Ch 22 - Resistance to Change

A Matter of Style

The Meiji Government attempted to establish a new era of relations between Japan and Choson by replacing the age old diplomatic and commercial relations that had been controlled by Tsushima's feudal lords for over 250 years.

Not long after the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, the newly formed imperial government announced that, subject to revision of unsatisfactory clauses, it would honor all foreign treaties signed by the bakufu in the shogun's name. The sole exception to this policy was the management of relations with Choson. Neither the Meiji State Council nor the Foreign Office was familiar with Tsushima's traditional role or the elaborate diplomatic formalities of dealing with Choson. So, for the time being at least, Tsushima continued its role as intermediary in the conduct of relations between Choson and Japan. Before launching any new policy toward the peninsula, the Meiji government had a great deal to learn from the Lord of Tsushima and his retainers.

Tsushima's feudal lords of the So clan had controlled Choson's diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan since 1603. Tsushima's economic dependence on Choson over the years had made the island kingdom a virtual tribute state. Lord So Yoshitatsu and his ambitious retainers were determined to change that humiliating set of circumstances. They had no desire to continue their traditional role as Japan's diplomatic intermediary.

In May 1868, Tsushima sent a message to Tokyo that outlined the origin and development of Choson-Japanese relations and urged reform of the traditional conduct of those relations. After lengthy meetings in June and July between Tsushima's resident Choson expert and the Foreign Office in Osaka, a reform program was put into effect.

The new system of "reformed formalities" made four significant changes in the conduct of diplomatic relations with Choson. First, characters that appeared in the names of emperors and kings of the five generations preceding the reigning sovereigns would not be used in diplomatic notes. Second, the seals which Tsushima had received from Choson were replaced with a new seal from the imperial government inscribed with, "The Foreign Office." Third, the title and rank of So Yoshitatsu was changed from Lord of Tsushima and Chamberlain to Lord of Tsushima and Major General of the Left Imperial Guards to elevate his status relative to the Choson officials with whom he communicated. Higuchi Tetsusaburo, Lord So's senior retainer and the Choson expert Kawamoto Kuzaemon were appointed chief ambassador and vice-ambassador respectively. Finally, the Meiji government abandoned the earlier shogunal practice of signing documents as "Taikun," or Great Lord. Henceforth, official letters to the king of Choson used Emperor Meiji's title, "His Imperial Highness," thus raising his status above that of the Choson ruler.

Tsushima's first mission to Choson was an embassy to announce the new Meiji government and a new relationship with Choson was totally dependent on its success. Because Choson officials always looked for ways of refusing irregular envoys, there was little chance they would receive a Japanese ambassador with documents stamped by a new state seal. On November 13, in advance of the formal mission, Lord So dispatched Kawamoto Kuzaemon as a petty envoy to Choson to obtain recognition of the new Foreign Office seal. He arrived in Pusan carrying two important notes: one to the Department of Rites and the other to the Tongnae magistrate and the commander of the Pusan garrison.

An Tong-jun, Pusan's language officer, was the one man responsible for nearly all negotiations with the Japanese. A career interpreter of Japanese, he was a determined man with ultra-nationalist inclinations and a single-minded devotion to the Taewongun. An's superior officer was Chong Hyon-dok, the magistrate of Tongnae. Although Chong seldom participated directly in negotiations, all official reports on diplomatic discussions with the Japanese were sent to him for dispatch to the Department of Rites in Seoul. Above Chong was Kim Se-ho, governor of Kyongsang Province and a close associate of the Taewongun. His participation in Choson's dealings with Japan was confined to advising the Taewongun, Chong Hyon-dok and An Tong-jun.

After arriving at the Japan House, Kawamoto had his first interview with An Tong-jun on January 30, 1869. He showed An and his aide a copy of the advance note from Tsushima and briefly explained to the men the Meiji Restoration underway in Japan. Kawamoto asked to have the notes forwarded to the Department of Rites and the magistrate of Tongnae. An's response to the documents was little short of violent. He considered the terms "imperial house" and "imperial edict" perverse and insolent. Such words were reserved solely for use by the Chinese emperor. He also regarded the arbitrary replacement of the traditional seal with a Japanese Foreign Office seal as a "matter of urgent alarm" and demanded Kawamoto immediately leave the country.

The day after this tense meeting, special ambassador Higuchi Tetsusaburo unexpectedly arrived in Pusan. On February 2, An went to the Japan House hoping to learn more about what Kawamoto had already explained. Higuchi merely reiterated Kawamoto's words and requested that he be accorded the treatment due a formal envoy from Japan. The Japanese negotiators tried to persuade An Tong-jun to accept the ambassador's notes, because until his credentials were examined and accepted, no Tsushima envoy could be formally received by the Chosen government. The issue of accepting the advance notes from Tsushima remained deadlocked for months. In view of An's objections, the Japanese withdrew the advance notes on April 29 and pleaded instead that An accept the ambassador's notes for presentation to the Seoul government. An argued there was no precedent for such an act and said he could not give them a final answer until he had spoken with his superior in Tongnae. Chung Hyon-dok forwarded the Japanese proposal to the Department of Rites and asked for instructions.

