Ch 20 - The Awakening of Japan

Tairo Ii Naosuke

Townsend Harris convinced Chief Councilor Lord Hotta Masayoshi of the necessity of signing the Treaty of Kanagawa, but Emperor Komei remained firmly committed to excluding the West. After Shogun Tokugawa Iesada's sudden death in early 1858, Senior Minister Ii Naosuke signed the American treaty on July 29, 1858, and undermined the position of Japan's strong anti-Western daimyo.

For over two centuries, the Tokugawa shogunate operated on the assumption that foreign and domestic policies were inextricably bound together. Japan's bitter experience with the West during the sixteenth century led the Japanese Government to conclude that its ability to maintain internal order, in fact its very survival, required cutting off the inherently disorderly and often uncontrollable affairs of the world beyond its borders. While Japan may have chosen isolation, the Japanese people, including the peasants, were about as well educated as the average British commoner, certainly more so than a typical French peasant, and were not really isolated.

Well before Commodore Perry's sudden arrival at Uraga in June 1853, knowledge gleaned of Western cultures through the Dutch trading post at Nagasaki had already begun to attract the excited interest of Japan's upper class. Katsu Kaishu, the son of a samurai, became a keen student of rangaku, the study of Europe and its science known as "Dutch learning." The few samurai who studied rangaku were often considered to be eccentric. By 1839, one group of intellectuals had become so involved in learning about the West and spreading their newly discovered knowledge that several committed suicide, fearing their activities had embarrassed their daimyo in the Shogun's eyes. The impact of Commodore Perry's sudden arrival launched the first ripples of uncertainty among the Japanese. Neither Perry nor those who followed him into Japan really understood or appreciated the inherent tension between desiring knowledge of the outside world in order to protect Japan and the very real fear that spreading such knowledge could create disorder, even civil war.

Townsend Harris settled into his quarters in Edo, the hub of the Japanese universe, with high hopes of concluding a new treaty with Japan. While in Shimoda, Harris had heard sketchy reports about the political turmoil in Edo. Soon after his arrival in the capital however, he began to realize just how bad things had become among the politically active daimyo. Chief Councilor Abe Masahiro's decision to invite comments from the daimyo on the proper response to Commodore Perry's demands brought all the building tension and uncertainty about the future to the surface. With popular sentiment running strongly against opening the country, there was a growing feeling in Japan that to meet the foreign menace the nation would have to pull itself together more effectively around the Emperor. Many proponents of the Sonno Joi movement ("Respect the Emperor, Expel the barbarian") were young warriors from the lower rungs of the samurai hierarchy known as shishi. These self-righteous, intolerant men who were also rabidly anti-Western, extremely dogmatic and disinclined to be reasonable. They saw themselves as the saviors of Japan, the only true patriots. Ruled by strong passions and short tempers, they were convinced that truth was on their side and those who failed to agree with them were self-serving traitors. In effect, the shishi were forerunners of the ultranationalist extremists of pre-World War II Japan.

Anti-shogunate forces fiercely resisted the treaty proposal. This faction, with Emperor Komei at its head, not only opposed opening Japan, but advocated the expulsion of all foreigners. The politically ambitious fudai daimyo who actively supported the Shogun understood the direction events were moving, resigned themselves to change and, by and large, favored giving in where necessary to foreign demands. The great debate over the question of not just how to respond, but whether to respond at all continued to rage for several years. Even ordinary Japanese, for reasons they could never fathom, became engulfed by uncertainty.

On December 12, 1857, Townsend Harris made his presentation for the new treaty to Lord Hotta Masayoshi, who had replaced Lord Abe Masahiro as Chief Councilor. The Japanese, it seemed, had to learn everything from the beginning. Harris had to explain simply and clearly just why trade was a good thing, how it worked, how it affected the nation's economy and why it would benefit the common people of Japan. The daimyo, untrained to even think in terms of change, constantly frustrated the American consul. Using a combination of peaceful entreaty, stark emphasis on the realities of the international situation in East Asia, and thinly veiled threats to present his case, Harris explained over and over the necessity of open harbors and argued over tariffs, currency regulations and a seemingly endless host of other issues.

