign in its affairs, it must be regarded as an independent state under international law. The 1871 Sino-Japanese treaty had nothing to do with it. Prince Gong held firm to his assertion that Korea "belonged to" China as a dependent country, while Mori complained that factual evidence of China's assertion was still unclear. He stated the relationship between China and its dependencies was so lose there was scarcely a reason to even call them "dependent." Frustrated, Prince Gong repeatedly tried to substantiate his claim, but no subtle argument or clever twist of a sentence could reconcile their divergent views on Korea's international status. While Prince Gong and Mori Arinori exchanged diplomatic notes in Beijing, China's "grand old man" of foreign policy, the venerable aging diplomat Viceroy Li Hongzhang, was residing at his winter headquarters in Baoding, southwest of the Qing capital. The Zongli Yamen kept in close contact with Li, informing him of developments and asking for his advice. Both Li and the Zongli Yamen ministers were becoming increasingly worried about a future Russian threat to Korea, but Japan's growing strength and ambition posed a more immediate problem. Li realized that Japan's military action on Taiwan in 1874 ended any hope of securing Japanese friendship or help in opposing western aggression. He knew that Korea remained China's first line of defense in the northeast and feared the 1871 Sino-Japanese treaty alone would not effectively deter a Japanese invasion of Korea. Worse, he realized the domination of the peninsula by a hostile power would pose a direct threat to north China and the imperial homeland of the Manchus. The Qing Emperor feared a deeper involvement in the Korean matter. Eager to avoid a clash, he recommended the Board of Rites advise Seoul not to go to extremes with Japan. Just two days later, on January 19, the Board of Rites sent such a communique to King Kojong. The fear that Russia might intervene in a war between Korea and Japan prompted the Zongli Yamen to ask the military governors at Mukden, Kirin and Heilungkiang to monitor Russian military activities in the northeast. The same day the Board of rites sent its communique to Seoul, Li expressed his concerns in a letter to the Zongli Yamen. He wrote that although Japan had taken Taiwan, its real aim was the Korean peninsula. Korea had been recently humiliated and would refuse to receive a Japanese envoy peacefully. That attitude could easily provoke an armed response from Japan. He felt that Korea's weak military and poor economy made it impossible for the country to defend itself against the Japanese. If it were attacked, then according to the Ming dynasty precedent Korea would presumably call on China for help. Li urged the Zongli Yamen to advise Seoul to act with caution and courtesy toward Japan and suggested that Seoul might send an envoy to Japan to explain the Unyo Maru Incident to prevent further trouble. Li also wrote, As to whether or not the said nation should start trade relations with Japan, it is a matter which should be left to her own decision and China is not in a position to intervene ... At the same time the Japanese were negotiating in Beijing, the Korean tribute mission left the Qing capital to return home. Yi Yu-won, head of the tribute mission, wrote a letter to Li Hongzhang that expressed admiration for his service. Li took advantage of the moment to write a letter to Seoul that informed the Korean government that the era of isolation had ended. It was now time for Korea to open its doors to the outside world. Li Hongzhang and the Zongli Yamen held essentially the same point of view. Neither would assume responsibility for the Korean situation. Neither seemed to understand that the rapid changes in the international situation in East Asia demanded that China move quickly toward a more positive policy towards Korea, one which necessitated direct Chinese interference in Korea's foreign relations. Urging Korea to behave courteously toward Japan and explain its actions would, in the end, forfeit China's traditional suzerainty rights in Korea and virtually invite the Japanese to move into Korea and secure a position on an equal footing with China. Although a majority of government officials in Seoul still favored the Taewongun's absolute isolationism, Japan's recent display of its formidable new military power had clearly demonstrated they would use force if necessary to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, the Confucian literati pointed out that Japan was no different from the Western "barbarians" and opposed any treaty negotiations. They argued that concluding a treaty with the Japanese would open the door to the spread of Catholicism in Korea. Choe Ikhyon, the man who led the drive that brought down the Taewongun, stated that a treaty with the Japanese would mean an inundation of Japanese goods. The resulting outflow of Korean rice would surely ruin the economy. Confronted by Japan's formidable strength and determination, some believed that Japan would attack Korea again when the time was ripe. After many meetings and arguments, the Yi court reluctantly decided to send negotiators to Kanghwa. Mori Arinori realized