Ch 23 - The Opening of Choson

A New Posture

Faced with mounting pressure from Japan, the Seoul government reevaluted its exclusionist position. King Kojong stubbornly held to Confucian ideals while Japan's Korea policy shifted from passivity and compromise to aggressiveness and intransigence. Japan began looking for an opportunity to force a commercial treaty on Korea.

Korea's first step toward a new foreign policy came through a reevaluation of its relations with Japan. King Kojong and his highest advisers did not understand modern concepts of international relations and showed little awareness of the depth of Japan's growing interest in Korea. They considered it unwise to antagonize Japan needlessly. The royal court believed that Japan could be placated and peace could be maintained if they simply adopted a friendlier attitude without compromising on substantive issues. Based on this naive assumption, Kojong's government initiated a policy of reconciliation with Japan in early 1874. Many government officials found this new philosophy hard to accept. Some were totally opposed. Most were indifferent.

A secret censor appointed in February 1874 looked into the conduct of relations with Japan under the Taewongun's rule. Fixing the blame was easy enough. The investigating team placed the blame squarely on the Taewongun's faithful executor of Korea's exclusionist policy;  An Tong-jun, the Pusan language officer. They charged that during his long tenure in office, An had willfully obstructed communication between Korea and Japan. The secret censor also charged An's supervisors with neglecting their duties, thereby helping to strengthen negative attitudes that led to a breakdown in relations with Japan.

Kim Se-ho, the governor of Kyongsang Province, and Chong Hyon-dok, the magistrate of Tongnae, were reprimanded and banished. An Tong jun suffered a worse fate. On April 9, 1874, An was decapitated and his head was put on public display. The sudden and dramatic changing of the guard in Pusan did not change minds in higher officialdom. King Kojong still had to battle the lethargy and tradition of his own bureaucracy before he could ever hope to break the deadlock with Japan.

In Japan, rumors about the punishment given the An Tong-jun group and the restoration of King Kojong's rule in Korea sparked a renewed interest in normalizing relations with the peninsula. In the spring of 1874, Moriyama Shigeru, a Korea specialist who had accompanied earlier missions to Pusan, suggested that diplomatic contacts with Korea be renewed through the Tsushima daimyo. Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori approved the idea and subsequently ordered Moriyama to Pusan on May 15 to study the situation first hand. Moriyama found the change in Korea's official attitude pleasantly surprising. Although he had no authority to conduct negotiations, the Korean's uncustomary eagerness to learn his views encouraged Moriyama to begin informal communications.

On August 4, 1874, King Kojong received an urgent note from the Qing Board of Rites that reported Japan's military adventure in Taiwan in the wake of the Mutan Village Incident. The message explained the act as a Japanese government diversion to divert samurai discontent over the defeat of the sei-kan ("conquest of Korea")proposal the previous fall. The Board also forwarded a copy of a Zongli Yamen memorial from Shen Baozhen, Imperial Commissioner for Taiwan Affairs, that reported a rumor which alleged that after withdrawing its expeditionary force from Taiwan, Japan might use 5,000 troops reportedly stationed at Nagasaki for an invasion of Korea. In addition, France and the United States, still harboring grudges against Korea, might join Japan in such an undertaking. Shen Baozhen's French adviser recommended that if China could persuade Korea to enter into treaty relations with France and the United States, it might deter Japan from attacking the peninsula.

This secret warning was received in Seoul with anything but gratitude. Already aroused by earlier word of violent disturbances in Japan, the news served to only heighten fears of a Japanese invasion. Incredulous and highly alarmed, Chief State Councillor Yi Yu-won and Right State Councillor Pak Kyu-su voiced their shared opinion that Western incursions had resulted from China's unguarded display of weakness. The government's highest officials, who watched China retreat in the face of Western demands, could not take the Zongli Yamen's message as sincere advice.

Yi Yu-won angrily exclaimed that China's advice was only words and that China was apparently unaware of Korea's military strength. Pak Kyu-su argued a much broader point;  past trouble occurred because Korea alone rejected trade with the West. Now Japan was demanding trade with China on the Western model. Though he had no objections to trade itself, Pak exclaimed that since Westerners were so cunning and unfathomable, he doubted that trade was all they were after.