Although Townsend Harris had no military force close at hand, he nevertheless had ample help from the armed forces. When pushed to extremes, he consciously used the very real threat of what was happening to China to hint at what would happen to Japan if he failed in his mission. He warned of "the calamities which will inevitably arrive" if Japan rejected his proposals. They were delicate hints to be sure, but they worked. The Japanese were receiving exaggerated Dutch reports about British plans, the destructive British-led war in China and the impending Allied advance against Tianjin and knew a great deal about events in China, even more than Harris. That knowledge had a decided impact on Lord Hotta's dealings with the American consul.

Harris explained to Lord Hotta that Russia was converging on East Asia from the north and Great Britain and France were converging from the south. They could soon fight another war in which one of them might seize Japanese territory as a base of operations. In his peaceful pursuit of diplomacy, Townsend Harris pointed out that the United States prohibited the acquisition of territory in East Asia and reminded Lord Hotta that he had come to Japan as a representative of the United States with no intention of creating disorder. He explained that the things he was ordered to obtain would benefit Japan and that America had no intention of procuring them against Japan's will or by force. Japan could best protect itself by "going western," training itself under the guidance of the United States and preparing itself to meet the Europeans on European terms. "If you accept my proposals," Harris predicted, "Japan will become the England of the Orient."

Harris continued to drive home the point that Japan should give up its policy of isolation, freely admit all foreigners to trade and preserve its own independence and integrity by playing off foreign rivalries against each other. It would be better, said Harris, for Japan to open foreign relations with all nations by honorable treaty terms modeled after its agreement with the United States. Harris confidently offered that if Japan accepted his proposed treaty, no other country would demand anything more. "If I display this treaty to the Europeans," he stated, "they will desire to conclude identical treaties, and the matter will be settled by the mere sending over of a minister." Lord Hotta, who took held a fairly realistic view about the need to open Japan to foreign trade, took Harris at his word.

In March 1858, with the new treaty ready for signatures, Lord Hotta encountered such strong opposition from the daimyo he decided to personally seek the emperor's approval. Emperor Komei, an almost mythical figure, remained a virtual prisoner cloistered in his palace at Kyoto surrounded by spies, advisers who were grossly ignorant of the world situation, servants and women. His seclusion left him vulnerable to any strong willed adviser who wished to persuade him that opening Japan would be disastrous. Lord Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito, who ranked among the most influential daimyo in the palace, remained adamant in his opposition to opening Japan to foreign interests and persuaded Emperor Komei to support the anti-foreign faction. Despite such opposition, Chief Councilor Lord Hotta pressed his case for approving the treaty with the United States and fully expected imperial consent. His presentation to the Emperor, filled with subtlety and flattery, argued in favor of the policy behind the new foreign treaties. Between the lines however, were all the signals of Japan's future rise to power in the East Asia. Lord Hotta stated that,

"...in establishing relations with foreign countries, the object should always be kept in view of laying a foundation for securing the hegemony over all nations ... Such a policy could be nothing else but the enforcement of the power and authority deputed [to us] by the spirit of Heaven. Our national prestige and position thus ensured, the nations of the world will come to look up to our Emperor as the Great Ruler of all the nations, and they will come to follow our policy and submit themselves to our judgment ... now is the opportune moment offered us by the changed condition of the world to throw off the traditional policy three centuries old, and make a united national effort to seize the opportunity for realizing the great destiny awaiting our country."

Despite Lord Hotta's best efforts, Emperor Komei remained firmly committed to excluding the West.

The sudden death of Shogun Tokugawa Iesada in early 1858 without an heir to succeed him only added to the confusion surrounding the treaty debate. In such times of national emergency, it was customary to revitalize the office of Senior Minister or Chief Councilor, tairo, the highest administrative post in the Tokugawa Shogunate. The tairo, who ranked above the other senior councilors, acted as Prime Minister, advised the Shogun on matters of high national policy, or served as a shogunal regent. As a matter of hereditary right, Ii Naosuke, 13th Lord of Hikone, was appointed Great Councilor, thus becoming the sole government executive and the most powerful man in Japan. Meanwhile, in the ongoing debate over the shogun's successor, the Council of Ministers split between two rival candidates. Ii Naosuke supported Tokugawa Yoshitomi, the twelve-year-old boy from the Kii branch closest to the direct line of descent. Tokugawa Nariaki's mature and intelligent son, Yoshinobu, also known as Keiki, was considered the most eligible candidate and had the strong support of not only his father, but of Matsudaira Yushinaga of Echizen and Shimazu Nariakira of Satsuma. Great Councilor Ii Naosuke, whose foreign sympathies were already well-known, decided in favor of Tokugawa Yoshitomi (now renamed Iemochi), a decision that only deepened Tokugawa Nariaki's growing anger.

