Ch 21 - Mounting Pressure Against Choson

Growing Suspicions

At a time when traditional and reform elements battled for supremacy, Japan's interest in Asia underwent a qualitative change and took the form of an aggressive call for continental expansion. Choson's long-dormant distrust of Japan bred suspicion about Japanese-Western collaboration against the peninsula kingdom.

Japan had learned to master the new tools of power by the second half of the nineteenth century and gradually assumed a new role in relations with its neighbors, that of an aggressive Eastern state. Until its eventual downfall in 1945, Japan acted toward East Asia in much the same way Western powers had acted toward Japan and other East Asian nations. The reawakening and growth of an active Japanese interest in the Asian continent coincided with the rise of Western expansionism in East Asia. This process, stimulated to a large degree by a Japanese fear of Western aggression and expansion, emerged in three major phases.

The first phase lasted from the late eighteenth century to the mid-1850s, when Japan was opened by Commodore Perry. Interest in the Asian continent was first aroused by concerns about Russia's eastward expansion, which by the late eighteenth century appeared to threaten Japan's northern frontiers. During this period, such interest was limited principally to a small number of Dutch scholars, whose knowledge of the West provided an understanding of the nature and gravity of the Western threat to Japan and East Asia.

The Japanese geographer Hayashi Shihei, an early specialist in Dutch studies, wrote in 1781 that the Choson peninsula held a strategically vital position. His defensive interest in China and Choson was chiefly concerned with the strategic problem of how to defend Japan from Russian aggression. He warned against unwarranted complacency and indifference toward China and Choson and urged the study of both countries for their strategic importance in defending Japan from Western aggression. A decade later he warned that Manchu China, either on its own or at the instigation of Western interests, could become an aggressive military power that might seriously threaten the security and independence of Japan. Hayashi's work implied potential expansionist action by Japan, at least in Choson.

Sato Nobuhiro, a Western scholar of encyclopedic interests, also helped turn Japan's expansionist attention toward Asia. In 1808, he described China as a potentially far more powerful country than Russia. He stated that Japan should cultivate friendly relations and expand trade with China, even if it must humble itself in the process. He later asserted that, because Japan was the first land created at the beginning of the earth, it was destined to rule the world. To fulfill that destiny, Sato urged the taking of Manchuria, to be followed by the conquest of China. The Sino-British Opium Wars apparently had a sobering effect on Sato's visionary expansionism however, because afterward he more or less returned to his earlier position, hoping for a resurgence of Qing power to ensure Japan's security and that of other Eastern nations in the face of a rising Western rampage. Hayashi and Sato exemplify Japanese scholars who retained some of the traditional Asian respect for China. When confronted by a growing threat from the West however, such scholars seemed to have turned to China not for expansion or conquest, but for mutual cooperation and defense.

Commodore Perry's visits deepened Japan's sense of national crisis, stimulated a renewed interest in continental East Asia and ushered in the second evolutionary phase of Japan's development and growth, which lasted until the early 1860s. In the past, Japan's interest in Asia had been mainly defensive in nature. At a time when Japan was torn by the great joi-kaikoku controversies ("expel the barbarians - open the country") however, political activists emerged and crystallized a qualitative change in Japan's perspective that took the form of an aggressive call for continental expansion. Despite their different intellectual and ideological backgrounds and opposing domestic political positions at home, early proponents of Japanese expansion held nearly identical views and attitudes toward the outside world. They all shared a common recognition of the superiority of Western power and accepted accommodation, if not cooperation with the West. There was still a traditional deference toward China and some desire for Chinese cooperation in meeting the Western threat, but China was gradually diminishing in Japan's estimation. The territory of Choson, Manchuria and Taiwan soon became either immediate or potential objects of Japanese expansion.

The third phase in Japan's reawakening occurred in the mid-1860s, a time when Japan seethed with internal and external turmoil as traditional and reform elements battled for supremacy. In March 1866, Saigo Takamori of Satsuma and Kido Koin of Choshu joined in an alliance aimed at the overthrow of the bakufu, then fighting for its very survival. Shogun Tokugawa Iemochi died in September of 1866 and Tokugawa Yoshinobu (Hitotsubashi Keiki) was persuaded to accept the post in January 1867. Yoshinobu became the fifteenth and, as it turned out, the last Tokugawa shogun.