The government believed the entire matter was a French-American plot to force a treaty from Korea. Kojong's reply to Beijing on August 9 reiterated the reasons why his country could not trade with the West, reasons he said had already been explained to the Americans. As for the Japanese, Kojong believed that since China had granted them a treaty, they would "not dare disobey the Heavenly Court." He asked the Board of Rites to appeal to the Emperor on his behalf to instruct the French and American ministers and Japanese officials in China not to create trouble for Korea needlessly.

Moriyama Shigeru returned to Pusan in September to once again test the political climate. In meetings with the newly appointed language officer and his assistant, Moriyama sounded out the prospects of submitting a diplomatic note announcing the dismissal of So Shigemasa, the daimyo of Tsushima, from his traditional post as diplomatic intermediary. If the Seoul government refused the message as unacceptable, Moriyama said Japan was willing to change it, even to the extent of having Korea draw up its own version. Moriyama's visit, coming so close behind the Chinese warning of a possible Japanese invasion, hastened Kojong and his officials toward the reestablishment of communication with Japan.

Chief State Councillor Yi wrote on September 19 that the government should accept Moriyama's suggestions. The new magistrate of Tongnae was instructed to accept the Japanese letters in the future;  everything would be done to speed up reconciliation with Japan. Cho Yong-ha, Commander of the Royal Guard and Queen Dowager Cho's nephew and the king's legal cousin, delivered a confidential letter to Moriyama on September 24 that blamed the Pusan interpreters for the breakdown of relations between their two countries and expressed regrets. Cho also conveyed the Yi court's sincere desire for an early restoration of relations with Japan.

Delighted by this turn of events, Moriyama departed Pusan for home on October 6 convinced that Japan need no longer compromise with Korea to reach an agreement. The former loyalist samurai, a firm believer in "restoration diplomacy" toward Korea, was convinced that intimidation or the use of force would be the best way to deal with Korea. The recent change in Korea's attitude and the Meiji government's interpretation of that change encouraged a bolder attitude toward Korea. Japan's self confidence grew stronger, bolstered by the combined effects of its recent treaty with China, the settlement of the Sakhalin dispute with Russia and the recent successful adventure in Taiwan. Japanese policy quickly shifted from passivity and compromise to aggressiveness and intransigence.

Japan's first tentative steps toward opening the kingdom of Korea occurred early in 1875. The Japanese court was so impressed by the change of events in Korea that Foreign Minister Terashima felt compelled to dispatch an official mission to Pusan. Moriyama Shigeru was again appointed to head a mission to demand a formal apology for past grievances and explore its current status relative to China. The mission departed Tokyo on February 10, 1875, and reached Pusan two weeks later. The day after his arrival at the Japan House, Moriyarna told the language officer of his intent to present the letters he carried directly to the magistrate of Tongnae at a formal reception.

Kojong's government was eager to reconcile its differences with Japan, but not if it meant a significant alteration in traditional formalities. When the language officer asked to see the letters, Moriyama insisted he would give them only to the negotiating official. Local officials felt the arrangement of a formal reception for the Japanese mission was beyond their competence and they referred the matter to Seoul for a decision. Moriyama was told a reply would be made within twenty-five days.

Still holding to the formalities and proprieties of Confucianism, Korean officials argued with Moriyama for the next two weeks over matters of style, content and issues of protocol. After twenty five days passed without a reply from Seoul, Moriyama threatened to leave the compound of the Japan House with one hundred men and march on Tongnae. The intimidated language officer finally revealed what he had known all along;  Seoul had indeed instructed the magistrate of Tongnae to receive the letters at a formal reception scheduled for April 1. While Moriyama waited in Pusan however, the language officer returned to Seoul and the reception was never held.

Moriyama interpreted Korea's stubbornness as a sign of confusion and weakness. In a report submitted to Tokyo in April 1875, he urged Japan to adopt a bolder policy toward Korea. Moriyama's deputy, then in Tokyo for consultations with the Foreign Ministry, used rumors about a reversal of the political situation in Seoul to also argue for a change in tactics. The best time for an effective demonstration of force would be before the Taewongun and his anti-foreign supporters could regain power. Foreign Minister Terashima demanded patience. If Korea found it hard to renew the old friendship with Japan, then Moriyama should be satisfied with trying to persuade Seoul to send an envoy to Japan to convey its congratulations for the Meiji Restorations.