Between 1858 and 1860, Ii Naosuke led a lethal persecution known as the Ansei Purge to silence over one hundred samurai who had opposed his policies and the candidacy of Iemochi through execution, imprisonment or banishment. Tokugawa Nariaki was placed under house arrest in his own domain of Mito, which aroused fierce resentment among the Mito samurai. Yoshida Shoin, a samurai from Hagi in Choshu and a prominent exponent of Sonno Joi, tried to hide aboard the U.S.S. Powhatan while it was anchored at Shimoda in August 1854, hoping to get to the United States. Yoshida was arrested and imprisoned for a time, but after his release he continued to spread his patriotic fervor by urging the samurai who studied at his school in Hagi to rise against the shogunate. He declared the bakufu had betrayed Japan by failing to engage the foreign threat and had forfeited its right to rule. Two of Yoshida's students at the Shoka Sonjuku, Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, would later rise to prominence during the Meiji Restoration and leave their own mark on Japanese history. After an assassination attempt against a bakufu official, Yoshida was arrested, taken to Edo and executed in 1859.

Ii Naosuke became tairo at a time when the shogunate was already under pressure from Western powers to make further concessions for open trade. Faced with mounting pressure from Townsend Harris, Ii Naosuke unilaterally agreed to a commercial treaty with the United States, but first he sought to seek formal permission from Emperor Komei in Kyoto. Already under the heavy influence of an increasingly anti-bakufu faction which opposed Naosuke and the newly appointed shogun, the emperor delayed his decision. At this point, Ii Naosuke made a dramatic decision;  he would sign the treaties with America, and later with England and France, without the emperor's consent. On July 29, 1858, Ii Naosuke signed the Harris Treaty to open Japan to trade with the United States, thereby undermining the majority of domains across the country in which strong anti-Western sentiment prevailed. After two centuries of dealing only with the Dutch, the Koreans, the Chinese, and the Ryukyu islanders, the 250-year-old Tokugawa Shogunate opened itself carefully, narrowly and hesitantly to the recently born United States.

Key items of the agreement called for a Japanese Minister and consuls to reside in the United States and an American diplomatic representative to reside in the Shogun's capital at Edo beginning January 1, 1862, and Osaka beginning January 1, 1863. American consuls could also reside in the open ports of Shimoda, Hakodate, Kanagawa, Nagasaki, Nigata, and Hyogo (modern Kobe), and could freely travel in Japan. The ports of Hakodate, Kanagawa and Nagasaki were scheduled to open for trade beginning July 1, 1859. Nigata, or some other convenient seaport on the Japan Sea would open in January 1860. Hyogo would open on January 1, 1863. The treaty also invited Japan to study naval architecture and to buy both merchant ships and warships in the United States. Should Japan ever request it, the President of the United States would agree to act as mediator between Japan and foreign powers. American consuls and, if need be, warships of the United States were obliged to extend friendly assistance to Japan everywhere within the obligations of neutrality.

Before the end of 1858, the Dutch, the Russians, the English, and the French all secured similar treaties, and the concessions gained by each treaty power extended to all the others. These treaties and subsequent agreements applied the full "unequal treaty" system developed in China to Japan. Foreign traders took up residence at the new port of Yokohama near Edo and at other treaty ports, protected by European military forces and extraterritorial privilege, while treaty limitations on Japanese tariffs opened the whole economy to the industrial production of the West. With its archaic feudal system, Japan seemed as defenseless before Western imperial expansion as the other countries of Asia that had already succumbed.

