Ch 22 - Resistance to Change

Little War with the Heathen

In an effort to seek China's good offices to secure a shipwreck convention and a commercial treaty with Choson, the United States stumbled into an armed conflict with Choson at Kanghwa Island. Instead of breaching Choson's isolation, American action served only to reinforce the belief that Choson could repel all Western powers if it remained united, determined and upright in its Confucian morality.

Maximilian August von Brandt, Germany's chargé d'affaires in Japan, decided to take a side trip to Choson in late May 1870, after his tour of southwestern Japan. While in Nagasaki, he engaged the services of Nakano Kyotaro, a native of Tsushima and a former interpreter in Pusan. On the morning of June 1, Brandt, Nakano, an official from the Foreign Office, and several other Japanese arrived unannounced in Pusan harbor aboard the German warship Hertha, the first Western steamship to visit Pusan.

The arrival of the 2504 ton, 28-gun warship Hertha in the heart of Kyongsang Province at the "south gate" of the kingdom alarmed local officials. Pusan officials viewed the event as direct evidence of Japanese collusion with the West and a deliberate attempt to breach Choson's seclusion. Troops and government officials rushed to the harbor. Alarm turned to anger when it was learned there were Japanese aboard the German ship, particularly Nakano. Chong Hyon-dok sent An Tong-jun to the Japan House to lodge an immediate protest, to demand that all Japanese be removed from the Hertha, and order the ship to leave Pusan immediately. Once Brandt realized that his visit had caused unexpected complications for the Japanese, he ordered the Hertha to depart Pusan the following day without protest.

On orders from the Taewongun, the Department of Rites promptly dispatched a strongly worded protest of the incident to Tsushima on June 11. It also reported the incident to the Qing Board of Rites in Beijing, stating there was reason to believe that "the Japanese were conspiring with the Western barbarians" against Choson. The memory of the von Brandt affair was still fresh in the Taewongun's mind when he received the report on the report on the An-Urase compromise plan. He rejected the compromise outright.

The von Brandt incident happened at a time when Choson's anti-foreign sentiments were already running high. His visit served only to exaggerate Choson's fear of the West and its anxiety and suspicion of Japanese collusion with the West. On July 13, An explained to Urase that the "incident of the foreign ship" had completely altered his government's policy. Trivial though it was, this minor incident destroyed whatever chances might have existed for an accord between the two countries and virtually ended Tsushima's diplomatic effectiveness in Choson.

While Japan was applying diplomatic pressure for entry into Choson, the West was applying its own pressure from other quarters. Consul-General Geroge F. Seward, United States Consul-General in Shanghai, China, was recalled to Washington, D.C. in early 1870 for a personal consultation with the Department of State. On February 28, 1870, Seward met with Assistant Secretary of State John C.B. Davis and the newly assigned commander of the United States Asiatic Squadron, Rear Admiral John Augustus Rodgers.

Seward proposed the United States seek China's good offices to secure a shipwreck convention and, if possible, a commercial treaty with Choson. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish adopted Seward's proposal, but decided to entrust negotiations to a more seasoned diplomat; Foreign Minister Frederick F. Low, America's minister to China since September 1869. Low was picked largely because "the political relations between China and Corea are such as to make it desirable to first obtain the good will and possibly the good offices of the Chinese government." Should the expedition encounter a hostilities, Admiral Rodgers was instructed to defer to the Secretary of the Navy for a decision on war or peace.

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Frederick Low had arrived in China in early May 1870. Although he had little success gathering intelligence about the peninsula kingdom, he did learn that Korea was "substantially an independent nation" that sent annual tirbute to Beijing. Low understood this tribute to be more a quid pro quo for the privilege of trading with the Chinese than official government tribute. Outside this arrangement, Minister Low could find no connection between China and Korea. On November 22, 1870, Frederick Low wrote Secretary of State Fish with a request that he be granted full power to negotiate with Korea so that "The Coreans may not have any grounds on which to base technical objections ..."