In the wake of the failed French expedition to Kanghwa Island and continued American efforts to learn the fate of the General Sherman, rumors ran wild in China and Japan that a joint French-American expedition to Choson was planned for the spring of 1867 and that Great Britain might participate. There was a real fear that some Western power might seize the peninsula; a fear that was particularly acute in domains such as Choshu and Tsushima, whose security would be immediately threatened by the Western seizure or control of the peninsula. Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu did not want to see Choson become involved in an uneven conflict with the Western powers. In January 1867, within weeks of his formal investiture, Yoshinobu made an unprecedented decision to propose sending a high-level bakufu mission to Choson, purportedly to mediate Choson's disputes with France and the United States.

Meanwhile, Yabe Junshuku, a Japanese Confucian scholar living in Hong Kong, wrote a series of articles about Japan for local newspapers. On January 18, 1867, the Chinese and Foreign News of Hong Kong and other newspapers in Canton and Shanghai printed an article in which Yabe boasted that Japan had made great strides in the introduction of Western arms and technology and that it had more than eighty modern warships. Although Yabe had no official connection with the bakufu, he stated that Japan was planning a military expedition to Choson as punishment for Kojong's failure to send the tribute he was required to send to the shogun every five years. Yabe made a number of other statements containing distorted accounts of the historical relationship between Japan and Choson, including the assertion that the three ancient peninsular Samhan kingdoms had once been Japanese tributaries and the Choson king used to go to Yedo once every five years without fail to visit the Shogun.

Yabe Junshuku's inaccurate knowledge of Japan's historical relationship with Choson was not the exception, but the rule. His view was typical, if not representative, of many Japanese who believed that ancient Choson had once been a Japanese tribute state. Like Yabe, they considered Choson's relationship with the Tokugawa Shogunate to be essentially tributary in nature. This misconception created the inherent presumption of Japanese titular superiority that later became a basic assumption behind Japan's "restorationist" diplomacy toward Choson. Local Chinese officials hurriedly sent newspaper clippings containing these stunning remarks to the Zongli Yamen. The report of a possible Japanese expedition to Choson greatly alarmed Emperor Mu Zong, Prince Gong and other Yamen ministers, men already troubled by Choson's armed clash with France over the missionary issue and American inquiries concerning the merchant ship General Sherman.

The French minister to the shogunate, Lèon Roches, first heard of the Shogun's mediation proposal at Osaka Castle on March 12, 1867. At the time, he raised no objection to the plan. By the time Roju Itakura Katsushige and another of the Shogun's aides arrived to meet with Roches the following day however, the French minister had changed his mind. He declined to accept Japanese mediation on the grounds that negotiations had to be conducted between Choson, the Qing government and Henri de Bellonet, the French minister in Beijing. Despite Roches' refusal, Yoshinobu decided to proceed and appointed Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hirayama Keichu to head the peace mission. Hirayama proposed that a warship and two battalions of escort troops be included in the trip to display the military power of Japan and, should his mission be successful, that the bakufu allocate funds for "bribing" Choson's delegates sent to Japan for final negotiations.

On March 20, the Zongli Yamen expressed its concern over Yabe Junshuku's statements in a jointly addressed secret report to the emperor. The foreign ministers began with a brief reference to Japan's historical "depredations" against China and its "conceited" self-image. Having watched Japan's "wars" with Britain and France, the ministers stated that Japan's proximity to China meant that "its victory or defeat would alike affect China greatly." Japan "has greatly exerted itself and become strong" in recent years and, noting the island nation's progress in arms expansion and modernization, the ministers stated that "Japan's ambitions are not small." If Choson were to be drawn into a fight with Japan, "the calamity she may suffer will be much greater than that caused by French soldiers."

The Zongli Yamen ministers also noted that Britain and France had their disputes with Choson, but they sought only trade and permission for missionary activities, not territory. On the other hand, there was nothing to restrain Japan. If Choson were occupied by Japan, foreign trade and missionaries in Choson would become secondary to far more serious problems facing China. After listening to the Zongli Yamen's warnings, the Emperor ordered the Board of Rites to take a first step toward preventing a potential catastrophe by sending a confidential inquiry to Seoul to explore any disharmony between Choson and Japan.