Having promised to open the tiny, unimportant fishing village of Kanagawa on July 1, 1859, Ii Naosuke opened the port city of Yokohama instead, just 30 km from Edo and off the main Tokaido highway, which meant it could easily be cut off much like Deshima at Nagasaki. During the early summer of 1859, even before the treaty took effect, large numbers of foreign traders began settling in Yokohama and began to convert its harbor into a chief port for foreign trade. Though still quite limited, commerce with the West began to increase during the 1860s and within six years Japan's imports exceeded its exports. Raw silk was the principal export commodity;  tea, copperware, lacquerware, and marine products were among the exported items. Imports included such goods as sugar, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, woolen fabrics, and ironware. Although the dominant form of production in Japan was domestic handicrafts, foreign trade had the vitally important consequence of stimulating the growth of some of Japan's factories in which many workers were brought together under a single roof.

Paying for the increased volume of imported goods caused an inordinate outflow of gold from Japan. This aspect of the foreign trade situation in Japan was particularly disturbing to the bakufu. On the world market, the silver-to-gold exchange rate was about 15:1. Because the Shogunate fixed the value of Japanese coinage independent of its metal content however, the ratio was only about 5:1 in Japan. This disparity led to enormous profiteering by foreigners who first exchanged silver for gold in Japan and then took the gold into China, where it commanded its full value on the world market. The metals exchange problem, combined with a heavy foreign demand for certain export commodities and the frantic efforts of many of the daimyo to increase their armaments, set off a severe inflationary spiral in Japan.

Townsend Harris' treaty policy fit perfectly with the expanding commercial interests of the United States;  to conserve the independence and territorial integrity of eastern nations so that none would be exploited exclusively by any one European power or group of powers. It also perfectly suited Japanese interests;  allowing Japan to conserve and develop its natural strengths until it became strong enough to upset that balance and begin to assert its own hegemony in Asia. A different Japan was beginning to stir. Things changed rapidly in Japan following the signature of the foreign treaties, even though the general mood of the country remained strongly anti-Western. Recognizing the need to train some of its officials in Western languages, the bakufu opened the "Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books" in 1857. In less than six years the institute was fully converted into a government-run college for Western studies. Many of the daimyo developed educational programs to increase the exposure of Japanese to Western culture.

In early 1860, the bakufu dispatched a diplomatic mission to the United States to exchange ratifications of the Harris Treaty. The seventy-seven member delegation, headed by Shimmi Masaaki from Buzen, Japan's first ambassador to the United States, departed Yokohama for San Francisco on February 13 aboard the U.S.S. Powhatan, escorted by the 300-ton, Dutch-built three-masted Kanrin Maru under the command of Katsu Kaishu, Dean of the Shogun's Naval Academy at Nagasaki.

The pride of Tokugawa's five-year-old Western-style navy and the first full scale western-style warship in Japan, the Kanrin Maru was intended to train Japanese to navigate the seas on their own. One of its more famous passengers was none other than Nakahama "John" Manjiro, the Tosa fisherman-turned-Tokugawa bureaucrat who was given the title Honorable Navigator-Teacher and served as an English translator for the delegation. He not only helped explain the intricacies of American culture, but was entrusted by Captain Katsu with "full navigational authority." Manjiro acquitted himself admirably, guiding the Kanrin Maru to San Francisco in 35 days including a brief stopover in Hawaii. It was the first Japanese-navigated ship to cross the Pacific. Manjiro traveled with the delegation only as far as San Francisco, where he remained to oversee ship repairs for the return journey .

The arrival of the Kanrin Maru in San Francisco with its cargo of kimono-clad samurai from Japan impressed Americans with the skill and abilities of the Japanese. They were given a warm welcome during their brief visit before the diplomats and their entourage continued their journey to Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City. While in San Francisco, Fukuzawa Yukichi, a rangaku scholar and leading proponent of Westernization, was not very impressed with many of the marvels of American technology. He noted that "there was nothing really new," and that Americans seemed to waste a lot of iron, which would have been eagerly sought after in Japan. Still, the man who later founded Keio University and helped found The Japan Times newspaper, bought a copy of Webster's dictionary one of the first copies of the reference work to arrive in Japan.