that the Zongli Yamen would not be much help. On January 21, he traveled to Baoding to meet with Li Hongzhang. An imposing figure in his early fifties, Li personified the mature wisdom and grandeur of the declining Qing empire. Beneath his dignified and unruffled exterior however, Li was deeply concerned about the external dangers facing China, particularly the growing threats from Russia and Japan. He had extensive knowledge and experience in the arts of politics, diplomacy and warfare, and ever since he helped conclude the Sino-Japanese treaty in 1871, he felt troubled by the situation in Korea, a country he considered to be strategically more important to the Qing dynasty than China's own coastal provinces. Having failed to secure the good offices of the Zongli Yamen to help open Korea, Mori Arinori arrived in Baoding on January 24. He hoped his meeting with Li Hongzhang would be more fruitful. Li graciously received his young visitor and Japan's chargé d'affaires Tei Einei. As the talks began, Li immediately guessed the nature of the visit. Mori's haughty and prideful behavior mirrored the youthful ambition and vigor of a rising new Japan and gave Li cause for apprehension. Mori proved to be far more outspoken and fearless than his predecessor, Minister Date Munenari, but less diplomatic. The meeting focused on three principal topics: the concept of international law, the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871 and Korea. Despite his pragmatism, Li maintained that China's tribute system was the traditional foundation of Chinese supremacy in East Asia and cited the first clause of the 1871 treaty to justify his point. He expressed his belief that the nations of East Asia, in order to better meet the challenges coming from the West, had to live in peace and harmony in accordance with the treaty. Annoyed that Li was taking the same position as the Zongli Yamen, Mori bluntly stated that treaties "would do only for ordinary commercial relations. But great national decisions are made according to comparative national strength, not according to treaties." In other words, relations between two countries were based solely on power, not words on paper. Li held to his ethnocentric concept of a moral, if inactive, suzerainty over a tributary state and countered that he believed the 1871 treaty was both "good and complete." He reiterated that, "to rely upon strength and violate treaties is not tolerated by international law." Mori dismissed the idea, stating that, "international law is also useless." Li soon realized that the Japanese had a distorted impression of international politics and an unfavorable attitude toward international law. He also felt that Japan was not all that sincere in engaging China's good offices to open Korea. The conversation soon focused on the practical results of the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871. When Mori asked Li if he was the negotiator for the treaty, Li responded that he had been and inquired as to the health of Minister Date Munenari, Mori's predecessor. Mori replied that Minister Date had retired from service and added that, "since the negotiator [Date] had gone, the treaty could not be relied on." Li responded that since it had been ratified by both China and Japan, the 1871 treaty should be observed by both sides. Displaying an almost flippant attitude, Mori answered, "Some agreements are subject to change and some are not. How can it be observable if it is not revised?" Li hinted that there would be no revision to the treaty for ten years following its signing. Li Hongzhang proved more than able to hold his own with the young Japanese minister. Not only was Li more cautious and diplomatic in his choice of words, but he seemed to be seriously seeking friendly relations with Japan. When the discussion turned to Korea, Mori declared that Korea could not be a tributary state of China, since China had neither levied taxes in Korea nor taken part in governing the country. Li tried to emphasize Korea's dependent status by referring to Article 1 of the 1871 treaty, explaining, The word territories refers to various Chinese provinces, which are our inner domains or inner possessions subject to our taxation and administration. The word nations refers to Korea and other similar countries, which are our outer dominions or outer possessions, and whose administration and taxation have always been carried on by themselves. Mori doubted the validity of Li's interpretation and reminded him that Korea was not mentioned anywhere in the 1871 treaty. Realizing that omission was a serious mistake, Li replied that, nations in Article I obviously implied Korea, and that when occasion should occur for a revision of the treaty, the implication could easily be made explicit by inserting "Korea, the Liuchius, the Eighteen Provinces, etc.," as explanatory notes to words like nations and territories. Mori pressed his point, stating it was beyond belief that China should call Korea a "dependent country" when, by its own admission, the peninsula fully managed the administration of its own foreign and domestic affairs. The logic of Mori's argument showed when Li uneasily admitted that, according to the young