The Winter Solstice Mission headed by Yi P'ung-ik, returned to Seoul on April 10, 1867, carrying the imperial inquiry from China together with copies of Yabe's newspaper articles. He immediately presented the documents to King Kojong and the Taewongun. Nearly everyone in the Choson government was stunned by the arrival of the Chinese inquiry and enraged by Yabe Junshuku's statements. A formal reply to the Qing Board of Rites was prepared the following day in the king's name that rebutted the historical errors in the newspaper articles. It noted that Yabe's version of the Hideyoshi invasion was totally distorted and the insulting notion that Choson kings visited Japan, let allow paid tribute to the Shogun, were totally without foundation. Choson assured China that it had long maintained peaceful relations with Japan and that it always faithfully reported to China any rupture in its relations with the Japanese.

Japan, meanwhile, continued to appoint members to its proposed Choson peace mission, including Metsuke Furuga, the Chikugo daimyo Mizuno Tadanori and nine specialists in Confucianism and foreign affairs. In accordance with customary practice, the bakufu sent a special message to Lord So of Tsushima on May 10 announcing its intention of sending Minister of Foreign Affairs Hirayama Keichu and his delegation to Choson in December 1867. It also ordered Lord So to notify the Choson government in advance of the dispatch of the mission.

Lord So Yoshitatsu sent petty envoy Nii Magoichiro from Tsushima to the city of Tongnae on July 30 with instructions to formally present the magistrate with a note for Choson's Department of Rites announcing the impending Hirayama mission. The Taewongun ordered the magistrate to reject the mission with the explanation that Choson was suffering crop failures, epidemics and the aftermath of the French invasion. Furthermore, there was no precedent for receiving an envoy for the purpose of mediation. The bakufu's unilateral decision to send the unwanted Hirayama mission further deepened Choson suspicions. In the collective minds of Choson authorities, the bakufu's apparent eagerness to "help" France and the United States made it doubly suspect.

Highly offended by the allegation that any Choson king was required to send tribute to the Japanese shogun, the Seoul government sent a stern note of inquiry to Lord So Yoshitatsu at Tsushima, demanding a full and satisfactory explanation from the bakufu for Yabe's statements. The Choson government's request was carried to Edo by a Tsushima representative and presented to Roju Itakura in Edo on June 16.

At the bakufu's direction, Lord So Yoshitatsu sent a message to Seoul in late October that denied any knowledge of Yabe's statements and branded the "invasion plan" as an unfounded rumor. Lord So stated that the bakufu had no hostile plans or intentions toward Choson and explained that Japan's recent acquisition of ships and guns was solely for self-strengthening and defense. He also reaffirmed the bakufu's friendship and goodwill toward Choson. The bakufu merely dismissed the entire Yabe affair in a rather cavalier manner. The Choson government did not. By the time the Hirayama-Furuga mission was ready to depart for Pusan however, Japan was deeply embroiled in fighting between bakufu loyalists and daimyo of the Satsuma and Choshu clans and the mission never left Japan.

The episode left a lasting impression on the Taewongun and his associates. It was an alarming reminder of Choson's precarious position in a world dominated by two powerful neighbors and increasingly threatened by predatory Western powers. Despite the denials and reassurances from Japan, Yabe's language was an uncomfortable reminder of the Hideyoshi invasions three centuries earlier and in some quarters it stirred up fears of an imminent Japanese invasion. The affair stirred up a long-dormant distrust of Japan and sowed the seeds of suspicion about Japanese-Western collaboration against Choson.

The underlying nature of relations between Choson and Japan during the period of the Taewongun's rule was defined by the inherent conflict between tradition and innovation. Japan's newly emerging leadership found recognition of the traditional diplomatic relationship between Tsushima and Choson no longer compatible with the rapid social, political and economic changes taking place in Japan. In Seoul, Choson leaders saw that very tradition as eternal and the only legitimate basis on which to conduct and maintain relations with Japan. Given their already strained relationship and their conflicting understanding of that relationship, it was inevitable that conflict would erupt between them.

The Yabe Junshuku episode exemplified the prevailing views and attitudes of China, Japan and Choson toward one another during this period. It not only revealed China's perception of the Western threat to Choson, but its awareness of a potential Japanese threat to the peninsula. Despite the possibility of further French retaliation and American military action against Choson, Prince Gong and his associates in the Zongli Yamen never considered France or the United States to be a real threat to Choson. This partly accounted for China's refusal to intervene directly or actively in efforts to open Choson to foreign trade. On the other hand, at a time when few nations considered Japan to be a major power, China saw the island nation as a threat potentially more dangerous than any Western power; a threat not only to Choson, but to China itself.