The American expedition was tentatively scheduled to depart from either Shanghai or Cheefoo (modern Yantai) sometime during the first two weeks of May 1871. To convince Korea of America's peaceful intentions, Low decided to give Seoul advance notice of his mission. He notified the Zongli Yamen on February 11, 1871, that the United States would soon be sending a naval expedition to Korea to open diplomatic negotiations and requested Chinese assistance. The Yamen hesitated to help and twice tried to discourage Low from pursuing his plans. They finally refused his request by stating that Korea's affairs were under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites. They also noted that, although Korea was a tributary state of China, it was "wholly autonomous in government, religion, prohibitions, and laws, and China never interfered in its affairs." Undeterred, Low informed the Zongli Yamen on March 7 that he had been appointed American envoy and that he was going to Korea aboard a warship with or without their assistance.

Impressed by Low's determination, the Yamen agreed to help and requested the Board of Rites to forward Low's letter to Korea. Emperor Mu Zong approved the Yamen's request and on March 12 the Board of Rites forwarded Low's letter to Seoul along with a cover letter that emphasized Korea was "free to make whatever decision it deemed appropriate." The Yamen explained its reversal this way:

"We have done everything possible to prevent the Americans from sending warships to Korea, but they have to the end refused to listen. In view of America's firm determination, whether or not its warships go to Korea does not depend at all upon whether or not this letter is forwarded. If we do not forward the letter, Korea, not knowing why the Americans are coming, would probably take a wrong course of action."

Frederick Low's letter reached the Korean Council of State on April 10, accompanied by extracts from earlier memorials by the Board of Rites and the Zongli Yamen on the matter in question. It stated that America would arrive in Korea in three months. It was coming in peace and friendship and did not want anyone to be alarmed by the arrival of its warships. Frederick Low wrote he was coming to investigate the fate of the General Sherman and to make arrangements necessary for the future protection of American seamen shipwrecked in Korean waters. He expressed the hope he would be received in peace and friendship and requested that the king appoint an envoy to negotiate.

Frederick Low's letter greatly disturbed the Yi government and the Council of State proposed it should not be answered, since that would be seen as "intercourse." The Bureau of Diplomatic Correspondence drafted a lengthy note to the Board of Rites that acknowledged receipt of Frederick Low's letter and expressed Korea's determination to reject the American mission. The matters Frederick Low wished to discuss were fundamentally non-negotiable and they saw no reason why they should meet with him. The message justified the destruction of the General Sherman based on the hostile actions of its crew, pointed out that Korea's established law for protecting the crews of foreign ships in distress made a shipwreck convention unnecessary. Further, the note declared that Korea's ancestral law, which had Chinese imperial sanction, prohibited communication with foreign countries. The message also requested the Emperor issue a special edict to calm the American minister's anxiety regarding Korea. The note did not reach Beijing until after Low and the American naval expedition had already sailed for Korean waters.

With preparations completed, five warships of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet weighed anchor at Shanghai on May 9, 1871, under the command of Civil War hero Rear Admiral John Rodgers. The military contingent of 1,230 marines and sailors with eighty-five artillery pieces departed Shanghai, China, for Korea. The squadron comprised the 3400-ton steam-frigate U.S.S. Colorado, flagship of the Asiatic Fleet, the wooden-hulled steam sloops-of-war U.S.S. Benicia and U.S.S. Alaska, the sidewheel steamer U.S.S. Monocacy, and the gunboat U.S.S. Palos.

After a four-day stopover at Nagasaki, Japan, Admiral Rodgers' squadron sailed again on May 16 and arrived south of Kanghwa Island in the vicinity of Asan Bay seven days later. The following day, on May 24, the U.S.S. Palos under command of Lieutenant Charles H.Rockwell, was sent north to scout an anchorage for the fleet near the island of Yongjongdo, located a short distance from Inchon.

Curious about these newly arrived visitors, local officials contacted the American squadron and presented a note written in Chinese asking who they were and why they were in Korean waters. Since all written communication in Korea was still conducted in Chinese, exchanging messages proved to be not nearly as difficult as it could have been. Minister Low's secretary, Edward B. Drew, spoke, read and wrote Chinese and had two Chinese secretaries on his staff, so translating messages was not a problem.