King Kojong took the reigns of government with youthful self-confidence and enthusiasm, eager to put into practice the Confucian ideals and precepts that his tutors had spent over a decade drilling into him. After assuming power however, his naive and inept leadership compounded inefficiency and corruption in the bureaucracy and brought the government to the brink of financial bankruptcy. The young monarch stubbornly held to the belief that relations between states - like those between individuals - could be harmonized by mutual goodwill and courtesy.

The encouragement given Moriyama in September 1874 had apparently been the king's alone, because he never put the matter before his ministers. His reconciliation policy toward Japan not only failed to appease the Japanese, but aroused strong domestic opposition. Most of the literati became disappointed or alienated by his refusal to adopt their recommendations. When Moriyama returned in the spring of 1875, the king could no longer ignore his ministers' opinions. Faced with contradictory advice, Kojong became uncertain about what to do next. His self-confidence waned and he began to doubt not only the effectiveness of Confucian precepts of government, but his own ability to lead.

On June 13, 1875, the royal court received a report from the magistrate of Tongnae that summarized Moriyama's proposals and described his adamant attitude. Kojong summoned some thirty top government leaders to an emergency court conference to deal with the problem. A great debate erupted, but the court's wavering attitude set a vague and evasive tone to the debate, raising the fear that the young king would not forcefully present his own views and would lose control of the conflicts within his government. Only Right State Councillor Pak Kyu-su favored accepting the Japanese letters. He insisted that if the Japanese were received with politeness and propriety, Korea would manifest strength despite its weakness. He also warned that a continued rebuff of the Japanese would force them into a violent reaction. Pak evidently feared a war.

Despite the pleadings of Pak Kyu-su for a royal decision to break the impasse, Kojong was unable to decide. He ordered his ministers to discuss the matter further and recommend a solution. There was no consensus of opinion on what to do with the Japanese and, in the absence of strong royal leadership, the hard-liners prevailed and the opportunity for compromise was lost. The conciliatory tone was gone.

The government dispatched one of its most capable language officers to Tongnae to try and work out a compromise. Before he reached Tongnae however, the Pusan language officer notified Moriyama on June 24 that so long as the Japanese letters contained unacceptable terms and his delegation insisted upon wearing Western-style clothing, the government of Korea was unwilling to arrange a formal reception for him. Korea's response stiffened Moriyama's attitude toward the Pusan officials. After concluding there was no hope for a successful outcome, he ordered his deputy back to Tokyo with a request to recall the mission and urge the Meiji government to take drastic measures to break the impasse. On September 20, Moriyama received his new instructions;  break off the negotiations and return home.

Were it not for Japanese intransigence, born of ignorance of contemporary Korea politics, Moriyama's mission to Pusan might have reached an accord with Korea in 1875, but time was running out. Newly formed and rapidly growing Japanese industries needed new markets. Japan's survival depended on a huge inflow of natural resources, a corresponding outflow of manufactured goods to pay for imports, and conditions of regional peace and open trade that permitted such a massive exchange of goods. Without these conditions, no amount of skill and accomplishment would help the Japanese. To expand and protect its regional commerce, Japan decided to prevent Korea from being dominated by any other power. Instead of representing a pistol pointed at its heart, Korea would become a natural bridge to the Chinese mainland.

Moriyama Shigeru's rebuff in Pusan sorely tested the patience of the Meiji regime and made it all the more receptive to Moriyama's plea for a strong show of force. The changing situation in Korea prompted Japan to seize the opportunity to force a commercial treaty on Korea that would support its aggressive designs in Asia. The nation's mood shifted from compromise to obstinacy;  a shift that laid the foundation for a new form of relations between the two countries.

In a historic change of tactics, Japan decided to use Western concepts of international relations and evoked a readiness to emulate the predatory tactics of the West;  gunboat diplomacy. Like Commodore Perry in his 1854 visit to Japan, they would shadow their presentation of moderate demands in a display of superior force. Unlike the Perry mission however, Japan's intentions involved more than just a show of muscle. Japan deliberately sought to create a confrontation with Korea and force its way into the Seoul court.