Ch 22 - Resistance to Change

The Rising Sun

Japan emerged as a rising power in East Asia and entered into a modern treaty with China that embraced a fundamental concept of Western international law; the principal of national equality. Once it established titular equality with China, Japan moved toward forcing a new relationship with Korea and establishing titular superiority over the peninsula.

Korea maintained its traditional isolation largely because of the the relative lack of sustained Western interest in the peninsular kingdom. Its tradition of excluding foreigners was intensified by the rigid conformity of Neo-Confucianism and an appalling ignorance of the outside world that bred a militant form of cultural chauvinism. This tendency was most pronounced in Korea because its isolation had been far more rigid and effective than that of either China or Japan.

Most Koreans believed their superior "moral virtue" had enabled them to withstand Western pressure. Many yangban firmly believed that China and Japan were already "contaminated" by Western barbarians;  China was crumbling under their attacks and Japan was giving in to the lure of their technology. The belief that Korea alone had faced down the West gave the Koreans a strong sense of national pride and, perhaps, a sense of mission; if civilization was to be saved, Korea had to remain free of Western influence and uphold Chinese tradition.

Imperialist rivalries continued to nibble away at the edges of the Chinese Empire with increasing intensity after 1870. Driven by economic nationalism and encouraged by the missionary passion to deal with the "white man's burden," European democracies led the way in this colonial expansion. As competition for new colonies developed, it became apparent that China's frontiers were either unstable or ambiguous. The confusion arose over the fact that contemporary maps were usually unreliable, historical claims to territory were often conflicting, and the limits of Manchu authority were frequently disputed. Added to this uncertainty was the vagueness and timidity of Beijing's claims to suzerainty over its tributary states.

China's tribute system was based not on military domination, but on a regional belief in the cultural supremacy of Confucian ethics. When the West forced China to either take responsibility for disorders in its tributary regions and compensate aggrieved foreigners or renounce suzerain jurisdiction altogether, Beijing's first impulse was usually to avoid the responsibility and pay indemnities. This decision gradually loosened China's hold on its tributary states. Once that bond was weakened or broken, vast areas of Central Asia became fair game for foreign colonial ambition.

With imperialist expansion underway in Asia, Japan looked to become a major power in its own right. Japan turned its attention toward the Asian continent and decided to send a diplomatic mission to establish titular equality with the Chinese;  anything less would "blemish" Japan's restored imperial status. A treaty would not only put Japan on an equal footing with China, but would also enable Japan to achieve its ultimate goal without risking war - titular superiority over Korea. Japan opened negotiations with China in Tianjin in the fall of 1870 and, after a year of hard bargaining, the two Asian nations signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity on September 13, 1871. The document was a revolutionary departure from traditional East Asian diplomacy. It marked the first instance where two Asian nations signed a modern treaty based on a fundamental concept of Western international law;  the principal of national equality.

In the past neither China nor Japan had considered the principle of equality applicable to their mutual relations and China accepted the treaty partly because Japan was not a tributary state. Perhaps far more than the Chinese cared to admit, the Sino-Japanese Treaty seriously damaged China's efforts to preserve the traditional world order and its supremacy in East Asia. Having once acknowledged Chinese titular superiority and cultural leadership, Japan now stood as its diplomatic equal, a bona fide member of the East Asian world. Japan achieved its initial goal; titular equality with China. All that remained was to translate its new status into titular superiority over Korea, and the symbolism in this historic episode was a stirring portent of the future that went unrecognized when it happened.

Following the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity, the Foreign Office in Tokyo took complete charge of diplomatic relations with Korea. One of its first actions was to remove the Japan House from Tsushima's control. In September 1872, the Japanese government appointed Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Hanabusa Yoshitada to carry out the formal requisition of the Japan House. Hanabusa was empowered by an imperial edict to repatriate all nonessential personnel, terminate the sending of trade ships, settle Tsushima's debt to Korea, and return shipwrecked sailors from Korea. On September 30, Hanabusa's mission sailed from Shinagawa aboard the warship Kasuga, accompanied by two infantry platoons aboard the steamship Yuko Maru.