The squadron sailed north the next day, reaching their anchorage near Yongjongdo on May 30, at a densely wooded island the French called Isle Boisée, which literally means "Woody Island." The next day, two Korean junks and a sampan, carrying three Korean envoys and some twenty other persons of lesser rank, arrived at the U.S.S. Colorado. The three envoys identified themselves as attaches to the foreign office in Seoul and claimed to have been sent by King Kojong. The men taken aboard and escorted to Admiral Rodgers' office, where their message was received and read by Edward Drew, John P. Cowles, acting Secretary of Legation, and the two Chinese interpreters. By their wardrobe, two of the Koreans were identified as third order officials and the other was of the fifth order. Minister Low did not meet with them, saying he would only meet with officials of the first rank.

The envoys were assured that the American squadron had no aggressive intent and were distinctly told that Americans would not fire their weapons unless fired upon first. They were also told that the squadron wanted to taking soundings of the coastal waters and to survey the shorelines. It was America's hope that people ashore would not fear their presence and that none of the men conducting the surveys would be bothered or harmed. The envoys were asked to pass this to the local population in hopes of preserving friendly relations. It was further stated that the surveys would not begin for twenty-four hours in order to allow time for the message to be delivered to those people living in the area.

According to a report written by Rear Admiral Rodgers about the May 31 meeting, the three Korean envoys wanted to learn all they could about American intentions and the purpose behind their being in Korean waters. At the same time, they never committed themselves, either by word or expression, to anything said to them. The envoys did not raise a single objection to either the survey mission or anything else said to them. After receiving official gifts from the Americans, the Korean party left to prepare a written report of their meeting.

Translating the written word was one thing. Properly interpreting verbal and cultural communication was quite another. Korea had little interest in learning about western culture. The Taewongun had none. The Americans knew very little about Korean life or the culture and showed little evidence of trying to understand just who they were dealing with. In Korean culture at the time, unless specific permission was granted to do something, no action was permitted. In American culture, unless an act was specifically forbidden, one was free to act. The Americans quite simply misinterpreted the fact that the Korean envoys expressed no objections to anything discussed in their meeting aboard the U.S.S. Colorado as actual compliance with American requests. In fact, the envoys disagreed with everything. This simple misunderstanding led directly to what followed.

Operating on the belief he had the tacit approval of Korean authorities, Admiral Rodgers ordered a survey of the Kanghwa Island-Han River region. On June 1, Captain Homer C. Blake took the steam gunboats Alaska and Monocacy northward through the narrow Salt River to chart the area and take depth soundings. Unknown to Blake's task force however, no vessel, private or public was permitted in the Salt River without written permission from the authorities. In addition, Korean law prohibited any foreigner to pass beyond Sondolmok - a sharp bend in the lower river that was the main passage to Kanghwa city - without a special permit from the proper authorities.

The Alaska and Monocacy steamed past Sondolmok shortly after two o'clock in the afternoon and entered the Salt River without noticing any signs of hostility. None of the fortresses along the Salt River had received word of the American visit. Operating under earlier orders from the Taewongun to destroy any armed foreign ship, the eight-gun shore battery at Kwangsong-jin promptly opened fire as soon as the American ships appeared. Gunners from the nearby batteries at Choji, Tokp'o and Tokchin quickly joined the shelling. The Alaska and Monocacy immediately returned fire and destroyed the shore guns, killing one of the island gunners. In case of an attack, Commander Blake had orders not to pursue the assault to advantage. With only a small force and limited supplies and ammunition, he ordered a fighting withdrawal to the anchorage. Two American crewmen suffered minor wounds during the brief engagement.

From the outset, Frederick Low's intentions were to establish diplomatic contact with the Korean government, present his demands and return later for a reply. Frederick Low and Rear Admiral Rodgers were completely surprised by the sudden attack on the American ships, since the initial reception had been friendly. Thinking the attack might have been caused by a misunderstanding on the part of local commanders, Low issued a stern protest to the Korean envoysand demanded an immediate apology for the unwarranted attack on American naval vessels. He gave the Koreans ten days to respond (the tides would be more favorable then), after which they would attack the Kwangsong-jin fortress. The American squadron sat at anchor south of Kanghwa Island and waited for a reply.

The Seoul government ignored the Americans. The Taewongun responded to the report of the Salt River incident by immediately taking steps to reinforce positions guarding Kanghwa Island and adjacent areas. He felt confident that Korea could repel the Americans just as it had the French. Korean coastal defenses, which had seen numerous improvements over the previous five years, were further strengthened in preparation for a possible armed confrontation with the United States. Defensive fortifications on Kanghwa Island were repaired and new gun emplacements were built. Over two tons of gunpowder, 30 crossbows, 900 arrows, 30 artillery pieces, and nearly one ton of rice were sent to the island. 0 Chae-yon, deputy commander of the Chinmu Regiment on Kanghwa received reinforcements of several hundred troops from other regiments, including men from the infamous "tiger hunters."