While Kawamoto and Higuchi sat in Pusan awaiting an answer from Seoul, the Meiji government adopted a policy known as "return of the land and people to the emperor," the beginning of another significant change in Choson-Japanese relations. The Council of State issued a decree in October that formally transferred the management of Choson-Japanese affairs to the Foreign Office. Over the next two years Tsushima and the Foreign Office jointly managed foreign affairs as the Meiji government prepared itself to eventually takeover the handling of Choson affairs entirely and sought to open a direct line of contact with the Choson government.

Japan's almost chaotic modernization that followed the downfall of the shogunate stood in sharp contrast to the Taewongun's xenophobic isolation that held such a tight grip in Choson. He felt contempt for the Meiji government's modernizing transition and its increasing imitation of the West. Choson regarded Japanese efforts to adopt Western ideas and institutions as evidence of their depravity and barbarity. Bitterly anti-foreign and anti-Christian, the Taewongun was every bit as anti-Japanese as he was anti-Western and incited a number of violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in Pusan. He disapproved of the removal of the Tokugawa Shogunate and refused to accept ambassador Higuchi's notes, complaining they had not been written with sufficient respect.

On November 1, 1869, An reported to Kawamoto and Higuchi that the attitude of the Department of Rites was decidedly negative and Seoul had instructed Chung Hyon-dok to order the "irregular envoys" to leave the country. The Seoul government declared that it had no intention of accepting the ambassador's message, even if he stayed in the Japan House for the next ten years.

On December 11, An Tong-jun reasserted this view again in two notes prepared for Higuchi Tetsusaburo. The primary reasons given by the government for refusing to receive the Japanese envoy included sending an irregular envoy in violation of Tsushima's 300-year-old treaty with Choson, discarding the traditional seal, using unacceptable characters and expressions in the Japanese notes, the unprecedented claim of Lord So's new title, and Japan's lack of sincerity. Behind the stated reasons however, was a growing suspicion in Seoul that Japan was collaborating with Western powers against Choson. Although the Meiji regime considered its claim of titular superiority over Choson the natural outgrowth of restoring imperial rule, Choson saw no historical or legal validity to the claim and regarded it as not only unacceptable, but insulting. The Japanese returned home empty handed.

In January 1870, the Foreign Office dispatched Sada Hakuchi, Moriyama Shigeru, and Saito Sakae to Choson. The three men arrived in Pusan on March 23, pretending to be officials from Tsushima. Their supposed mission was to study Japan's traditional relationship with the peninsula along with such matters as its armaments, seaports, customs, economic and political conditions, and Choson's relationship with China and Russia. They spent only a short time in Choson, but their report to the government attracted a great deal of attention, particularly among those seeking to expand the power and prestige of Japan.

Sada Hakuchi's report amounted to nothing less than a plan for the conquest of Choson. "Korea casts dishonor upon our empire," he wrote. "She must be subjected! If she is not, the imperial dignity cannot be established." This fear was clearly reflected in an earlier report from the unsuccessful Hirayama-Furuga diplomatic mission:

"In view of the fact that Korea is a country that either stands or falls with us, our imperial country cannot stand idly by when Korea is faced with mortal danger as it is today. Should [France, the United States and Britain] jointly send an expedition to Korea, Korea would fall within weeks and the whole country would be seized by the barbarians. It is difficult to measure how dangerous this could be to our divine land."

The failure of the Kawamoto-Higuchi mission was not only a rejection of Tsushima's ambassador, but the entire Tsushima "reform" plan. To redeem its position, Tsushima obtained permission from Tokyo to send another Choson expert, Urase Saijo, to Pusan to propose a compromise plan to open formal diplomatic relations. Under this plan, Japan would temporarily accept the demands of the Choson government by eliminating controversial wording and withdrawing the new state seal.

Shortly after he arrived at the Japan House in early June 1870, Urase Saijo began negotiations with An Tong-jun. He explained that the rejection of the Ambassador Higuchi's notes had placed the former Lord of Tsushima in an extremely embarrassing position. Because of his failure, he would soon be relieved of his post. Urase added that there were some extremists in the Meiji government advocating punitive action be taken against Choson. He assured An however, that a few people were trying hard to calm these extremists and that no such action would be taken.

An Tong-jun expressed his deep sympathy for the people of Tsushima and assured Urase that he was willing to personally do anything possible to remove the "bottleneck." An's amiability encouraged Urase to turn their talks to the main subject, the compromise plan. After exchanging views, the two men agreed that the ambassador's notes would be amended. The term "imperial" would be changed to "court," the document would be stamped with the old Choson seal, and that future negotiations between the two countries would be conducted in the names of the two governments on the basis of equality. Future details regarding the use of the Japanese seal and other such matters would be settled by formal negotiations between the two countries.

An Tong-jun forwarded the results of his meeting with Urase to Chong Hyon-dok, who in turn sent his own report on the compromise plan to Seoul. In view of the formalities involved, An promised Urase that he could expect a final answer by July 8, 1870. Under normal circumstances Seoul would almost certainly have approved the An-Urase compromise plan. Because of a single trivial incident however, the compromise never happened.