diplomat's definition, Korea was independent. Taking advantage of the elderly viceroy's discomfort, Mori launched into an "imposing speech" to refute the accusation that Japan had provoked the Unyo Maru Incident. Li defended Korea's position by declaring that Japanese warships entered Korean territorial waters without permission and in violation of international law. Korea had never concluded treaties with other nations, Mori argued, therefore Seoul had no right to use international law as a defense against Japan. Mori next wanted an explanation for why Korea refused to enter into treaty relations with Japan. Speaking on behalf of the Korean government, Li tried to explain that Korea's refusal to intensify its contacts was based on a long-standing fear of Japan following the Hideyoshi invasions, suspicion of Japan's recent modernization and the fear that others would follow Japan onto the peninsula. Mori added that, despite the deep bitterness among the Japanese public, his utmost hope was to secure China's good offices in order to maintain peace. Li responded by saying that if China helped Japan in Korea, the western nations would soon request the same service. Mori assured him that the other powers had no interest in Korea. Li next asked Mori just what were Japan's true interests in Korea. To preserve peace between Japan and Korea, Mori urged China to use its influence to ask the Korean government to fulfill three simple demands: receive the Japanese envoy and future Japanese missions with due courtesy; hospitality and protection of shipwrecked Japanese sailors along the Korea coastline; and permission to survey the Korean coast. Mori added that if Korea refused such requests, then war would be unavoidable. Li rose to the challenge and reasserted that Korea was China's tributary state and that Japan should not violate the non-aggression clause of the 1871 treaty. If Japan should ever make war with Korea, both China and Russia would send troops to assist Korea. After seven hours of fruitless debate, both sides remained far apart on the Korean issue and were getting no closer to a resolution. Nevertheless, Li agreed to relay Japan's requests to the Qing government and asked Mori to refrain from putting undue pressure on the Zongli Yamen. After a brief meeting the following day, the two sides ended their heated discussions in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and reprimands. Mori Arinori and Tei Enei left Baoding on January 27 without having brought the Chinese viewpoint one step closer to that of Japan. Just three days later, on January 30, General Kuroda's squadron rendezvoused and anchored off the Kapkot'chi promontory near the city of Kanghwa. In a last minute attempt to reach a reconciliation with China, Mori Arinori sent Tei Einei back to Beijing in early February to get a clear statement from the Zongli Yamen on Chinese responsibility in Korea. On February 12, the Yamen replied that the responsibilities China assumed for Korea were "to relieve Korea's difficulties, to settle its disputes, and to insure its safety," otherwise, "though Korea is a dependent country of China, it is not a territorial possession; hence, in its domestic and foreign affairs it is self-governing." The Zongli Yamen added, with obvious irritation, that if China did anything to protect Korea's safety, it would do so without a reminder. Japan interpreted China's vagueness and uneasiness as a clear indication that traditional commitments in East Asia no longer had to be taken seriously. The clash of opinions and temperaments between Mori Arinori and the Chinese ministers over Korea planted the seeds of future trouble between China and Japan. Although Mori Arinori's inconclusive mission failed to secure Chinese assistance in Korea, his mission did establish two points. First, Korea was autonomous in domestic and foreign affairs and possessed all the powers of an independent state, but it was nevertheless a tributary of China. Second, while King Kojong was not answerable to the Qing emperor for the governance of Korea, China assumed a moral responsibility for his kingdom's safety. Although both points were clearly at variance with the principles of international law to which the Japanese government now fully subscribed, Mori succeeded in moving China to advise the Seoul government to be friendly toward Japan, advice which facilitated Japan's next move on the peninsula.
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After bluntly restating China's policy since 1860, Shen Baozhen asserted that Korea was a dependent of China and subject to the control of the Board of Rites. When Mori pressed him to define "dependent country," Shen stated that Korea was left to her own devices in domestic matters and possessed complete power of decision in the field of foreign affairs. He added, "China's attitude toward Korea was not to interfere with the latter's governmental affairs." Mori lost little time in winning the one point he had come to clarify; the nature and quality of China's relationship with Korea. He must have been more than a little delighted to hear an affirmation that the Qing emperor had no control over the foreign relations of its dependent countries.