On June 2, at the suggestion of the Defense Command, a few hundred additional soldiers, over 1,000 pounds of gunpowder, 15,000 rounds of ammunition, and additional rice rations were sent to the region. Local commanders were replaced with high-ranking generals. Military units surrounding Seoul were secretly mobilized and 0 Chae-yon was ordered to move his regiment into the fortress at Kwangsong-jin.

The Taewongun sought to bring formal charges against the American's unwarranted intrusion into the Salt River. Chong Ki-won, commander of the Chinmu Regiment, prepared a stern note to the Americans on his behalf and delivered it to Low on June 6. The note explained that the Salt River was a restricted inland waterway and sternly denounced the American intrusion. In case the Americans were unfamiliar with Korea's position, Chong attached a copy of the earlier note to the Qing Board of Rites asking Chinese authorities to reject the American request. It was the first Low had seen of the note since his departure from Shanghai. Korea's stubborn, hardened stance left Low and Rodgers with a difficult decision;  withdraw or fight. In consideration of the possible effect of a hasty withdrawal on not only Korea, but China as well, Low reported to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish;

"If the squadron retires now, the effect upon the minds of the Coreans [sic], and, I fear, upon Chinese also, will be injurious, if not disastrous, to our future prospects in both countries. Corea will rest firmly in the belief that she is powerful enough to repel any of the Western states singly, or even all of them combined; and this opinion will be likely to react upon China, and strengthen the influence of those who insist that it is practicable to drive out by force all the foreign residents. ...I cannot advise the admiral to abandon the field without further attempts at redress for the wrongs and insults which our flag suffered."

Admiral Rodgers decided that Low would have little success in ever reaching the Korean court in Seoul without silencing the gun emplacements on Kanghwa Island. Both men concluded that a forceful retaliation would improve the prospects for negotiation. Through his secretary, Edward Drew, Low warned Chong Ki-won on June 9 that if his government failed to indicate a willingness to negotiate within the next three or four days, it would have to listen to whatever terms the Americans decided to dictate. While the Americans waited in vain for the Korean government to apologize and commence negotiations, Frederick Low decided to act without waiting for the time limit to expire. The United States initiated the "Foreign Disturbance of 1871."

Aboard the cruiser Benicia, Admiral Rodgers planned a combined shore bombardment and marine-led beach assault against the island fortresses at Choji-jin and Kwangsong-jin. On the morning of June 10, Captain Blake ordered the gunboats Alaska, Palos and Monocacy, plus several launches and 450 marines under Captain McLane Tilton to move into Choji Bay near the mouth of the Salt River. Shortly after noon, under covering-fire from the gunboats, Tilton's marines crossed the mud flats and went ashore below the cliffs surrounding the Choji-jin fortress.

Tilton's Marines, largely equipped with Civil War era .58 caliber muzzle-loading rifled muskets and supported by an improvised brigade of about two hundred sailors, led the assault against Choji-jin. The fortress was abandoned without resistance and all its guns and ammunition were completely destroyed. The next morning, after spending the night inside the fortress, Tilton's task force marched northward over the low hills above the beach to assault the fortress at Tokchin, which quickly fell in the same manner.

Resistance increased in almost direct proportion to the distance the Americans advanced up the island. Fierce counterattacks drove back a Marine force that attempted to land at the Kapkot'chi ferry, just below the city of Kanghwa. Korean troops successfully withdrew toward the main garrison position of 0 Chae-yun's Chinmu Regiment at Kwangsong-jin. There was no further retreat. At the Battle of Kwangsong-jin, American troops encountered brave, determined, yet ill-equipped Korean soldiers defending the fortress, men who fought with stubborn, if not futile courage.