When the Japanese delegation arrived in Washington, D.C. on May 14, their elegant silk clothing and traditional samurai swords attracted considerable attention. The Japanese appeared to enjoy the warm receptions at every stop, particularly in Manhattan, where sword-wielding delegates drew large crowds during a ride through the city. America appeared as a different world to the visiting Japanese. In his diary, Second Deputy Ambassador Muragaki Norimasa wrote that Americans wrote in horizontal lines from left to right and their books begin where Japanese books end. The differences were so stark, noted Muragaki, that "their days are our nights." One aspect of American culture that caused problems for the Japanese was the food. The Japanese were not meat eaters, they hated the smell of dairy products and did not like the American way of cooking rice. About the only thing they could tolerate was wine, champagne and ice cream. Despite the sumptuous meals served them at hotels and banquets in their honor, most of the delegation nearly starved.

The presence of women at official ceremonies and banquets astonished the Japanese, who were equally puzzled by the courtesy American men showed to women. They were also quite surprised to discover that President James Buchanan wore no swords and dressed and behaved just like an ordinary person. In an article written by President Buchanan published in the June 2, 1860, edition of Harper's Weekly he expressed surprise that,

"They never speak to me without calling me Emperor and His Majesty. They can't understand me at all. To think that I, the Emperor of the United States, should go down among and shake hands with the people astonished them wonderfully."

One American institution the Japanese found particularly perplexing was the United States Congress. Following a visit to Capitol Hill on May 23, Muragaki Norimasa wrote in his diary, "the scene in Congress we viewed today - we whispered among ourselves - resembled that of a fish market in Nihonbashi." Despite the mutual amazement expressed on both sides, the first official Japanese visit to the United States was deemed a great success. The following year, in 1861, Japan dispatched yet another major diplomatic mission to Europe. Between these two trips abroad, a number of influential Japanese returned home convinced of the need to adopt Western practices and institutions.

The decision to enter into commercial and diplomatic relations with the West proved to be politically disastrous for the Tokugawa Shogunate. Ii Naosuke, who did nothing to strengthen the bakufu or institute effective economic reforms, came under severe criticism for having signed the treaty without imperial approval. The apparent high-handedness of his actions, his clear insult to Emperor Komei and the House of Mito and the bloody Ansei Purge left him with few supporters. After forcing Lord Hotta Masayoshi into retirement and exile, the bakufu's conservative faction felt honor-bound to avenge the deaths of their fellow samurai.

A light snow fell during the early morning of March 3, 1860, as Senior Minister Ii Naosuke rode quietly in his palanquin from his mansion near Edo Castle to the Shogun's Court, escorted by about 60 samurai. As the procession neared the Sakurada Gate of Edo Castle, a small group of 17 former samurai of the Mito domain waited nearby, their razor edged swords hidden beneath their snow capes. The loud gunshot that signaled the ambush startled the guards, whose overconfidence in the shogun's power caused them to make the fatal mistake of riding with their swords covered. The ronin charged wildly into the procession with their swords drawn and began cutting down Naosuke's guards. Wearing heavy straw overcoats, the guards could not mount an instant counterattack and quickly lost control of the fight. Some of the attackers quickly broke through to the palanquin and began repeatedly thrusting their swords into the covered sedan chair, mortally wounding the senior minister. In a rage, they dragged Ii Naosuke's bloody body from the palanquin and beheaded him with a stroke of the sword. One could almost hear the death knell of the Tokugawa Shogunate in the silence that followed.

News of the assassination spread quickly, but it was almost two weeks before the Shogun's Court made any official announcement. With the strongest of the Shogun's ministers and the champion of the foreign treaties out of the way, exclusionists led by Tokugawa Nariaki quickly moved back into positions of power. Nariaki never enjoyed the benefits of his victory, for he died in his home domain of Mito on September 29, 1860. Ironically, Ii Naosuke's successors in government discovered they could not undo what had already been done. Japan was now involved in foreign trade agreements with the West and the country was on a path toward modernization. Ii Naosuke's assassination caused a sharp turn in the Japanese political scene.

With Ii out of the way, control of the bakufu fell to more moderate men who sought to neutralize the shishi while simultaneously affecting a cooperative alliance between the Imperial Court and the bakufu known as kobu gattai, "union of the court and military." The shishi were adamantly opposed to this new policy and launched a terror campaign, assassinating those who supported Ii Naosuke and kobu gattai. Another target of their vengeance was, naturally enough, foreigners. While the business of trade got under way between Western adventurers and Japanese entrepreneurs, political circles continued cutting each other's throats both literally and figuratively.