An Tong-jun was absent in Taegu when the mission arrived at Pusan on October 16 and took over the Japan House the next day. When Hanabusa tried to arrange a meeting with Hyon P'ung-so, the new assistant language officer, to settle Tsushima's debt and surrender the shipwrecked seamen, his offer was flatly rejected. The magistrate in Tongnae backed up Hyon and ordered Hanabusa's mission to leave Korea. He also ordered Korean merchants to boycott the market at the Japan House, effectively cutting off their supply of provisions. The Japanese departed Korea empty-handed on October 25.

Tensions steadily mounted after Hanabusa's visit and in late May 1873 matters came to a head when three agents of Mitsukoshi, one of Tokyo's new business conglomerates, or zaibatsu, were detected after they had smuggled a large amount of merchandise into the Japan House. The men were denounced as dealers in contraband and guards were posted around the Japan House along with a strong warning to the Japanese that if they violated Korea laws, "They shall take the consequences for whatever may happen." Japan proved to be far more persistent than any Western power in its efforts to open Korea. Korea's continuous rejection of Japanese attempts to open foreign relations produced a response significantly different from that of China. Japan's reaction mimicked that of the West;  it became impatient and irritated.

The revolutionary changes introduced by the Meiji Restoration profoundly affected all segments of Japanese society. The modernization efforts that followed the downfall of the Shogunate left a sizable segment of the population rootless, including many former samurai who were rapidly joining the ranks of the unemployed. Saigo Takamori, a former samurai from Satsuma, was a member of the five-man council of court aristocrats who led the early Meiji Restoration. Saigo was motivated by a virulent and zealous patriotism and hoped to build a strong government around the former samurai. Discontented by the turn of events in Japan and seeking an outlet for their anger, a number of like-minded men joined with Saigo to agitate for a return to the former glory of the daimyo system of military rule.

The repeated insults from the Taewongun along with an allegedly insulting public pronouncement from Seoul about the Mitsukoshi merchants illegally engaging in trade in Korea prompted Saigo Takamori to seek revenge. With the support of other councillors, Saigo proposed that Japan send a punitive military expedition to Korea and openly challenge China's claim to suzerainty over the peninsula. Such an action would not only redress past insults, but would provide an outlet for thousands of displaced and disheartened samurai at home and shift attention from domestic problems to a foreign issue. Not everyone shared Saigo's proclivity for the reestablishment of military rule, but they were sympathetic with his idea to give the samurai a greater role in society.

The proposed use of military action against Korea was not the result of a well-articulated expansionist policy. Expansionist sentiments in Japan arose, in part, from a strong desire for adventure in a period of domestic uncertainty and were promoted mainly to safeguard or advance special political interests at home. The real driving force behind the expansionist views of reformists like Saigo Takamori however, was the urgent fear of Western aggression. They had a better understanding of the West than their Asian neighbors and apparently believed that foreign adventures in the face of a Western threat would provide an opportunity to achieve national unity at home. Furthermore, if Japan was ever to acquire the wealth and strength necessary to survive in a hazardous new world dominated by the West, they felt expansion onto the Asian continent was essential.

These two causes of expansionism - domestic politics and fear of Western aggression - continued to influence Japanese policy toward China and Korea for decades. The issue reached crisis proportions during the heated debate that raged in Tokyo between October 14-23, 1873, and seriously divided the Japanese Council of State. There was no disagreement over the necessity of conquering Korea, the only question was the timing. The famous statesman Okubo Toshimichi rose to remind the council that Japan was still in a transition stage and financially too weak for such an adventure. Cooler heads prevailed and in the face of tremendous pressure from opposing factions in the Meiji government the plan was cancelled. Intervention in Korea was only postponed however, not rejected. Japanese ambitions toward Korea lay revealed. Japan readied itself to pursue a more active and forceful policy toward Korea, waiting only for a suitable opportunity to seek its fulfillment.