Armed only with muskets and small caliber wood-barreled mortars, the Chinmu Regiment had little chance against the Americans and their deadly big guns. All the classic techniques of fighting were displayed at Kwangsong-jin, from storming the walls to bitter hand-to-hand fighting. After expending all their ammunition and arrows, 0 Chae-yun's men resorted to throwing rocks, gravel and dust at the Americans in the vain hope of blinding them; not a single man surrendered. Admiral Rodgers later reported that, "Only when the last man fell did the conflict end."

After two days of fighting, a total of five fortresses had been captured or destroyed. Korea suffered the loss of 243 dead, including O Chae-yon, who died in the fighting at Kwangsong-jin. American losses totaled 3 dead and 15 wounded. The American assault force captured 481 cannon along with 40 to 50 impressively large battle standards. On June 20, Low wrote of the fighting, "the Coreans [sic] fought with desperation, rarely equaled and never excelled by any people. Nearly all the soldiers in the main fort were killed at their posts."

Despite repeated heavy losses from superior Western arms, few men in Korea at the time, including the Taewongun, had either the knowledge or information to correctly appreciate the strength of the Western powers. At the very time American marines were fighting on Kanghwa Island, Chief State Councilor Kim Pyong-hak, a sophisticated scholar, was explaining to King Kojong that the United States was merely a sundry collection of settlements. He advised the young monarch that the Americans were little different from pirates and that their comings and goings, though swift and unpredictable, should not cause undue alarm.

Faced with determined resistance, Low and Rodgers realized they had neither the authority nor the means to pursue further military action and there was little hope that King Kojong would change his mind. Outraged by the American action, Kojong declared, "How can a country which has upheld propriety and justice for thousands of years make peace with the likes of dogs and sheep?" Rear Admiral Rodgers concluded it was foolhardy to risk further losses to his small force. In a report to the State Department, Frederick Low noted that American naval action, "which would have produced a profound impression upon any other government," had virtually no effect on the Korean government. Convinced there was no longer any prospect for fruitful negotiations, the Americans decided to cease military operations and adopt a conciliatory approach. On July 3, the American squadron departed Korean waters for Chefoo (modern Yantai), China.

The Taewongun was exultant. Korea's centuries-old wall of seclusion remained solid. America's "Little War with the Heathen," as it was called by a New York newspaper, ended without achieving a single stated objective. Instead of convincing Korea of Western strength or the advantages of establishing contacts with America, the American attacks stiffened the attitude of the Korean government. As Low feared, it reinforced the belief that all Western powers behaved like pirates and that Korea could repel them if it remained united, stout of heart, and upright in its Confucian morality. The American withdrawal convinced the Koreans they had defeated the West again. It mattered little that the Americans had silenced the fortresses on Kanghwa Island or that so many soldiers were killed in the fighting. What mattered was the Americans had left. It was sufficient that two Western powers failed to do what they had come to do. Korea, therefore, was victorious.

A joyful Yi government proudly reported the "victory" to the Qing Board of Rites and asked the Board to petition the Emperor for an edict instructing Frederick Low not to worry about shipwrecked Americans, to abandon plans to negotiate other matters and not to make any more trouble. The triumphs over the French and the Americans further hardened the Taewongun's policy of foreign exclusion. To demonstrate his new resolve to reject all contact with the West, he ordered monument stones set up along the main thoroughfare in Seoul and at various points throughout the country, inscribed with this admonition: "Western barbarians invade our land. If we do not fight we must then appease them. To urge appeasement is to betray the nation!" A determination so demonstrably unyielding as this could not easily be shaken.

Contrary to the Taewongun's beliefs, the stubborn resistance of the Korean army was only a small factor in the failures of the French and American expeditions. First, no Western power felt sufficiently motivated to send a large military force to aggressively open Korea to trade. Second, neither France nor the United States had any intention of occupying Korea or annexing any of its territory. Both believed that intimidation alone would prompt Korea to open its borders for commerce. The Taewongun had sufficient strength and determination to stand firm against such limited, punitive attacks. Finally, the principal Western powers in the region had more demanding preoccupations elsewhere;  Britain was busily putting down revolts in India;  Russia was occupied with the colonization of the Siberian Maritime Territory and the Kurile Islands north of Japan;  France was engaged in the colonization of Indochina;  and the United States was contending with post-Civil War reconstruction and settling the western half of the North American continent. When the West encountered unexpectedly tenacious resistance from Korea, it was simply unprepared to employ sufficient force to overcome it.